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tahanson43206,
The optical / thermal power input must increase slightly to achieve thrust closer to 10kN (for a 1kg/s propellant flow rate). I used the wrong temperature for achieving 1,000s Isp, but that was my target Isp for the design, because it reflected the maximum temperature that the engineers who worked on Project Timberwind believed was attainable using then-known ceramics.
I agree with GW about using the H2 propellant as regenerative engine coolant.
I don't think a 240m long quartz window heat pipe is very practical, so maybe I'm missing something, but you need purpose-built photon collectors and then you need a purpose-built rocket engine to dump the thermal power into the propellant to generate thrust.
Dr Clark,
All the personal attacks against Elon Musk, for whatever your personal motivations happen to be, won't solve a thing.
tahanson43206,
Yes, testing can be performed with N2 vs H2. This is fairly common. The safety equipment required for using H2 as the test propellant dictates some fairly extreme equipment costs. Only a well-equipped university labs or NASA ion engine test facilities would have that kind of equipment. Performance values can be extrapolated.
H2 mass flow rate (mdot) was anticipated to be around 1kg/s. I think I originally empirically derived H2 flow rates obtained from NERVA documentation.
Target / desired Isp was 1,000s, which is how the 40MWth input figure was derived.
I believe 3,200K corresponds with a 1,000s Isp using H2 as the propellant, NOT the 2,750K I originally used.
Target thrust level was 10 kiloNewtons vs the 1kN I kept referencing. My memory is not what it used to be. Apologies.
Thrust = g0 * Isp * mdot
9,806.65N = 9.80665 * 1,000s * 1kg/s
mdot = Thrust / (Isp * g0)
1kg/s = 9,806.65N / (1,000s * 9.80665)
Isp = Ve / g0
1,000s = 9,806.65m/s / 9.80665
That all seems to check out.
We'll use 14,300J/kgK as the Specific Heat Capacity of Hydrogen gas, but the real input energy is here:
NIST - Hydrogen Specific Heat Capacity
14,300J * 3,200K = 45,760,000J/s of input thermal energy
1 Watt = 1 Joule per second
45,760,000J/s = 45,760,000W/hr
45.76MW <- Closer to actual input energy requirement
I think I remember what I initially did wrong. I miscalculated the temperature required. I think I used 2,750K or something like that.
14,300J * 2,750K = 39,325,000J/s <-- That was indeed my mistake
So...
45.76MW / 0.95 CoP = 48.168MW <-- This is closer to our true input optical power requirement, after accounting for 5% losses in the optical array. There will be some additional power losses involved with heating of the core. We need GW to tell us what those might be.
Aircraft Carrier Hull Design
Forrestal's hull dimensions and displacement remains the minimum size for an effective mobile air base capable of 45 day minimally supported contingency deployments. Smaller hulls force too many capability compromises. Larger hulls help with longer deployments, but only to a point. You still need to replenish the jet fuel at least once per week, especially if you insist on using heavy fighters. We have deeper onboard reserves than that, but replenishment at sea is not like shopping at a store that magically appears whenever you need it to. There was rarely a week that went by during OEF without an UNREP event scheduled, unless it was a transit period with little to no flying. That's why the argument for using nuclear power seems so ludicrous to me. A fast fleet replenishment ship that's already supplying food, ordnance, and jet fuel, may as well deliver ship's fuel for the carrier at the same time, which it's already supplying to all other ships in the battle group. You keep everything topped-up in case there's a resupply problem.
The Heavy Fighter Resource Trap
The physical size / weight of modern "heavy fighter" naval aircraft and their associated fuel consumption rates are far too high. The complexity and frequency of airframe maintenance activities is well in excess of what can be tolerated while under real threat of air attack. The confluence of these factors limits the total number of aircraft carried and the total number of sorties generated per day, thus the total number of aircraft an adversary has to defend against. Regardless of what is theoretically possible, real naval aircraft are normally "broken" in some material way after each sortie, repaired overnight, and then returned to mission capable status the following morning. This is why it doesn't seem to matter how fast you can theoretically shoot aircraft off the end using fancier electromagnetic catapults. After they land, the pilot will have a list of squawks for the maintainers to fix. Beyond that, aircrew have mandatory rest periods, they have bodily functions like everyone else, and they need time to plan / brief / de-brief missions. Asking them to fly more than once per day is little different than asking them to squeeze extra hours into the day. If you want more sorties, then you need more planes and pilots, period.
No Living Memory Carrier Warfare Experience
No two nations equipped with carrier-based combat planes have ever fought each other in a modern air war. American aircraft carriers haven't fought a competent land-based aviation threat, either. To my knowledge, the North Korean, North Vietnamese, and Iraqi Air Forces were never able to mount a competent attack against our carriers. The results of two modern carrier battle groups fighting each other is likely to be very messy and expensive. If one side has twice as many air assets available to throw into a battle, then despite one side or the other fielding literal handfuls of hyper-capable stealthy heavy fighters, it won't matter if the other overwhelms the other with sheer numbers. Your heavy fighter can only be in one place at one time, it can only carry so many missiles. If that heavy fighter also spends most of its time in a hangar for repairs, then it still contributes less to the battle's result.
Inevitable Battle Damage Consequences
If the Soviet Union ever decided to launch a maximum effort cruise missile attack against an American carrier battle group during the Cold War, at the very least our air defenses would've been overwhelmed, with the likely end result of at least one missile hit. The fire damage caused to USS Forrestal from about a dozen accidental bomb / rocket / missile warhead detonations on her flight deck aptly illustrated what would happen to a carrier if a salvo of heavy cruise missile warheads found their mark. Forrestal was in no danger of sinking, but she was out of action for about 6 months while repairs were effected. A 24/7 war emergency repair effort probably could've put her back together in 3 months, but likely not much faster than that. BTW, I consider "heavy cruise missiles" to be ones with 1,000lb / 500kg class warheads, such as the BGM-109 Tomahawk, Russian 3M54 Kalibr, and Chinese Shangyou (Silkworm). Even if literal handfuls of personnel are killed, we can't replace them or repair their ships fast enough.
Air Wing Composition
We need significant numbers of small agile single engine fighters, not to do battle with the enemy's heavy fighters, but to locate drone and cruise missile threats inbound to our carriers, and to begin dispatching them. We need a small number of stealthy special mission aircraft that perform recon missions- essentially hunting for enemy ships. We need very significant numbers of drone / cruise missile / long range sensor carrier hybrids that can be configured as expendable low-cost munitions capable of inflicting serious damage. We're not going to intentionally send our fighters or special mission aircraft against heavily defended targets. Why would we? Why would we play stupid games with Integrated Air Defense Systems- deliberately designed to detect / track / kill anything that flies.
Defensive Armaments
A MVP carrier should heavily prioritize point defenses against drones and cruise missiles over longer-range systems designed to shoot down ballistic missiles or heavy fighters, which ought to remain aboard the escorting air warfare destroyers / cruisers. For example, I don't think there's much point to having a literal handful of ESSM aboard a carrier. It costs a lot of money to maintain the specialized weapons mount, you need dedicated support personnel for that specific system, you create pointless resupply logistical challenges, and the idea that each carrier needs 8X ESSM to fire at targets dozens of miles from the carrier, which the aircraft and all escorts somehow missed, but the carrier did not... is rather curious. I think smaller caliber guns, perhaps 76mm, equipped with these newer self-guided projectiles, should be evaluated for their capabilities against incoming sea-skimmers moving at up to Mach 3. If they do well, then we equip the carrier with perhaps 12 such guns. Maybe a mix of guns and missiles works best. Some realistic testing is required here, rather than the highly-scripted scenarios used in typical weapons testing.
Defensive Sensors
EMCON is going to be pretty important for staying alive and not advertising your position to everyone within several hundred miles. Rather than radars designed to range out to several hundred miles, highly precise maps of everything to the visible horizon should be prioritized, which greatly aids situational awareness within the critical defensive zone around the ship. As I stated previously, the primary major threats are going to be low-flying stealthy drones and missiles. Any missiles moving at fantastic speed and heights are going to get noticed rather quickly and from relatively far away. Whether the missile is moving at Mach 6 but gets detected 100 miles away, or is detected only after the visible horizon is breached, your reaction time is likely roughly the same and your options are equally limited. You're not going to launch a SM-6 against a cruise missile 10 miles away, in much the same way that you're not shooting down a hypersonic ballistic warhead with an over-glorified Sidewinder. Maybe you theoretically can, but it's a waste of valuable air defense missiles in both cases.
Carrier and Air Wing Design Concept of Operation Rationalization
The net net of those plainly observable facts is that we need many more carriers with more fighters, not far fewer larger nuclear powered carriers equipped with perhaps 3 squadrons of heavy fighters at most. We need to field far more aicraft if we're operating within several hundred miles of land air bases, not ever-larger and ever-more-capable aircraft which, through dint-of-fact that each pilot or AI only receives so many training flight hours per year, is only marginally trained for any given mission / target set. Even an AI requires realistic mission-tailored-training. For example, training a refueling drone to perform pentration strikes is rather silly. Adding the capability costs real money, assuming the capability is real, but no usable capability is acquired by doing so. The latest info on drone operation vs piloted aicraft operation, in terms of availability rates / cost / maintenance schedules, indicates that there is no real cost or time advantage conferred by using highly capable combat drones. Nobody's mother and father will lose their son or daughter if the drone accidentally crashes or gets shot down, but when that happens whatever capability it provided is still lost to error or enemy action.
tahanson43206,
After reading through, I'm genuinely impressed by how much work ChatGPT has enabled you to undertake on this idea I had. Whatever improvements were made between the answers it provided regarding transporting of shelf-stable chemicals to be converted into rocket fuel, on-orbit, and this work on photonic propulsion, I approve.
If there's a mere kernel of truth to what Will Lockett is asserting about Starship's design being highly mass-constrained because it's already over its target inert weight, then there are alternative steels that will perform better than 304L. Stainless does a lot of things fairly well, but austenitic stainless yield strength and ultimate corrosion resistance are very pedestrian when compared to alternative options. I've stated this before, in this very thread, I think, but austenitic stainless steel is a poor structural steel when compared to other now-viable alternative cryogenic-capable steels, such as Mangalloy (high-Manganese steel alloys). Mangalloys have minimum yield strengths ranging between 58ksi and 78ksi. 304L stainless steels have minimum yield strength of 25ksi, and ultimate tensile strength of 70ksi. That means a Mangalloy is 2X as strong as 304L, at a minimum, and could be over 3X stronger than 304L.
