Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

SpaceNut · 2005-08-15 07:08:21

And what good does such a long delay do? What are the real delay reasons?
Is this the amount of time to spray the foam onto a new tank?

Fire some buts and lets get it right this time...

edit :
No Obvious Cause For Shuttle Foam Loss

After a week of formal inquiry, NASA said there would be no quick fix for the foam problem on the external fuel tank that grounded the U.S. shuttle fleet.

:? They must be ignoring there own reports.

Call For Ending The Shuttle Program Building Momentum

Last Wednesday, NASA said that the fuel tank needs to be redesigned, scratching a planned launch of Atlantis in September.

:? They must be kidding?

:? :? :?

Ad Astra · 2005-08-15 17:43:20

I'd be skeptical of anything I read on SpaceDaily, seeing as how most of it is sensationalized reporting from Agence France-Presse. I remember a recent story about "America's space program in turmoil." Their two sources were Dana Rohrabacher (who sounded wishy-washy about the shuttle in the article, but never called for outright cancellation,) and Barney Frank (who has consistently opposed the space program in favor of increased social spending.)

The media is almost totally united behind the "cancel the shuttle" mantra. I'd like to say "keep it flying" just to spite the press. Pragmatically, we'll have to make a decision based on whether NASA can fix this foam problem in a reasonable amount of time. If they can't fix it by an arbitrary date (say, March 31, 2006,) we should cut our losses with the shuttle.

GCNRevenger · 2005-08-15 18:32:54

I am getting pretty worried though... NASA's credibility is pretty shakey right now, can they withstand the humiliation of being unable to fix the foam problem?

SpaceNut · 2005-08-15 20:02:31

Return to Flight Task Group Announces Final Report and Media Event

The Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task Group will issue the full text of its final report at 11 a.m. EDT, Wednesday, Aug. 17.

Great so they think they will give closure to Columbia with this last final report.

If anything it should read we failed.

NASA chartered the Task Group to perform an independent assessment of the agency's implementation of the 15 Return to Flight recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Which number was about foam?

final report

SpaceNut · 2005-08-16 08:15:00

ET article with what changes need to be made and possible causes for the foam within these areas.
Tank changes kill September Shuttle hopes

SpaceNut · 2005-08-16 19:15:35

NASA Successfully Completes Solid Rocket Motor Test

NASA’s Space Shuttle program successfully fired its first Production Rate Motor Tuesday, Aug. 16, at a Utah test facility. The two-minute static, or stationary, firing of the rocket motor was performed at ATK Thiokol Inc., an Alliant Techsystems company, in Promontory, north of Salt Lake City.
The Aug. 16 test demonstrated process, material and design changes made to the Reusable Solid Rocket Motors produced during the past two years. The motor firing also will allow NASA to further evaluate the performance of new sensors that read and retain detailed information -- much faster than instruments now used -- on pressures generated in the motor during a Shuttle launch.

Lots of additional testing info in the article:

Ad Astra · 2005-08-16 19:57:15

I don't want to rain on the "5-seg SRB" parade, but an unforseen consequence arises when one considers the weight of the new SRB casing. The casing's nozzle sits so low in the water after splashdown that OSHA regulations prevent the divers from attaching the plug and purging the water.

The best way around this is to petition OSHA for an exemption. Barring this, ATK will have to either lighten the casing (filament-wound SRB's, anyone?) or attach a scissor-wing and glide the casing back to KSC. Any way you look at it, an engineering solution will take a bit of time and money.

Commodore · 2005-08-16 20:10:47

OSHA has regulations saying you can only dive so deep? :?

I think the best solution is to tell OSHA to take a long walk off a short pier.