Mangalloys don't do quite as well as austenitic stainless steels in V-notch tests at cryogenic temperatures, but they're still a very strong runner-up to stainless. As far as strength at elevated temperatures goes, Mangalloy is stronger until you reach temperatures where both steels become silly putty. There are trade-offs associated with every type of steel, which is why we have so many varieties to choose from.
If you require optimal corrosion protection, either from LOX or elevated temperatures associated with atmospheric reentry, there is no stainless steel I'm aware of that performs nearly as well as a Silicon-based CVD coating. It's not even close. There's a mountain of testing and real world use case evidence behind these coatings, which is why they're used in high temperature corrosive chemical processing plants where stainless fails, the oil and gas industry which exposes their piping and instruments to elevated temperatures and corrosive chemicals, and marine applications.
When your base steel structure is 3X stronger than 304L, as well as significantly cheaper than any grade of stainless, you can afford to build a lot more rockets without spending a lot of money. More importantly, you can achieve significant mass reduction on top of the base structural material cost reduction, which then leads to even more cost reduction. Making the vehicle 25% to 35% lighter is realistic, while still being significantly stronger than a vehicle made from 304L. What would a 35% mass reduction do for a Starship? Quite a lot. The engines don't need any more performance than they already have. If pushing the engines to their limits is part of the issue, then a significantly lighter vehicle will help.
Maximum allowable stress for a 304L welded tube / pipe (like a propellant feed line) is 14.9ksi, at least if you're following ASME BPVC. Well... That's very low compared to something "exotic" like A36 (one of the most common and cheapest types of structural steels, generally considered inadequate for any aerospace uses), which would still be 24ksi. While A36 won't survive cryogenic exposure, Mangalloy will. So... If we're running up against weight and strength issues, a cheaper steel with good mechanical properties at low and high temperatures, as well as a much greater strength reserve, is going to serve SpaceX better than 304L. Nobody with any sense attempts to fabricate buildings or ship hulls from stainless- the strength is too low, the cost too high, the corrosion resistance is not as great as cheaper alternatives, and the weight increase associated with using a weaker steel is too significant to merit its use outside of highly specialized use cases where more than one factor warrants its use.
I can't know if this Will Lockett fellow is "over-the-target", so-to-speak, or not, but if he's merely somewhere near the target, then perhaps someone at SpaceX ought to consider alternative fabrication materials. "The Angry Astronaut" makes a good point about Bill Gerstenmeier knowing a thing or two about aerospace engineering. If Bill thought this wouldn't work, he would've said something or left the company.
tahanson43206,
Unfortunately, I'm very sick right now, so I won't be joining.
RobertDyck,
kbd512, you have argued for American supercarriers because you're familiar with them.
I advocated for them on the basis of the capabilities they provide (a true "air force in a box"), and the simple fact that the Forrestals were not terribly expensive ships to purchase and operate. They were less than half as expensive as the Enterprise or Nimitz classes in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars. They would've been even less expensive without the 8 sponson-mounted 5-inch guns that caused so many design issues. Modern power and propulsion options (SCO2 or SOFCs) would make Forrestals drastically less expensive to operate, because fuel burn rates would be on-par with LM2500-powered destroyers. The cost to construct modern warships is not a function of their displacement or physical dimensions. A 25,300t LPD-17 class ship costs less to construct than a 9,900t Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyer, in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars. The cost difference is explained by all the expensive weaponry and sensors that the Arleigh Burke carries. The equipment cost of a warship frequently exceededs its hull construction cost.
However, I understand the argument that Canada will typically operate fighters from land bases. It has good points in its favor, but the probability of it surviving a sneak attack is low unless that assets are spread between multiple air bases, in which case there's not much available air power at any given location. Still, if this is how Canada wishes to operate its national defense, then I think it will work well enough, at least until the shooting starts, and then serious air defense missile batteries are required to keep an air base intact.
After checking the physical dimensions of the dry dock in your largest ship yard, I have now come to the same conclusion that an indigenous super carrier is out of the question for Canada. However, a ship the size of USS Makin Island (LHD-8) could be built there. Makin Island is 257m long, has a beam of 31.8m, draft is 8.1m, and at around 40,150t full load displacement, it fits the description of a large modern "light carrier".
USS Makin Island equipped with extra F-35Bs:
RobertDyck,
Why have a mobile air base when a stationary one is less expensive, less vulnerable, and Canada doesn't invade other countries?
If China or Russia conducted a sneak attack against Canadian air bases, then they might destroy aircraft sitting on the ground there, or at least immobilize them by cratering the runway they require to takeoff and land, before an effective defense or counter-attack can be mounted. After Canada's air assets are either destroyed on the ground or otherwise rendered inoperative for lack of a runway to operate them from, even a purely defensive response becomes more difficult. Did you pay attention to what the Russians did to Ukraine's air bases at the outset of the war? If the destruction of Ukrainian air bases was not enough of a wake up call, then how about the damage done to Israeli and Iranian air bases?
A stationary air base is not nearly as difficult to attack as a mobile air base. Air bases remain exactly where they were from the time they were built until the time they're closed, so finding one only requires a small observation satellite or an airborne radar sensor aircraft, which could be located hundreds of miles away if it's at high altitude. Land based long wavelength over-the-horizon radars possessed by Russia and China can also create target images of our air bases. You don't need expensive guidance electronics and sophisticated onboard sensors to launch a weapon against a fixed point on the surface of the Earth. The moment your target is mobile and can be relocated to a different ZIP code inside of 30 minutes, the sophistication of both the target detection / tracking solution and the weapons used to conduct a successful attack goes up exponentially. To successfully attack an airbase, a ballistic missile or glide bomb using purely inertial guidance is sufficient. The cost of glide bombs is about equal to 155mm artillery shells. The ballistic missiles are obviously more expensive, but the speed of the attack is much greater, so there's less time to defend against it. To attack a carrier battle group, you need cruise missiles with radars or imaging infrared sensors, off-board inertial guidance delivered via jam-resistant data links, and remote airborne or satellite sensors capable of finding and tracking the carrier. That is far easier said than done. If you knew a carrier's last position, as of 15 minutes ago, that's not good enough. If the carrier was moving at only 20 knots, then it's already 5.75 statute miles away from the position where it was last spotted. The carrier could be anywhere within an 8.625 mile radius if it was moving at 30 knots.
The counter-argument in favor of large air bases is that they can and typically do launch more sorties per day, in comparison to a super carrier. That is especially true for the US Air Force, but only because they have as many or more aircraft stationed there as can be carried aboard an aircraft carrier, aerial refueling tankers, labor-saving devices for rearming planes which are not present aboard a carrier, a host of other aviation support assets such as ISR and CSAR, and defense-in-depth of said air base, which is largely provided by the Army (Patriot and THAAD) or Navy (the AEGIS Combat System has the ability to guide any weapon from any ship using data links, namely SM3 / SM6 / ESSM / RAM, and the fully integrated electronic warfare suite used to jam or decoy inbound missiles). This is great for the US Air Force, but the last time they operated in contested air space was the Viet Nam War, and numerous aircraft were destroyed on the ground by surprise artillery barrages. The runways were also cratered. They were repaired, but that took time. Meanwhile, the Navy and other air bases had to provide air support to help repel the attack while repairs were effected. The air base in question was defended by SAM batteries, but those weapons were useless against incoming artillery shells. Canadian air bases may be located far enough inland to prevent that kind of simplistic attack from being effective, but that also means they're far enough away that immediate retaliation is not an option.
Fighter aircraft like the Hornet or F-35 are small enough to store in hardened aircraft shelters with their ground support equipment. I've never seen hardened shelters for aerial refueling aircraft. B-2s get their own shelters because there's only 20 of them and they're strategic assets. Maybe Canada could do something similar for their tanker fleet, but will they? I'm sure more and larger shelters could be built, but at that point we're talking about serious money being sunk into air bases so-equipped. If SAM batteries and facilities hardening don't grant near-immunity to an attack, that's a serious problem. The point is, you're never going to get a "cheap but good" solution. The solution will always be a major compromise so as to be cost-justifiable by your politicians.
At a more fundamental level, do you think Canada has sufficient air power to stop surprise Russian and Chinese attacks (from something as simplistic and low-cost as a mass drone barrage launched from a Russian container ship in response to Canadian support for Ukraine)?
The Israelis and Americans ran out of missiles to intercept the barrage of missiles and drones launched by Iran. If Iran had the resources of Russia or China, they could launch waves of attacks, as-seen in Ukraine, and then all the previously defended air bases and cities start getting hit because there are no interceptor missiles left. That has happened numerous times to both the Ukrainians and Russians. They have an effective defense until the missiles run out, and then the lack of AAA assets means there's not even an effective point-defense to backstop running out of missiles. In the mass attack launched by Iran, American Eagles scrambled to intercept resorted to firing their cannons after they ran out of Sidewinders and AMRAAMs, which they immediately stopped doing because when the drone or missile warheads detonated from being struck by the 20mm cannon shells, they spread shrapnel in the flight path of the Eagles. The risk of "shooting yourself down" was too great for that tactic to be effective.
The real lesson to be learned there is that AAA cannons for air bases and ships are not a "dead technology" as a means of effective point defense, because modern radar-guided AAA has been shown to be a viable interception tool when used against comparatively cheap and slower drones and missiles. The Shahed 136 drone can deliver a 50kg warhead to a distance of about 1,600 miles. That means anybody with a cargo container ship could feasibly launch hundreds of them at an air base, and some of them will inevitably make it through the missile defenses and fighter patrols.
Asserting that the US will help is to ignore the timeline for an effective response to be mounted. It takes at least 4 to 6 hours for aircraft to be scrambled in numbers from US air bases, 24 hours for carriers to be deployed from naval bases in CONUS, so the attack is likely to have already destroyed whatever air assets Canada has, before any reinforcements show up. In short, there's no "magic button" that America can press to fight back if the attack occurs more than a thousand miles from the nearest friendly units. As such, any allied nation which values its own military had better make sure that they can at least repel an attack long enough for help to arrive. If we have some inkling that an attack is likely, then of course we'll try to pre-position assets to intercept, but that typically only works against known military assets like Russian Tu-95 bombers and their warships.
If Canada did have carriers, of whatever size Canadian military experts deem most appropriate, and enough of them were built to keep at least 2 deployed at-sea at all times, the timeline for an effective counter-attack is considerably reduced, to the point that the Russians or Chinese are far less assured of being able to effectively "ground" Canadian air assets when they're needed most. America has so many military assets, spread over such a large area, that the results from a surprise attack doing much more than steeling American resolve to lay waste to the attacker is non-existent.
As 9/11 and Pearl Harbor proved, if you're willing to die for your cause, you absolutely can successfully attack America in a big and highly destructive way, but you should fully expect that any military capabilities you had will be reduced to near-zero afterwards, irrespective of how long that takes or how costly it proves to be. Despite that simple fact of history, our reaction has never been an effective deterrent against attacking America.
These are the real military capabilities aircraft carriers confer that air bases do not:
1. To generally forego the destructive results of a surprise attack by being mobile and therefore unpredictable
If you had 4 light carriers and all of them were in different physical locations, there's probably not a realistic attack scenario which can disable or destroy all of them at or near the same time.
2. To rapidly strike back against an attacker following a surprise attack
Swiftly "returning the favor" is an under-appreciated aspect of carriers.
3. To support ground maneuver elements without moving the aircraft nearer to the enemy
Enemy troops can walk to an air base, but they can't swim to an aircraft carrier unless it's anchored. Attacking a carrier battle group in small boats is not a realistic option. You need your own blue water naval assets if you wish to engage prudently operated aircraft carriers, which use hit-and-run strikes and movement to confound attempts to sink the carrier. This fixes the "minimum complexity solution" that any potential adversary can effectively employ to neutralize Canadian air power, and that bar is set fairly high. In the real world, there's never been an effective submarine attack against a carrier. These fictional "carrier sinking scenarios" always begin with conveniently co-locating the submarine and aircraft carrier. If the submarine had to move underwater at 20 knots to at least keep pace with a carrier, then it's going to make enough noise to be detectable. After the ASW helos fix its location, it's probably not going to survive. There's far more mythology to submarine capabilities than real world equivalence. However, when operated at low speeds, they make fantastic stealthy first-strike platforms that can do a lot of damage in a hurry. The majority of ships sunk or seriously damaged since WWII received bomb or missile hits or they struck a mine. If I had a sizeable fleet of attack submarines, I would use them as the excellent first-strike weapons that they are (against commercial ships or land targets that can't fight back), and only reluctantly attempt to engage carriers with them if no better options were available. I'd much rather lose an entire squadron of heavy fighters and expend several hundred cruise missiles to successfully attack a carrier, than lose an attack sub in an ill-advised attack wherein multiple ships have the opportunity to sink my sub.
4. To rapidly distribute supplies to friendly forces or humanitarian aid after a natural disaster
The ability of carriers to deliver badly needed consumables, or to medevac any injured or wounded, in a timely manner, is very under-appreciated. Smaller ships can and will do this to a limited degree, but a purpose-built ship has capacity that destroyers lack. If there's a mud slide or fire or earth quake that destroys a town, a nearby carrier is like "manna from heaven". Even the smallest carriers have cavernous hangar bays that can be packed to the gills with food and water, or a makeshift trauma triage center set up in the hangar bay to treat the wounded. Purpose-built ships are even better, but spendy, and you don't get to use them very often.
5. To provide a top-notch air crew training program that creates aviators with superb basic airmanship skills, useful for saving stricken airliners
Flying from aircraft carriers forces air crews to become better aviators because maneuvers must be more precise, greater attention to detail is exercised when it comes to the aircraft's "health" is required (there's very little of the usual "we'll try flying this marginally mission capable plane, just for the hours"), weather briefs are considered a critical integral element of every flight brief rather than a check in the block, great effort is spent detailing alternative ingress and egress routes to get yourself out of trouble (from bad weather and enemy action), and an absolute mastery of emergency procedures is necessary, so that the response to a safety-of-flight incident is instant and decisive. Most fast jet pilots are pretty decisive in the cockpit, but naval aviation takes it to another level. You cannot be complacent or indecisive or gloss over details while operating jet aircraft from a ship, or people will die. I don't doubt that there are more than a few Air Force and Army aviators who are every bit as well-trained and detail-oriented, but all of them said they learned something on exchange tours to become carrier qualified.
RobertDyck,
The smaller French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, may not require refueling at-sea, but they only have 45 days of food onboard, so irrespective of whether or not they need to refuel, they still require UNREP every 2 weeks or so to remain at sea for any significant period of time, even when they're not burning any jet fuel by conducting flights ops.
I consider 40,000t to be the lower limit for useful aircraft carrier capability when operating at least 3 squadrons of jet aircraft, although 60,000t provides significant better capability, and an 80,000t to 110,000t full load displacement provides full super carrier capabilities, because the mass allocation increase allows the carrier to be large enough to store significant amounts of food, fresh water, fuel, aviation ordnance, spare parts, and of course, multiple squadrons of jet aircraft. Smaller aircraft carriers make a lot more sense if the aircraft are smaller and burn less fuel. That is why I suggested repurposing Textron AirLand's Scorpion. If heavy fighters will be operated, then you really need a larger carrier. The Phantom, Tomcat, Rafale, Super Hornet, Lightning II, various navalized Flanker derivatives produced by Sukhoi or Shenyang, and the new Shenyang J-35 are all heavy fighters which require extreme logistical support. I use the term "heavy fighter" to describe any fighter aircraft with a MTOW similar to or greater than a Boeing B-17 or Consolidated B-24 bomber from WWII, both of which had MTOWs of 65,000lbs. The Scorpion's MTOW is 22,000lbs, so it's literally a third of the weight of those other fighters.
Fully laden modern combat jets are around 1/3rd fuel by weight, because they have to be, as a function of their extreme weight and the requirement for extreme amounts of thrust to push them through the air. A B-17 or B-24 carries a similar number of gallons of internal fuel to a heavy fighter, and their cruising range with a modest ordnance load is remarkably similar, even though they travel at slower speeds. This is an indicator that you can do lots of things to optimize aerodynamics when you have a high thrust-to-weight ratio power plant and optimized airframe, but you're not going to "cheat" basic flight physics. Carrying a given payload to a specific distance, whether done using lower speeds / larger airframes / less engine power or much smaller airframe (reduced wetted area) with far greater engine power, your total fuel burn for an optimized airframe and flight profile is remarkably similar across WWII radial piston engines to turboprops to primitive turbojets to modern afterburning turbofans. Modern fighter jet climb rate / turn rate / acceleration performance greatly exceeds that of a B-17, but you end up burning just as much fuel as a WWII era strategic heavy bomber to achieve that performance.
The net net is that operating the consumption-equivalent of WWII era strategic heavy bombers off of aircraft carriers either requires a lot of fuel and space to put those heavy fighters, or very few jets can be carried. I feel like the ship size comparisons below will provide a visual perspective regarding how large of a ship we're talking about.
USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and Charles de Gaulle steaming in the Med, for size comparison purposes, 16 May 2001:
USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74), USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), Charles de Gaulle, and HMS Ocean, 18 April 2002:
This is what the French are planning to build to replace Charles de Gaulle (75,000t full load displacement):
What the world thought of as "the first super carriers" (the Forrestal class), were in fact the smallest ships realistically capable of extended duration blue water operation.
USS Forrestal (CV-59), 31 May 1962:
USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), 23 April 1964:
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), 4 June 2020:
Edit:
For comparison purposes USS Midway (CV-41), as she appeared in 1945 (45,000t), 1957, and 1970 (64,000t):
The Midway class carriers were generally thought of as poor blue water carriers (their bows were frequently drenched with salt spray unless the sea was calm), a function of too little freeboard (distance between the waterline and the flight deck). Their internal volume and displacement was insufficient to provide similar capabilities to the Forrestal class. The US Navy operated them for so long because replacement super carriers competed with other dubious spending priorities (nuclear powered carriers) and they already had 3 Midway class carriers in service. The Midway class embodied what the 24-ship Essex class carriers should have been. If the Essex class had not been so limited in upgradability, it's probable that the Navy would've continued to operate those carriers until the Cold War ended, with various mid-life upgrades and refurbishment activities taking place over the decades of service. Quantity has a quality of its own, so if we had built 32 Midway class carriers, there'd be little need for the follow-on classes (Forrestal, Kitty Hawk, Enterprise, Nimitz) of super carriers. We built 19 of those super carriers. 32 upgraded Midway class carriers could've provided like-kind capability, probably for a lot less money, at least until the Cold War ended.
USS Midway (CV-41, Midway class, top left), USS Teddy Roosevelt (CVN-71, Nimitz class, top right), USS Ranger (CV-61, Forrestal class, bottom left), USS America (CV-66, Kitty Hawk class, bottom right), 2 March 1991:
RobertDyck,
I'm not sure what you had in mind, but a ship the size of a super carrier would require 8 OK-900A reactors to provide 208MW of propulsive power. The 8 reactor compartments carried by Enterprise weighed about 13,208t. To that figure you must add the weight of the geared steam turbines. 4,000,000 gallons of F-76 weighs about 12,882t for reference purposes. Unlike a nuclear reactor, that weight will be situated in the lowest portion of the ship's hull, where it aids in maintaining stability in rough weather. Most or nearly all of Enterprise's reactor weight was situated below the waterline, so that's good, but still not as good as fuel in the fuel bunkers. At least some ships of the Nimitz class, interestingly enough, have a slight list due to a weight distribution problems, although I don't think the reactors were the cause of the list, but I can't recall.
USS Nimitz covered 100,395 statute miles during 321 consecutive days at sea while the COVID pandemic was in full swing. To the best of my knowledge, that represents the greatest total number of miles covered during a single carrier battle group deployment. There was every incentive to minimize at-sea replenishment activities to slow or prevent the spread of COVID.
100,395 / 7,704 hours = 13.0315mph / 11.332 knots <- average speed of travel
Q: Why did USS Nimitz travel at that speed?
A: Her escorts don't have nuclear power, so she had to deliberately keep her speed slow enough that her escorts wouldn't require constant fuel replenishment.
At that cruising speed, a SCO2 powered Kitty Hawk class aircraft carrier would burn 2,355,241.2 gallons of fuel, or a little more than half of her 4,000,000 gallon diesel fuel load. The historical steam boiler powered Kitty Hawk class would burn 7,065,723.6 gallons of fuel, so she would require at least one UNREP event to replenish her fuel oil bunkers, probably two since they don't like it when the ship's fuel load drops below 50%. That said, if you have SCO2 power and you're going to travel that slowly, then the carrier doesn't need any fuel replenishment for a very long time.