GCNRevenger · 2005-08-16 21:04:47

Or a long walk out a short airlock - with no suit

Please, this is really a STUPID problem, OSHA be damned.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-17 05:24:05

Have a boyancy float collar at the end with tubing running up the side. Attach a source of helium to the end when pickup is being made to inflate the collar. Raising the nozzle end up so as to allow the divers the safety factor that OSHA wants.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-17 10:42:41

NASA Return to Flight Task Group Final Report Issued

Pretty much that is the end of there responsibility..
While Nasa found more problems and fixed a many, they still fall short after see the amount of foam still come off the ET and of its size.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-17 12:12:41

NASA Updates Media About Space Shuttle External Tank

At 2 p.m. EDT, Monday, Aug. 22, NASA managers will provide reporters the latest status of engineering teams looking into why a large piece of External Tank insulating foam broke off during Space Shuttle Discovery's liftoff.
The briefers are:
- Bill Gerstenmaier, NASA's associate administrator for Space Operations
- Dr. Richard Gilbrech, External Tank 'Tiger Team' lead

SpaceNut · 2005-08-17 20:17:52

NASA Announces Media Update About Space Shuttle Program

Bill Gerstenmaier, NASA's associate administrator for Space Operations, will update the media about plans for the next Space Shuttle mission (STS-121). The press conference will be live on NASA TV, news conference starting at noon EDT, will last approximately one hour.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-18 10:03:45

[url=http://www.flatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050818/NEWS02/508180347/1007]Launch chances look slim for this year

Tank headed back to factory; NASA eyes March launch date[/url]

A 15-story external tank will be shipped back to its New Orleans manufacturing plant early next week, where it will serve as a test article for troubleshooting or be retrofitted for NASA's second post-Columbia test flight.

So which tank is this one and has it ever seen the conditions of fueling. In fact it should be the first tank that was removed if anything.

Of course if they need to remove the existing tank from Atlantis, then any chance of a september launch is out.

Also questionable is whether NASA will be ready to launch during four-day windows that open Nov. 7 and Jan. 4.
unless a quick fix is identified soon, managers might set a target date during a March 4 through 19 window.
Other available windows include May 3 through May 22 and June 30 through July 19.

Also if minor or no changes are made then the other possible plan is to fly Discovery again to get the same duplication of event conditions.

Last but not least is if the launch is delay to march 2006 then the 5 year certification limit of use on the boosters is the next questionable item being that they are currently 4 years and 4 months old. Considering that the oldest booster ever fired during ground tests was about 4 years old.

Palomar · 2005-08-18 10:25:41

[url=http://www.flatoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050818/NEWS02/508180347/1007]Launch chances look slim for this year
Tank headed back to factory; NASA eyes March launch date[/url]

*Saw the potential March date in an article yesterday or day before. It has aroused more "scuttle the Shuttle" talk (permanently/entirely) at different sites.

Yep...Discovery again:

Also under consideration:
Which orbiter will fly the next mission.
Atlantis long has been scheduled to launch on the second post-Columbia flight. But managers are thinking about launching Discovery.

Whatev.

Doing so would enable engineers to most closely duplicate conditions encountered on Discovery's recently completed test flight to the International Space Station.

I actually laughed in spite of myself. They've GOT to be kidding. Someone tell me it's a joke...I'm dreaming...no, really.

They barely get Discovery back safe and sound, and they want to duplicate the conditions of the previous mission as much as possible? With human lives on board?

Am I missing something? I suppose there's some method to the madness I, as a layperson, am not privy to. Explanations, anyone?

--Cindy

SpaceNut · 2005-08-18 10:42:57

Only 7 out of the 25 member panel dicided to vioce there opinions as to the succes or failure of Nasa to follow the boards recomendations.

7 NASA panelists report program is still troubled

The culture inside the space shuttle program remains arrogant, sloppy and schedule-driven, says a scathing statement published Wednesday by a faction on the panel that oversaw NASA's efforts to return the shuttle to space.
The minority statement says NASA managers still rely on the logic that technical glitches are acceptable if they haven't caused a catastrophe on prior shuttle missions.

GCNRevenger · 2005-08-18 10:48:45

"Doing so would enable engineers to most closely duplicate conditions encountered on Discovery's recently completed test flight to the International Space Station."

My first impression was that I thought I was going to be ill... ill in a "hey NASA, you're fired, somebody go get Burt and Elon on the line" kind of way.

I do think they mean with the new "super" foam-proof fuel tank that the Michoud people are supposedly going to make... And make they will, in short order, or they should all be fired.

Rxke · 2005-08-18 15:32:47

Griffin conceding publicly the minority report is important.