My brain still understands how to count, so it can't concoct a reality-based scenario where a carrier either leaves all her escorts behind to prove that she can sail off at 30 knots ('cause nuclear power, man!), and it also understands that making every ship in the battle group nuclear powered is a total non-starter on cost alone. If I'm more than doubling the cost of the carrier, then I want to know what it is that I'm actually "saving" by switching to nuclear power. I have a capability I cannot use for double the cost of the alternative. Maybe that made perfect sense to Admiral Rickover, but it makes no sense to me, because I'd rather have 2 CV-63s (with drastically more efficient propulsion) for the price of 1 CVN-68. I can purchase 7 CV-63s for the price of 1 CV-78. There is no capability that 1 CVN-78 possesses which makes it worth the price of 7 CV-63s.
During operation "prove that a nuclear ship doesn't require at-sea fuel replenishment", aka "Operation Sea Orbit", in 1964, USS Enterprise, USS Long Beach, and USS Bainbridge (all nuclear powered) sailed 30,216 miles during 57 consecutive days at sea, which means their speed was 22.09mph, or slightly less than 19.21 knots.
Could a SCO2 powered Kitty Hawk class sail at 19 knots for 1,368 hours without fuel replenishment?
Basic math says it could, for a lot less money.
What, then, is the actual point of having a singular all-nuclear carrier battlegroup or a battlegroup where only the carrier is nuclear powered?
Sea Orbit was a theatrical stunt concocted by Vice Admiral John S. McCain, Jr, who wanted to "prove" that nuclear powered ships don't require replenishment oilers. This is facially absurd, though, since all the aircraft were still powered by jet fuel. No actual warfighting capability is added by such stunts. While those ships were all quite capable for their era, leaving your sub chasers and radar picket ships behind is a better than average way to get your carrier sunk.
What military problem are you solving for by equipping a singular ship with a nuclear reactor?
Edit:
Apologies, RobertDyck, but I used the fuel burn rate data for the wrong ship in my above calculations. It was late when I first wrote that and I had a headache. I realized my error almost as soon as I posted it, but decided to leave it there. My data comes from a research paper from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, entitled "Predicting Ship Fuel Consumption: Update, by David A. Schrady, Gordon K. Smyth, Robert B. Vassian, July, 1996". The code for the paper is "ADA313847.pdf".
Kitty Hawk's historical burn rate at 11.1 knots was 2,482gph, so a SCO2 power plant would burn approximately 827.33gph, which means 4,835hrs of plant operation at 13.0315mph. That implies 63,004 statute miles of range, so 1 UNREP even to replenish the ship's fuel bunkers would be required to travel 100,395 statute miles at 13.0315mph, using a SCO2 power plant. Even so, I think that accurately illustrates how silly the "range anxiety" problem is. When Nimitz made her record deployment, she did take on fuel for her air wing many times, though, so the idea that a nuclear powered ship requires no fuel replenishment remains a fantasy. There is no such thing as operating a super carrier (as a mobile airfield) without underway fuel replenishment.
RobertDyck,
US DLA FY2024 list price for F76 diesel / distillate fuel for ships, is $3.54 per gallon:
Defense Logistics Agency - Standard Fuel Prices in Dollars - FY 2024 Budget Estimate - Fuel Short List - FY 2024 Fuel Price
Over 50 years, all 4 carriers would burn approximately 1.2 billion gallons of F76 marine fuel oil, which works out to $4.248B, or $84.96M USD per year.
Ignoring refueling costs, the price to construct and decommission the pair of reactors for an aircraft carrier works out to around $2B USD per ship, using costing figures from 28 years ago. I can promise you that it costs more money now.
LIFE-CYCLE COSTS FOR NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ARE GREATER THAN FOR CONVENTIONALLY POWERED CARRIERS
A nuclear-powered carrier costs about $8.1 billion, or about 58 percent, more than a conventionally powered carrier to acquire, operate and support for 50 years, and then to inactivate. The investment cost for a nuclear-powered carrier is more than $6.4 billion, which we estimate is more than double that for a conventionally powered carrier. Annually, the costs to operate and support a nuclear carrier are almost 34 percent higher than those to operate and support a conventional carrier. In addition, it will cost the Navy considerably more to inactivate and dispose of a nuclear carrier (CVN) than a conventional carrier (CV) primarily because the extensive work necessary to remove spent nuclear fuel from the reactor plant and remove and dispose of the radiologically contaminated reactor plant and other system components.
Life-Cycle Costs for Conventional and Nuclear Aircraft Carriers (based on a 50-year service life)
(Fiscal year 1997 dollars in millions)Cost category CV CVN
Investment cost
Ship acquisition cost $2,050 $4,059
Midlife modernization cost $866 $2,382
Total investment cost $2,916 $6,441
Average annual investment cost $58 $129
Operating and support cost
Direct operating and support cost $10,436 $11,677
Indirect operating and support cost $688 $3,205
Total operating and support cost $11,125 $14,882
Average annual operating and support cost $222 $298
Inactivation/disposal cost
Inactivation/disposal cost $53 $887
Spent nuclear fuel storage cost n/a $13
Total inactivation/disposal cost $53 $899
Average annual inactivation/disposal cost $1 $18
Total life-cycle cost $14,094 $22,222
Average annual life-cycle cost $282 $444
Tell me if you think Canada can afford costs like those, or if you think your nation's money is better spent on conventional alternatives that provide like-kind capabilities for a lot less money. Whenever you don't have an unlimited amount of funding that you're willing to devote to any single national priority, you become very shrewd about analyzing costs, and then you make pragmatic decisions that give you both capabilities and costs that you can live with.
Operating an aircraft carrier is never going to be cheap, but an air base that can be wiped off the map in a single surprise attack is pennywise pound-foolish. Mobile airfields have their place in a modern military, just as tanks and infantry rifles do.
While contemplating what the RCN could do if they had real aircraft carriers, also think through what the RCAF might be able to accomplish with pure air power, provided that their jets had the range and missile tech required. Any good military strategist considers all practical options before choosing a course of action. Naval air power may or may not be the most practical option for Canada.
First, develop a solid concept of operation for how Canadian defense against surprise attack should work. Identify the likely adversaries, avenues of approach they would take during a sneak attack, and then evaluate what they're most likely to be equipped with. From that exercise stems fighting doctrine, which informs purchasing decisions regarding the equipment, tactics, and training necessary to apply the fighting doctrine, pursuant to the concept of operation for a Canadian defense force.
RobertDyck,
If Canada is serious about operating aircraft carriers while remaining within its limited military budget, then it should operate conventionally powered carriers that don't require spending any precious defense dollars on all the support activities required to operate naval nuclear reactors. There's no clear military justification for nuclear power on surface warships, unless all the ships in the battle group are nuclear powered, because an aircraft carrier would never leave its escorts behind. Nuclear power is an extravagance that most nations cannot afford. Since all the other ships in the battle group and the aircraft themselves are still conventionally powered, adding nuclear reactors to the carrier doesn't economize on very many underway refueling events.
The high fuel burn rates associated with historical conventionally powered American aircraft carriers were due to the poor thermal efficiency of WWII era steam boilers, which was about 16.5% according to empirical data collected for speeds of 20 knots and 30 knots from the Kitty Hawk class, which were the last class of conventionally powered American aircraft carriers. Modern gas turbines, such as the latest versions of the LM2500, when run at max output / max thermodynamic efficiency, fall between 36% and 39%. Supercritical CO2 gas turbines would be 50% thermally efficient.
Kitty Hawk class cruising range / operating hours at 20 knots / 23mph, by propulsion plant technology:
Foster-Wheeler or Babcock and Wilcox Marine Boilers: 13,800 statute miles (600 hours)
LM2500s: 30,109 statute miles (1,309 hours)
Supercritical CO2 gas turbines: 41,818 statute miles (1,818 hours)
Kitty Hawk's longest operational deployment covered 62,000 statute miles. That means you'd need to refuel the ship once per 6 month deployment, or perhaps never if you only deploy your carriers for 3 months.
If Canada operated navalized variants of Textron AirLand's Scorpion, equipped with the latest sensors and weapons, they'd have more real combat power than most other navies. These fighters would be drastically cheaper to operate than all the heavy fighters operated by other western navies, so several squadrons could be purchased and deployed. Their simplicity, economy of operation, and range matters a lot more than how fast they are. The Scorpion is a twin-engine subsonic ISR / attack jet with 2 crew members and an internal weapons bay. Naval fighters benefit greatly from the ability to loiter at significant distances from their carrier. Modern heavy fighters cannot loiter for any significant period of time because they require so much power to remain aloft.
Numbers of combat jets matter far more than theoretical capabilities. In real life you launch with 2 primary weapons to perform your mission, because that's what you can land with. If you can launch with a pair of 2,000 pound class munitions and 2 to 4 defensive missiles, that's as heavy a loadout as you need. Anything more than that rapidly becomes impractical nonsense.
Let's say you field 2 air wings with 48 Scorpions per air wing, and deploy with half of the air wing at any given time on 3 month deployments, so you deploy twice per year. Let's assert that 18 of the 24 jets can fly each day on a single 4 hour mission.
18 jets * 4 flight hours per day * 130 flight ops days per year * $3,000 per flight hour = $28.08M per half air wing per year
Each crew receives approximately 390 hours of operational flying from the carrier per year (similar to the number of hours our squadron's air crews were accumulating during Operation Enduring Freedom), plus maybe 50 to 70 hours of flying back at a naval air station for recurrent training / work-ups. That makes them highly proficient aviators in at least one mission area, with enough spare flight hours for a secondary specialty, because they're getting a lot more hours than virtually any other western flight crews receive during peace time. All of this is possible because Canada selected a fighter with modest CPFH, so the money saved on airframe maintenance can instead be devoted to far more training hours with high quality sensors / weapons.
$56.16M per air wing per year, or $113.32M total cost to maintain 2 carrier mobile air wings. That's the purchase price for 1X F-35C, but instead of spending that amount of money merely to purchase stealthy heavy fighters, you're fielding 2 complete air wings embarked aboard 4 CATOBAR aircraft carriers deployed over non-consecutive 3 month deployment periods per year to increase sailor retention and to reduce the toll exacted on the equipment that would otherwise be associated with 6+ month deployments. There should also be fewer problems with complacency killing people. Around the 3 to 4 month mark, the younger American sailors seem to become complacent to the danger they're in on the flight deck. Maybe Canadian sailors are different, but I doubt it. This is mostly a "young man" problem.
Since the carriers are conventionally powered, one ship can have a skeleton crew aboard while in-port undergoing repairs / refurbishment while the other carrier is at sea. That provides 24/7/365 at-sea defense of the Atlantic and Pacific Canadian coastlines, in order to get between any potential aggressor and the Canadian homeland. If Canada has something equivalent to a Defense Logistics Agency, those are the people who would be refurbishing the carrier in port, so that most of your sailors can fully crew the operational carrier.
One of the key features of conventionally powered carriers is that you truly can "walk away" from them if you need to. If one of the four carriers requires complex overhaul, that ship doesn't need her crew present to babysit the reactor. There is no such thing as walking away from a nuclear powered ship. You're married to her.
If you're smart about how you design the electronics suite and defensive weapons, the possibility exists for anything classified to be entirely removed from the ship and stored separately, such that even fewer crew members need to remain aboard, perhaps limited to a handful of engineering officers overseeing the repair activities. At that point, it's functionally no different from a civilian ship. If the officers and a yard crew need to take her out for a shakedown, they can do that with minimal fuss.
Minimal complexity that doesn't sacrifice real combat capability is the name of the game here. You get 2 limited capability carrier battle groups that have the most important features of an American blue water carrier battle group, at a fraction of what America pays for the pointless techno-gadgets that may have some theoretical advantage in some specific scenario, but aren't doing much for anyone at all other times.
AIM-174 - Fleet air defense against sea-skimming and ballistic missile threats
AIM-120 - General purpose air superiority
AIM-9 - Defensive missiles
JDAM-ER - Precision all-weather stand-off bombing with data-link
Harpoon / SLAM - All-weather stand-off anti-ship or land attack cruise missiles
AARGM-ER - Stand-off anti-radiation missile for SEAD
Bay-mounted ISAR Pod - Organic mini-AWACS capability
Bay-mounted Camera Pod - Organic photo-recon / bomb damage assessment capability
I think that provides a good mix of capabilities that cover most missions an air wing attached to a limited capability carrier battle group could realistically be tasked to perform. The weapons selected are adequate for their intended use cases. No specialty weapons such as Hellfire or APKWS or SDB or bunker busters were included because they're inappropriate for a blue water naval force primarily focused on interdicting enemy bombers, tactical fighters, and ships, with the odd land-based target of opportunity that may appear. You can still clobber the snot out of any tank with a JDAM. It's cheaper than a Hellfire, can potentially fly much farther, and there won't be much left after it hits. It will require off-board data link guidance to hit a moving target, but it works.
RobertDyck,
Really? Do you understand how bad that sounds? A supercarrier alone costs billions, Wikipedia lists $11.2 billion in 2023 dollars. Plus the aircraft. Plus escort vessels. And most are unusable? But Wikipedia lists 10 Nimitz class carriers, 1 Ford class carrier. Of those the CVN-74 John C. Stennis is undergoing maintenance, the others are operational. Additional Ford class: CVN-79 John F. Kennedy is fitting out, CVN-80 & CVN-81 under construction, CVN-82 & CVN-83 ordered.
Yes, really.
The true purchase cost of the Ford class is closer to $15B, not $11.2B. If you add the cost of the maintenance, mid-life refueling, and decommissioning the reactor, total lifetime cost for that asset is around $20B.
If you think that's bad, every naval aircraft, regardless of age, how it was made, or who made it, has something broken that renders it non-mission-capable, after almost every single flight. In 3 years of sitting in our Ready Room with the aircrew, right next to our Maintenance Office, I can't recall an aircrew which came back from their flight without any squawks to report on the jet.
When we return from a 6 month deployment, we need another 6 months of maintenance to ensure that the ship is capable of completing its next deployment. If we worked on the ship with round-the-clock shifts, we could realistically shorten the required maintenance interval to around 3 months, except for the refueling event, which truly does take many months to complete, because you're cutting through the hull to access the reactor.
John C. Stennis is completing its mid-life refueling. I promise you that at least half of the other carriers are in some stage of maintnenace, in-port, but they're not in drydock. That doesn't magically mean they're available for use, whenever someone gives the word. We do maintenance outside of drydock as well. In point of fact, we performed various maintenance activities on a daily basis, because our ships would never make it back to port if we didn't.
Go ask some folks in the British Navy and Canadian Navy how often their ships have maintenance performed on them.
USS John C. Stennis Leaves Dry Dock, Begins Second Phase of Refueling and Complex Overhaul
10 July 2024
From Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers Public Affairs
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD - USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) undocked from drydock April 8, completing a significant milestone during its multi-year Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) at HII-Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) in Newport News, Virginia.
Commissioned in December 1995, the nation’s seventh Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier entered RCOH in May 2021, under a $3 billion contract with NNS. The overhaul is now more than 65 percent complete and tracking for redelivery in October 2026.
Aircraft carriers enter refueling complex overhauls at the mid-point of their 50-plus-year lifespan, incorporating upgrades to propulsion equipment, infrastructure and electronic systems. After NNS flooded the dry dock with more than 100 million gallons of water, the ship moved to the shipyard’s outfitting berth, where shipyard workers and crew will complete the installation and testing of major components and combat support systems.
Rear Adm. Casey J. Moton, Commander, Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers, recognized the important milestone, adding that the next phase of the ship’s overhaul will deliver impressive new technologies to support the Navy’s warfighters, enabling John C. Stennis to meet operational taskings during another 25-plus years of service.
“When John C. Stennis redelivers, she’ll be the most technologically advanced Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in the Navy,” Moton said. “She’ll bring to the fleet the highest level of capability across all mission sets.”
Moton also acknowledged that the shipyard and Navy team have been navigating several challenges and working under an extended redelivery schedule due both to mandatory growth work following ship condition assessments, as well as industrial base challenges.
“The Navy-Industry team is dealing with the lingering effects of a post-COVID industrial base—one that includes a reduced or unstable capability and capacity along with challenges in workforce recruitment, retention and proficiency. However, the bottom line is that fleet operators need us to deliver these capital assets to our warfighters ready for tasking, so we are working on a daily basis with our industry partners and within the Navy to accelerate problem solving and to speed production on the deck plates—all focused on delivering readiness. I am proud of our entire team for achieving this important production milestone towards redelivering USS John C. Stennis to the fleet.”
Capt. Mark Johnson, manager of the PEO Aircraft Carriers In-Service Aircraft Carrier Program Office, said that the Navy-Industry team is leveraging lessons learned from the Navy’s previous RCOHs, especially on USS George Washington (CVN 73), which was redelivered in May 2023.
“Recognizing the changing workforce demographics coming out of the COVID pandemic, the combined Navy/Shipbuilder team has taken measurable steps to improve the level of support to the mechanic or sailor actually performing work on the ship by leveraging new digital management tools and processes,” said Johnson.
More than 25 million total man-hours of work will go into John C. Stennis’ RCOH, with crews refitting and installing a new square and tapered mast, accommodating state-of-the-art defense and communications systems, updates to the ship’s shafts, refurbished propellers, and modernized aircraft launch and recovery equipment.
“RCOH construction enhances nearly every space and system on the carrier, beyond the most critical requirement to defuel and refuel the ship’s two nuclear reactors and to repair and upgrade the propulsion plant,” Johnson said. “We work on every part of the ship, from the hull, screws and rudders to more than 600 tanks; thousands of valves, pumps and piping components; electrical cables and ventilation; as well as combat and aviation support systems. It’s demanding, complex work that challenges every member of the planning team, shipyard crews and ship’s force.”
During the upcoming outfitting and testing phase, shipbuilders will complete the overhaul and installation of the ship’s major components and test its electronics, combat and propulsion systems. This period will also focus on improving the ship’s living areas and the general quality of life for the sailors, including crew living spaces, galleys and mess decks.
25 million man-hours over 5 years means an average of 571 workers would be working 24/7/365, for 5 years straight. In reality, multiple shifts are required to deliver a super carrier back to the fleet in about 5 years time. Note that while one of my old ships has now left dry dock, she's not done with her maintenance until 2026.
Warships spend time in port for planned maintenance, typically referred to as "intermediate maintenance periods" or "docks," which can last from a few days to several months, depending on the scope of work required and the size/type of vessel.
Here's a more detailed explanation:
Maintenance Frequency:
Navies perform scheduled maintenance at regular intervals (intermediate maintenance periods) to ensure ships are ready for their next mission or deployment, and more extensive maintenance/overhauls are performed periodically during a ship's life cycle.Types of Maintenance:
These range from simple repairs to complete overhauls and upgrades, depending on the ship type and the scope of work. Some examples include:Flight deck coating replacement on aircraft carriers.
Arresting gear overhaul.
Radar and electronics refurbishment or replacement.
Anchor chain and anchor maintenance.
Hangar bay and fire/sprinkler system overhaul.
Electrical, mechanical, and HVAC systems overhaul or component replacement.
Reactor upgrades and maintenance.Factors Influencing Maintenance:
Type and size of vessel: Larger ships generally require more extensive maintenance due to complex systems and larger surfaces.
Deployment history: Ships returning from deployments will require maintenance to address wear and damage incurred while at sea.
Available Resources: The availability of specialized equipment, skilled personnel, and shipyard facilities can affect the duration and complexity of maintenance.
Fleet needs: Maintaining the fleet means a continuous cycle of maintenance as ships cycle through different phases of readiness.
That part I put in bold print is what I'm talking about. When the ship goes out for 6 months, it's almost a given that it will require 6 months of repairs in-port. It may not require any time in drydock, but that doesn't mean you can send it right back out without performing any maintenance work, assuming you want the ship to successfully complete its next deployment.
Russia doesn't get to dictate terms. Sure, they would like to act like the strong-man bully, and they would like to be in a position of strength. But they're the invader, they're the offender, a criminal doesn't get to dictate how much he keeps of the stuff he stole.
We've been over this before. You don't get to treat Russia "as the criminal" unless you take Moscow. Since that's not going to happen, all the talk about who / what Putin / Russians is / are, is still just talk.
But you made a second major mistake with that statement. Neither NATO nor the United States ever promised NATO would not expand east.
You and your fellow history revisionists are remarkable in your persistence in your attempts to distort what actually transpired.
Why do you leftists always pull this crap?
You always manage to find someone who's willing to L-I-E for money, but when basically every other source contradicts what they're saying, you never admit to the lying, or that your lie-based worldview is (charitably) a distortion of what actually transpired.