"For good or ill, obviously it was ill, we in NASA did not look in detail at foam shedding from the tank for 113 flights, and shame on us," he said during a news conference at NASA's Washington offices.

"We don't suppose we are done ... one of the reasons why I was very receptive to the minority report is we can't get done unless we are willing to listen to all of the hard truths."

but he denies confidence crisis...

GCNRevenger · 2005-08-18 17:12:13

Now Mike, c'mon now... you know that foam has been falling off that tank before, you know for fact that it destroyed Columbia, and you know that it is still a problem from Discovery's near miss...

You have spent two years and about ten billion dollars now since Columbia, you knew what destroyed Columbia, but your repair job could only be described as "half-assed" after all that? After you knew the circumstance that killed those astronauts?

I think that this qualifies as a serious credibility crisis, and fixing it should start by getting rid of the External Tank officers responsable for the redesign of the tank for incompetance. Publicly. All foam applied by hand should be eliminated, no questions of excuses from the "foam guys." This business of "understanding" the foam loss is be stopped at once, and a much more pragmatic mission - stopping SHEDDING - be adopted.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-18 19:10:08

Thou Mike is in command of Nasa at this time, we must remember that he has only been in power since around March 2005.
The time it takes to make an ET means that we are living with the legacy making policies of the former Mr.O'keefe.

GCNRevenger · 2005-08-18 19:18:45

Irrelivent, Michael Griffin was in charge prior to Discovery's flight, so it was on him as the ultimate responsability to see that the problem that doomed Columbia, and by extension the obvious incompetance that caused it, was fixed before putting people back on the thing. He should have taken a trip to Michoud in his first month, realized how poor a job they were doing, and stopped the Return to Flight business until they did their job right.

The failure to do so is just that, a failure

John Creighton · 2005-08-18 19:27:48

Irrelivent, Michael Griffin was in charge prior to Discovery's flight, so it was on him as the ultimate responsability to see that the problem that doomed Columbia, and by extension the obvious incompetance that caused it, was fixed before putting people back on the thing. He should have taken a trip to Michoud in his first month, realized how poor a job they were doing, and stopped the Return to Flight business until they did their job right.
The failure to do so is just that, a failure

So Mike may of made a mistake and he has taken responsibility. However, Mike is the best guy we had in NASA so perhaps it might be a good idea to calm down a little.

Ad Astra · 2005-08-18 19:38:35

Aside from the PAL ramp oversight, it looks like NASA made some herculean efforts at reducing the foam shedding. Of course, a herculean effort isn't good enough when you're dealing with a fundamentally flawed system. Even NASA's fixes have caused unintended problems; the insulation on the heater wires for the bipod caused an unacceptably large piece of foam to fall from that area.

With the flaws of the shuttle as apparent as ever, NASA and Congress will have to decide if the shuttle is worth the risk and the money. If the shuttle is to be retired before STS-121, NASA had better make that call before the end of the fiscal year on Sept. 30.

SpaceNut · 2005-08-18 20:04:24

News of next shuttle launch to be in march 2005 as a result of the media update?
NASA Pushes Back Next Launch Date to 2006

This gives them more time to disect a few more tanks that were ready for use to aid in figuring out the root cause. This will also most likely mean that Discovery will launch and Alantis will remain as backup rescue vehicle.

RobS · 2005-08-19 01:34:44

Today's New York Times editorial:

Editorial
Mismanaging the Shuttle Fixes
Published: August 19, 2005

The troubled space shuttle program is in even more trouble than we realized. Seven members of an official review panel have just issued a scathing indictment of the process by which NASA determined that it was safe to start flying the shuttles again - only to discover that it really wasn't.

Meanwhile, NASA itself, still reeling from unexpected foam shedding on the first test flight since the Columbia disaster, has been forced to postpone the next shuttle flight until March or later while it struggles to fix the problem.

Both events ought to force the administration and Congress to take a much harder look at how long the shuttles should keep flying - or perhaps whether they should be flying at all. The underlying problems suggest the need to retire the shuttles quickly, both to end this needless flirtation with catastrophe and to free up funds for more exciting space ventures.