National Security Archive - NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard
Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner
Washington D.C., December 12, 2017 – U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.
The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”
...
The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.
...
But inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO. (See Document 27) The view of the State Department was that NATO expansion was not on the agenda, because it was not in the interest of the U.S. to organize “an anti-Soviet coalition” that extended to the Soviet borders, not least because it might reverse the positive trends in the Soviet Union. (See Document 26) The Bush administration took the latter view. And that’s what the Soviets heard.As late as March 1991, according to the diary of the British ambassador to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major personally assured Gorbachev, “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently, when Soviet defense minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked Major about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership, the British leader responded, “Nothing of the sort will happen.” (See Document 28)
...
If your response to that is, "Well... We lied! ha ha ha!" I can promise you that nobody in Ukraine is laughing now.
Instead of calling me names and trying to prove me wrong, someone who was truly curious about what was actually said unto the Soviets, would instead ask themselves, "Why is it that the Russians believe we (the US and other major European countries), lied to them about eastward NATO expansion?"
All the leaders of the Free World at the time said the opposite of what Robert Zoellick is claiming now. I wonder who the Soviets were actually listening to? Was it, Robert "I need my 15 minutes of fame now" Zoellick, or the US President, the actual US Secretary of State (rather than one of his under-secretaries), and the British / French / West German Prime Ministers?
Whose words carried more weight with the Soviets?
I wonder what gave the Russians the idea that NATO would not expand eastward.
BTW, that link above contains links to various pertinent memos from the meetings with the Soviets, decision documents, and even hand-written notes. There's a common theme running through all of them, which does not support Robert Zoellick's reinterpretation of what we actually told the Soviets about NATO, so that they would agree to peacefully dissolve the Soviet Union.
RobertDyck,
Are you defending Putin? That's treason.
You're too immature to accept that I'm asking you for a more substantive answer than, "Putin is stupid". If an accusation of treason is the only kind of answer you can provide, then that means you haven't devoted any real thought to why Russia invaded Ukraine. You're too emotional to be rational.
If Putin's as stupid as you claim, then why is he still in power?
He's such an idiot that he's retained power for almost as long as Stalin. I'm calling BS on that.
Putin is not playing chess. He's playing World War 3. You play his game, you get nuclear war.
If Putin has an itchy trigger finger, then what's stopped him from launching his ICBMs?
No, they don't. They are not the government of Ukraine. They are not the people of Ukraine. Ukraine gets to decide what happens in Ukraine. You don't, and a terrorist like Putin certainly doesn't.
All those dead Ukrainians are evidence that the Russians did get a vote. All your assertions about what is true and what is right are not going to bring them back.
Putin is responsible for all the dead.
Send the Canadian Army to arrest Putin, if you actually think that will work.
Are you seriously defending Russia? Seriously? Russia? Seriously?
If asking pertinent questions about your reductive logic is "defending Russia", then I'm not dealing with a rational actor. Go cool off and come back with a more thoughtful response.
I got that bit of news from a detailed analysis published by a financial expert in Ukraine. Do you think you're qualified to argue with a national level economic analyst?
You're making an appeal to an "authority" who cannot be questioned and hasn't published the basis for their findings. You didn't even name your source.
The US sanctioned more of Russia's shadow fleet of oil tankers. The sanctions mean those ships are not allowed in port of any western country, or any country that doesn't want to be sanctioned. Even China has refused to allow sanctioned vessels to dock at their ports. What more? Sanction them all!!! All of Russia's oil tanker ships.
The Russians are offloading their crude to foreign-flagged ships now. China and India still accept Russian crude, but from tanker ships not registered to Russian owners. Crude oil is one of the few substances more addictive than sugar. Modern civilization doesn't function without it. I'd be shocked if Russian crude wasn't being imported into the US the entire time President Biden was in office.
It's working. Russia is trying to look strong, cover up how much it's hurting. Just don't stop.
Iran has been sanctioned for decades. Sanctions never stopped them from acquiring weapons or waging war against the Israelis, and their citizens have not overthrown their government. If they did overthrow their government, do you seriously think "Death to Israel" / "Death to America" would not still be as common as citing verses from the Quran? You'd have to be really naive to think that would change overnight.
The land and people will continue, but the Putin administration will not.
Unless Putin dies, he's not leaving office.
Russia is running out of recruits, running out of tanks, and Ukraine is doing ever more effective damage within Russia. You make it sound like Russia is winning. They aren't.
Russia will eventually run out of people and war machines, but that process might take decades and there may not be anything left of Ukraine by the time it actually happens. Ukraine has not "won" anything thus far, and when last I checked the Russian Army is still in Ukraine. I think the fastest way for the Russian Army to leave Ukraine is for Putin to command them to leave. You seem to think that'll be accomplished by upping the stakes in our international pissing contest with Russia, which hasn't convinced the Russians to leave so far.
Russia has a "land military", heavy on tanks and artillery. America and the rest of Europe have delivered more anti-armor munitions to Ukraine than there are tanks on planet Earth, yet the Russian Army is still in Ukraine and still using tanks and artillery. I don't know about you, but I think the reason is probably not that western anti-armor munitions can't destroy a Russian tank, but rather that the number of Ukrainians capable of firing those weapons at Russian tanks is dwindling.
n 2024, Russia produced and refurbished approximately 1,550 tanks, which was enough to replace all of the tank losses it sustained that year, according to Bruegel. Russia also produced and refurbished thousands of other armored vehicles and artillery pieces.
Unlike you, I actually cite relevant sources when my arguments are based upon it, because reality matters to me (even when I don't like it):
Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed
Putin filed a document with the international community stating what he wants. And Putin himself has repeated on news broadcasts several times. When Putin says he intends to invade and annex Poland and the Baltic states, believe him. When Putin says he considers Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Dnipro to be Russian cities, believe him. When he demands Ukraine hand over the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, don't comply, but believe the threat.
I did not ask you about why Putin thinks or believes what he does. I asked you if you think his reasoning is or is not shared amongst his fellow Russians. Pretend for a moment that Putin does not exist. Poof! Putin just disappeared, never to be seen or heard from again. Does that mean whomever seizes power next won't simply continue doing exactly what Putin has been doing?
You're one of our, "If I could get in my magic time machine and kill baby Hitler, then WWII would've never happened." Hitler was a speaker who the people would listen to. He was very far from the most effective leader / strongman that the nazis had. If Hitler never existed, there's a better than average probability that someone willing to listen to his generals would've seized power. That would've been truly scary, because whomever that person was, he may have achieved what someone with a Corporal's understanding of war never could.
Do you think two or more people in Russia are utterly incapable of having the same strategic objectives, and may very well use the exact same methods to achieve them?
Putin's been in power now for almost 21 years. He's the devil we know. As long as he's there, I know what his priorities are, because he very helpfully wrote them down for us. Whenever he leaves, I can guarantee one thing- we won't know nearly as much about his successor.
Do you ever worry that someone more effective than Putin might take his place?:
The men who could succeed Vladimir Putin
You should.
RobertDyck,
Invasion has caused the opposite of everything Putin claimed this war is about. It was really really stupid.
Putin is stupid... What a wonderfully reductive bit of logic that allows you to ignore his / Russia's rationale for invading. You're just barely playing checkers with your reasoning. Putin is playing chess.
And don't tell me what Putin would accept. It's not up to him. He ordered invasion causing hundreds of thousands of deaths. He's a murderer and terrorist.
Russia gets a vote on which military organizations their nextdoor neighbors are allowed to join. You arrogantly think their opinions are irrelevant, but the entire reason there are hundreds of thousands of dead people, is that their opinions do matter.
Russia cannot sustain this war long term. Russia's banking system will collapse late this year, next year latest. Just keep the sanctions in place.
If Russia's banking system does not collapse, what's the next bit of economic and geopolitical sophistry you're going to tell yourself to paper over the fact that your arguments aren't congruent with reality?
If you want the war to end sooner, convince Trump to impose even stiffer sanctions.
What else do you think the US can sanction?
Everything that we feasibly could do to economically weaken Russia was already done by President Biden's administration. It didn't work. It strengthened Russia-China alliance, however temporary that may be, but achieved little else.
In 1917 and 1991 when Russia had a major economic collapse, their country ceased to exist.
I'm sorry, but Russia very much did still exist after the Tsar was deposed (1917) and the Soviet Union (1991) dissolved. You're attempting to reimagine modern history as it never was. Russia, the nation, was very much still present after both of those events.
If Putin wants to remain president of Russia, he better give up soon. Dictators don't have a retirement plan. When Russia overthrows Putin, where would he take refuge? Who would take him in?
If he does not "give up", then what? You'll talk about him some more? Write a strongly worded letter?
You believe that Putin's intentions for what will become of Russia are not widely held by other Russians. This is based on what?
Let's say you get your wish and Putin does get overthrown. What kind of person will take his place? Can you even imagine that he might be more ruthless and cunning and violent, rather than less, or is that beyond your ability to contemplate?
RobertDyck,
Attempting to admit Ukraine into NATO will ensure that the war with Russia continues. That was the entire stated reason for starting the war. The rest of the nonsense thrown out by Putin about rebuilding the Russian empire was merely his personal beliefs, which are not germane to the primary issue Russia has with having NATO countries on their borders. If Putin was gone tomorrow, the Russians would still be fighting in Ukraine to prevent NATO's eastward expansion, because that's a national priority for them. You have to separate national geopolitical issues from specific personalities in government. If all political parties are after the same objectives, then it's no longer about who's in charge, because regardless of who presently holds power, their strategic objectives are congruent. This is the same as thinking you're going to get a night-and-day different Soviet Union under Kruschev vs Stalin. It's the same Soviet Union with a different person in charge. There will be some reshuffling of national priorities, but not on major contentious issues.
All that oil and gas that was headed to Europe is now headed to China. If you think the Russian economy will collapse if Russian oligarch money in Brussels is not released, then you should be able to tell us why the Russian economy hasn't collapsed already. Peter Zeihan told us that the Russian oil and gas industry would collapse after the winter froze all of it in the pipelines leading to Europe. We blew up the Nordstream pipelines, but output of Russian oil and gas basically hasn't changed much over the past several years, because it's being redirected to China and India. Peter clearly didn't account for that possibility. Since Europe is an unreliable customer compared to China, Russia is not going to redirect the output back to Europe after the fighting stops, which means their source of income is stable, so they can continue producing weapons until they run out of raw materials. I wouldn't count on Russia running out of Iron, wood, and chemicals to make weapons.
Maybe it's time for a reality check on how "integrated" Russia actually is into the global economy. I don't think there is any integration to speak of. You can only take Russia's internationally-held money one time, and then it's no longer a bargaining chip. Now they view the West / NATO as thieves, in addition to being duplicitous on the matter of eastward NATO expansion. You're removing the incentive they have to negotiate, which means you're either going to militarily defeat them, or they overrun over Ukraine in due time.
So, then, short of using nuclear weapons, how does the EU intend to defeat the Russian Army?
Where are all those divisions of men and equipment to be supplied by the EU, and why are they not already amassed on the border of Ukraine?
They either don't exist, the Europeans are unwilling to use them, or they're not able to be used for the aforementioned logistical reasons.
How many operational tanks can France, Germany, and the UK send into Ukraine for combined arms maneuver warfare?
How many artillery pieces are available for support?
How many combat coded jets are available to support the ground maneuver element, and what vulnerability do they have to Russian SAM systems unless the very first missions are SEAD, rather than support?
I think you'll be shocked by how few are ready to be used.
RobertDyck,
America's military became unfocused, involved with regional conflicts, no longer focused on maintaining global security.
The entire reason we went to the Middle East to begin with was at the behest of the British, who reminded us of our obligation as allies to support their attempt to retake Kuwait. If America was unfocused on global security, according to you, then what does that say about the Europeans who demanded that America be there to begin with? America took Europe's and China's energy security concerns "too seriously"?
The bulk of the oil from Kuwait went to Europe or Asia by the time Gulf War II rolled around, not America, contrary to media blather. We did not buy our oil from Kuwait or Iraq. We were indeed "after the oil", but not for America, for our allies. The entire time the "No Fly Zone" was being enforced over Southern Iraq after Gulf War I, the Iraqis were taking pot shots at American patrol fighters using their remaining SAM batteries. That means they deliberately broke the cease fire agreement after Gulf War I. This breaking of the cease fire agreement happened about once per week. If Saddam never intended to abide by the terms of the cease fire, then we should've continued our push to take Baghdad.
What was the end result?
Factions inside Iraq fought a civil war and then a war against ISIS. Iraq remains an independent country with democratically elected leadership, to this day. That was the end objective, which was accomplished with military force and the willingness of the Iraqi people to not travel back down the same road that gave them Saddam. It was never pretty, but it worked.
Afghanistan never "worked out" because the people we recruited into the Afghan National Army never had any intention of making it work.
During times of peace, drastically reduce military spending, focus on economy. When under imminent threat from an invader, you rapidly ramp up.
You need a real world education in logistics. As far as rapidly ramping up production is concerned, there is no such capability to do that anywhere in the western world, specifically because we followed the policy you're advocating for after the Cold War ended. The policies that were effectively forced upon our military and the logistics apparatus that feeds it is part of the very same "alternative reality" that prevents the European Union from doing anything effective to fight back against Russia. War against peer level adversaries is a numbers game. Short of using nuclear weapons, if the enemy outnumbers you 10-to-1, then it doesn't matter how advanced your military is, because it won't be effective enough to achieve much more than a stalemate.
America has 12 aircraft carrier battlegroups on paper. In reality, we have 4 that are capable of operational deployment at any given time, all of which are stationed in entirely different parts of the world. The reason we only have 4 carriers available goes right back to basic logistics. All warships built and employed from WWII onwards follow a distinct repair, training / workup, and then operational deployment cycle. If you attempt to skip any of the phases of that cycle, there should be no expectation that the crews are even modestly prepared for combat against a competent enemy.
2 carrier battlegroups were required to provide 24/7 air support over Afghanistan, a nation with no organized military to speak of, which covers a land area about the same size as Texas. Therefore, deploying only 2 aircraft carriers against China, a nation with a very large military, spread across a land area nearly identical in size to the US, is an utterly ridiculous idea, even if there are no losses or significant hits to any of the available ships.
In Europe, their military strength was far more than most American's think. And your comments make me believe, you didn't realize how strong they were either.
Your comments make me think you've never paid attention to how long it takes to move a division of men and machines anywhere inside of Europe.
The UK had 4 ballistic missile submarines with multiple sea-launched ballistic missiles carrying a total of 120 nuclear warheads.
The UK would have 1 mission capable sub carrying ICBMs deployed at any given time, possibly 2 during a surge. You may believe otherwise, but you're still wrong.
Canadian army training is equivalent to US Marine training, and every enlisted soldier is trained for the next rank above his/her current position.
That's great, but the US Marine Corps is 6 times the size of the entire Canadian Army. The Canadian Army totaled 730,000 during WWII. Our Marine Corps had to grow to the same size as our active duty Army is today, during WWII. You can't accomplish that in six months. If the shooting started with China tomorrow, the rate at which the Corps can grow / replenish losses depends greatly upon how many Marines are already available to train their replacements. It's a logistics problem. Today's US Army is more than 15 times the size of the Canadian Army, or 30 times the size when you include all the reserve troops, who have seen more deployments to war zones than the active duty force in many cases. We don't employ reserve troops the way other militaries do. If you join the Army National Guard, you're getting deployed to a war zone at some point during your 8 year contract, probably by choice because that means you're getting combat pay. 70% of the Marines who fought in WWII were part of the reserves.
It's a concern Trump closed the military base in Greece. Putin ordered Trump to close it because that base has a port used to receive weapons destined for Ukraine. Why is Trump taking orders from Putin?
Souda Bay remains an active American naval base. Cite your sources or stop the nonsense.
Joint military exercises are conducted on Canadian military bases. Australia could do the same.
US military bases are located where they are in Australia because that's where Australia wants them. You're welcome to argue the point with the Australians.
An exercise does not take 6 months.
According to the Australian military web pages it does. Again, your argument is with Australia, not the US. Go tell the Australians how long military exercises are supposed to take.
And you think it's acceptable for China, Russia, and now Trump's America to use all the military might of a modern world power to conquer, subjugate, annex, and treat neighbors as resources?
What I want and the way the world actually works are two very different things.
I would like peace with Russia as well.
Russia has already indicated what their terms are for peace. We promised the Russians that NATO would not expand one inch eastward from Germany after the Soviet Union fell. We've reneged on that promise at least 20 times, and we continue to antagonize them by suggesting that Ukraine will join NATO. The Russians don't want NATO-aligned nations on their borders. They made that crystal clear from the end of the Cold War to the present day.
Don't think it'll stop there.
If Canada and the EU think they have the military might turn back the Russian Army, then there should be a lot less talking and a lot more doing.
RobertDyck,
America didn't "get bored" playing global policeman, America "got poor". There's a difference. It's amazing how someone with more than enough information to figure out what's going on can contort the situation to mean what he wants it to mean, rather than what it actually means.
Other nations pointed out the US has a military far too large and powerful. The 3 countries with large military budgets who were not allies were China, Russia, and North Korea. The world tried to tell the US they appreciate the protection, but cut it down to something reasonable.
Since the EU's military budget will now match America's annual military budget, all the leaders in Europe disagree with your assertion. You are not remotely qualified to determine what is or isn't reasonable. Your beliefs reflect having lived your entire life sheltered from the very ugly reality of life elsewhere in the world, where China or Russia or North Korea or Iran is your nextdoor neighbor.
Europe has a much larger military than many Americans think. Europe didn't need to increase spending, the US needed to just unilaterally cut. Close US military bases in western Europe, focus on eastern Europe.
If Europe has such a strong military, why does America need to maintain any military bases in Europe at all?
China is a threat, but does the US needed based in Australia?
The US maintains 3 facilities in Australia that host seasonal military exercise participants:
Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt
Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap
Robertson Barracks
Could we close those facilities?
Sure. How would we conduct military exercises with the Australians without them, though?
Marines have to be housed somewhere if they're going to be involved in an exercise spanning six months.
94% of all US personnel stationed overseas are deployed to only 10 countries:
Japan
Germany
South Korea
Italy
United Kingdom
Bahrain
Spain
Turkey
Norway
Belgium
The total head count for forward deployed forces varies between 150,000 and 200,000.
We could bring all those people home, but to what end? Merely to send them back out for their annual exercises with partner nations? If they're going to be there for 6 months anyway, what sense does that make?
We had an unprecedented period of global peace and prosperity. It may not have seemed so, there were many small regional wars, butajor powers did not fight against each other. And a strong empire absorbing smaller nations stopped.
Post WWII wasn't peaceful anywhere in the developing world. Whether you blame local dictators, economic circumstances, or America for that undeniable fact, the simple fact remains that there was nothing but war following WWII if you lived in the developing world. The wars were no longer on the doorsteps of major colonial powers because that is what the US sought to end with Bretton-Woods, but war as a way of life never went away. Ask someone who lives in Africa or Southeast Asia how "peaceful" the latter half of the 20th century was.
We're trying something new here. We're going to try to get along with Russia, rather than constantly antagonizing them. For all practical purposes, after China becomes comfortable invading their neighbors, we're going to need Russia and India to help contain them. You may think this is a matter of secondary importance to the war in Ukraine, but the entire world will think differently if their entire supply of advanced microchips is cut off in 2027.
Void,
Food prices for ordinary Americans will be least affected by import tariffs because most Americans are not purchasing expensive imported food, alcohol, and tobacco products. As far as President Trump's tariffs are concerned, if tariffs make every nation maximally independent of other nations, then I consider that a worthwhile result. There's less incentive to attack your neighbors when your nation is not dependent upon any other nations for energy, goods, or services. Co-dependence, on the other hand, is a weakness that inevitably leads to conflict. Almost everyone holds the false belief that trading partners don't attack their trading partners. America, China, India, Iran, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and various other former European colonial empires are prima facie examples where that belief is directly falsified, and within living memory in most cases.
America and the United Kingdom traded with Iraq and Iran. We've attacked each other at various points in modern history (since the industrial revolution started, in living memory in several cases). Spain has attacked Mexico. Russia and Turkey trade with each other. Russia sells weapons to Turkey. Not more than 10 years ago, Turkish fighters shot down Russian fighters which crossed into their airspace from Syria. This tit-for-tat style of attack has been going on since empires existed. Inexplicably, some of us have been duped into believing it's abnormal for this kind of thing to happen.
The US military should maintain bases in territory that America owns, but nowhere else. If any allied nation expects American military forces to show up en masse to defend them, then they either build and maintain military bases for that purpose, or we don't show up. Collective defense is either a mutual beneficial arrangement, or it isn't. If America is spending most of the money to provide collective defense, it's not a mutually beneficial arrangement.