After NASA spent two and a half years trying to repair the shuttles and instill a more rigorous, safety-conscious attitude in its work force, it was depressing to read a 19-page critique by the seven panelists accusing NASA of cutting corners to meet unrealistic launching schedules. That was precisely the kind of management failure that brought us the Challenger disaster of 1986 and the Columbia accident in 2003. If left uncorrected, it will probably bring us another shuttle catastrophe in years to come.

The seven critics were a minority on the panel, which had 25 members and was known as the Stafford-Covey Task Group, after the two former astronauts who led it. The panel was set up two years ago to assess how well NASA was doing in meeting the recommendations of the board that investigated the Columbia accident. In a lengthy final report issued this week, the task group concluded that NASA had met most but not all of the board's requirements.

The seven critics added a withering commentary based on observations they had made during two years of monitoring NASA up close. They found that arbitrary launching dates had led engineers to choose quick solutions for technical problems, not necessarily the best solutions. If a problem looked too hard to solve, the engineers and managers had a tendency to define it away. Performance standards that were supposedly mandatory became goals that simply required NASA's "best effort."

NASA's top leadership was accused of failing to set high standards and hold people accountable for meeting them, although the new NASA administrator, Michael Griffin, was praised for astute interventions after his arrival. Most troubling of all was the bald assertion in the minority report that NASA's much vaunted engineering force had lost its appetite for careful and rigorous analysis.

One technical review meeting degenerated into a series of status reports, with not a single technical question asked or answered. It can only be disheartening that such lackadaisical behavior is still entrenched after all the exhortations for NASA to reach new heights of vigilance.

A majority of the panel - which included members with substantial expertise in space matters, including some who have headed large technically based organizations - did not sign on to the minority report. Some members even praised NASA's performance.

But the minority report gains credence from the wealth of detail it cites and the expertise of the critics. Their ranks include a retired NASA engineer who spent years in key positions within the agency; an astronaut who made five shuttle flights and now oversees military space launchings in Florida; a longtime deputy director in the Navy's nuclear program, which is frequently touted as a model of technical management; a former director of the Congressional Budget Office; a former under secretary of the Navy; an academic who managed recovery operations in Texas after the Columbia accident; and a professor of public administration who has been analyzing the need to encourage dissenting views in organizations like NASA.

This is not a marginal group that can be dismissed as a bunch of misguided rabble-rousers. All seven were appointed by NASA because of their presumed expertise and objectivity.

Mr. Griffin pledged yesterday to read the critique carefully, as well as the main report, to extract ideas for improving the space program. He contended that the agency had made great strides in improving the shuttle and tightening its engineering discipline, but he clearly wants to shuck off the shuttle program when feasible.

The new administrator said he was no longer aiming at a specific number of shuttle flights but was working instead toward an expeditious but orderly retirement of the shuttle over the next five years - enough time, he thinks, to finish the space station. If the minority critique is anywhere near on target, as it appears to be, he ought to move that retirement date forward considerably.

New Mars Forums

Announcement

#26 2005-08-15 07:08:21

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#27 2005-08-15 17:43:20

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#28 2005-08-15 18:32:54

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#29 2005-08-15 20:02:31

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#30 2005-08-16 08:15:00

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#31 2005-08-16 19:15:35

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#32 2005-08-16 19:57:15

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#33 2005-08-16 20:10:47

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#34 2005-08-16 21:04:47

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#35 2005-08-17 05:24:05

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#36 2005-08-17 10:42:41

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#37 2005-08-17 12:12:41

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#38 2005-08-17 20:17:52

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#39 2005-08-18 10:03:45

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#40 2005-08-18 10:25:41

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#41 2005-08-18 10:42:57

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#42 2005-08-18 10:48:45

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#43 2005-08-18 15:32:47

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#44 2005-08-18 17:12:13

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#45 2005-08-18 19:10:08

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#46 2005-08-18 19:18:45

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#47 2005-08-18 19:27:48

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#48 2005-08-18 19:38:35

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#49 2005-08-18 20:04:24

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

#50 2005-08-19 01:34:44

Re: Shuttle ST-121 Atlantis

Board footer