I don't want a wildly lopsided power dynamic between American leaders and leaders of other countries, because that also leads to conflict. If we are to maintain military alliances with other nations, then those alliances should be predicated upon shared values and nothing else. I'm not a spokesman for our military industrial complex, so if that means they sell fewer weapons, I really don't care. Weapons production should be based upon local requirements and technical know-how, which every nation should be individually responsible for providing. I don't want other nations to solely rely upon America for a credible defense against a surprise attack from other major powers, because that means America inevitably becomes militarily involved in local or regional conflicts to prevent allied nations from living with the aftermath of inexcusably poor defense procurement and deployment of forces policies.
We told the Europeans to start spending more on their own defense for 25 years, which they utterly failed to do until President Trump came along. It started as a very polite request under President Bush Jr, and ended with an outright demand under President Trump. They didn't want to spend their public money on defense because they wanted public health care and other costly welfare programs. I understand their motivation, but the US cannot provide guaranteed defense of allies unless we have the most massive military in the entire world, which then leads to arrogant American neocon politicians thinking they have some sort of "right" to start wars. They have no such right. Any war America fights from this point forward should be formally declared and funded by Congress, because it's their responsibility to do so.
Trump's tariffs are a tax on US consumers. They are not a tax on Canadian exporters. I cannot see this being good for anyone, least of all the US. Tariffs on China make some sense, as North American producers need to replace Chinese imports before Mother Nature calls time on the Chinese economy. But tariffs on Canada and Mexico? One is a bulk commodity producer that the US needs smooth economic relations with.
Tariffs have been applied to American products imported into Canada, China, and Mexico for many decades longer than President Trump has been in office. Please explain why tariffs applied to American products imported into Canada, China, and Mexico are a good thing, and somehow not a tax levied against Canadian, Chinese, and Mexican consumers.
Is there any "greater magic" by which tariffs are a good thing when imposed upon American-made products imported into other countries, but bad when America imposes tariffs on products from countries that have historically applied a multitude of tariffs to American-made products?
That last part about tariffs on China "making sense", really doesn't make any sense if we're being completely logically consistent, but some members on this forum are not being logically consistent. They want preferential rules applied to their country, but take no issue with applying tariffs to other nation they're competing against. Is that type of inconsistency is a "special form" of consistency?
Maybe, just maybe, tariffs are being used by President Trump to protect American workers from foreign governments that are allowed to sell their products into America without tariffs, while their governments turn right back around and imposes significant tariffs on American made products, knowing full well that the end result will be the transfer of wealth of Americans to foreign countries. That was the reasoning used by foreign countries for their application of tariffs to American-made products. What's good for the goose is also good for the gander, or it's not good at all and needs to stop.
The US needs lumber, heavy oil, uranium, rare earths.
There is no actual shortage of those materials here in America, only the willpower to go after them. Democrat Presidents have repeatedly denied offshore drilling and mining permits to American businesses to open new mines here in America. It's time for that practice to end. We have enough Lithium in two deposits to bury all other global producers of Lithium. Democrats want EV mandates, so let them live next to some Lithium mines. They're going to become like President Biden from chronic exposure, but at least they won't have to remember how to drive their self-driving car. If those materials are all-important, then they should be extracted here in America by American labor, with American environmental regulations applied to the extraction processes. That way, no other nation can claim they're being exploited by America.
Mexico is industrialising fast, with a reasonably skilled, middle income workforce. The US needs Mexico as a manufacturing economy, able to fill the price points that US labour is too expensive for. A well integrated NAFTA could do most of what China does today. But none of that works without easy cross-border trade between all three countries.
Our Democrats just imported at least ten million people with which to create a new low-skill manufacturing economy here in America, and Mexico helped them do it. In the very near future, most manufacturing jobs will be done by robots, which require no sleep, take no lunch breaks, are paid no wages, do not go on strike after their demands for increased wages cannot be met without bankrupting the company, and only require electricity to continue producing. $25K for a robot that will never miss a day of work is peanuts compared to paying for a human worker. Necessity is the mother of all invention.
But none of that works without easy cross-border trade between all three countries.
What I just described is how commerce is going to function everywhere in the world, inside of the next 20 years or so. Every nation produces their own materials, goods, and services, locally, and only trades with foreign countries when they absolutely cannot create a locally-sourced like-kind substitute. Fewer things get produced in aggregate because it's not necessary to produce as many things when they're made to a higher quality standard and aren't deliberately designed to break. That tends to drive down over-consumption, which Democrats constantly tell me is a bad thing. You'd think they'd be happier about what President Trump is doing to achieve their stated climate policy objectives, but I guess they only meant consumption is bad when someone else is allowed to do what they do, even though that still doesn't make any sense. They talk a lot, spend a lot of other peoples' money, and accomplish nothing. It's part of their charm.
Europeans constantly criticize Americans for consuming too much. Now we're going to consume a lot less foreign-made products, hopefully none in the very near future. Does all the hysteria over President Trump reducing over-consumption by Americans mean we that Europeans actually want us to continue acting like Americans? I want some logical consistency, please and thank you.
If all the container ships filled with goods made in Asia or Europe or Canada and Mexico stopped arriving at American ports tomorrow, it would force Americans to prioritize what our true "needs" are, and then work towards "wants" after we reestablish local production. I can only dream of that day right now, but if Americans want a return to prosperity, that is what we must do.
I haven't purchased an article of clothing since before COVID started, and some of my clothes are older than my children. If I ever do need a new shirt or pair of pants, then I'll see what's available at the local thrift store. If that's not an option, then I'll buy whatever was made here, or learn to make do without. I spent the first half of my working life living out of a bag. Regardless of what I may want, I lost nothing of value by doing that. I may not be "fashionable" by European or coastie liberal standards, but I have more money in my pocket by refraining from purchasing anything I don't truly need.
People from my parents' generation spent their entire lives bankrupting everyone with their excess, but now it's time to pay for their excess, and pay we must, because we want a better future for our children. I'm not upset at them because they were never raised to know any better. At the same time, they gave us lots of great technological advancements, and were very industrious workers, so I chalk up the over-expenditure of public money to a misadventure borne of lack of reasoning about what it would lead to.
We're going back to a multi-polar world where America will only be one major player amongst many- Europe Union, Russia, China, India, Japan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. That way the rest of you can blame yourselves or each other, rather than America, whenever something doesn't go your way. If you choose to start another world war due to the lack of maturity of your leaders, that's on you. We're bowing out of the superpower game because we're not wanted or needed in our current role. Now there are real consequences to an ill-advised war, so think carefully about who you give power to.
tahanson43206,
ṁ = F / (g * Isp)
ṁ (mdot) = mass flow rate, in kg/s
F = thrust (force), in Newtons
g = standard gravitational acceleration; 1g = 9.80665m/s^2
Isp = specific impulse, in seconds
The 40MWth figure corresponds to an Isp of about 1,000s, and I "baked-in" some anticipated losses into that figure.
ṁ = 50,000 / (9.80665 * 1,000)
ṁ = 50,000 / 9,806.65
ṁ = 5.0986kg/s
I hope that helps.
tahanson43206,
You need about 40MWth of input power per kiloNewton of thrust generated at the same temperature and therefore Isp as a solid core nuclear thermal reactor, so 2GWth translates into about 50kN of thrust. This assumes the use of Hydrogen as the propellant. You can use higher mass propellants to generate more thrust, such as Methane or Ammonia or CO2, but pure Hydrogen will always provide the highest Isp, which is what we're after in this instance.
That anti-matter / fusion drive that Ryan Weed was working towards could generate enough power for a fusion propulsion system. It doesn't use anti-protons. There are certain radioactive isotopes that emit large quantities of positrons. The positrons would be used to initiate fusion.
Radioisotope Positron Propulsion
Current state of the art in-space propulsion systems based on chemical or ion propellants fail to meet requirements of 21st century space missions. Antimatter is a candidate mechanism for a propulsion system that could transport humans and/or robotic systems with drastically reduced transit times, providing quicker scientific results, increasing the payload mass to allow more capable instruments and larger crews, and reducing the overall mission cost. Unfortunately, previous propulsion concepts relied on unrealistic amounts of trapped antimatter – orders of magnitude away from any near-term capability. The goal of this effort is to determine the feasibility of a (TRL 1-2) radioisotope positron catalyzed fusion propulsion concept that does not rely on trapped antimatter. Such a transformative technology inspires and drives further innovation within the aerospace community and can be applied to a relevant mission – the bulk retrieval of an entire asteroid into translunar space – a mission of great scientific and commercial interest (e.g. asteroid mining). The idea of harnessing resources from asteroids goes back more than a century to Tsiolkovsky. Fundamentally, for asteroid mining to become financially viable, the cost of the retrieval spacecraft must be less than the value gained from the asteroid. Therefore, developing technology (e.g. efficient propulsion systems) that decreases the mass and complexity of the retrieval spacecraft must be a priority.
It's low-TRL, much like all other fission / fusion / anti-matter propulsion schemes, but if built such a propulsion system would either generate exceptional Isp and thus Total Impulse using very little propellant or an enormous amount of thrust if LH2 gas was fed into the exhaust to generate more thrust by super-heating the ordinary Hydrogen. Low molecular weight propellants such as Methane would also be good candidates. The primary benefit to this scheme is that it doesn't require generation or storage of large amounts of electrical power. Fusion is "auto-initiated", after a fashion, through the use of positrons. It does require a somewhat exotic isotope of Krypton, but only in relatively small amounts. Other isotopes are also suitable positron sources. The Deuterium used for D-D fusion is very plentiful here on Earth and on Mars. Asteroids are also thought to contain high concentrations of heavy water.
Calliban,
My surmise is that this plasma field has to be significantly denser than Earth's Van Allen belts and upper atmosphere due to scaling and the power input to maintain the field, because it has to be dense enough to produce collisions with incoming relativistic ions for it to be effective.
After a plasma sheath has been inflated, how does one communicate with the people or robotic equipment inside this proto-planet space station / mining operation?
Are there optical devices capable of penetrating through the plasma, perhaps X-ray laser communications?
If not, or if the signal distortion from plasma interaction is too great over vast distances, what about a laser comm relay satellite in orbit around it?
When we want to receive visiting spacecraft for transfer of crew / cargo / mined resources from the asteroid, will we have any electrostatic discharge or heating issues that might mess with its onboard systems?