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GregM, what is your per flight cost estimate for the Stick?
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In my opinion, the bigger developmental issue for such a vehicle would be the man rating for the second stage. It would be this stage that would be doing the bulk of the flying – likely burning for up to 8 or 10 minutes, depending on the launch profile.
But this is true for any CEV system since the US has no man-rated 2nd stages whatsoever, correct?
Edited By BWhite on 1118635896
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GregM, what is your per flight cost estimate for the Stick?
= = =
In my opinion, the bigger developmental issue for such a vehicle would be the man rating for the second stage. It would be this stage that would be doing the bulk of the flying – likely burning for up to 8 or 10 minutes, depending on the launch profile.
But this is true for any CEV system since the US has no man-rated 2nd stages whatsoever, correct?
Sure, very true. Couldn't agree more. There are currently no man-rated second stages in the US inventory. The point I was making was that the STS SRB is man-rated already - and that recertifying a modified version as the first stage of The Stick might be the easier part. But any second stage used in The Stick would be harder to certify because it would be new - or at least using current technology that has been never man-rated - hence this might be a bigger development issue than that of the STS SRB derivative first-stage of The Stick.
As for cost - oh God, who knows ? - since vehicle architecture isn't even defined yet. $60-90 million ??? (wild guess). I strongly suspect that it would be less than Delta 4 Heavy no matter what however. The thing is that the facilities for manned spacecraft launch already exist at LC-39, whereas all new facilities would have to be built to accomidate manned spacecraft for Delta-4, adding signifigantly to program cost. This is in some ways, The Stick's ace in the hole.
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Color me a bit parinoid, but I am verrry skeptical of using the SRB self destruct mechanism as a means of "shutting down" the booster... the unpredictability of the size of explosion worries me alot, but more importantly the requirement that the capsule be well away from the booster "within milliseconds" will put some pretty severe accelerations on the crew.
The biggest problem with the SRB though is how do you know when to trigger the escape mechanism? How do you know if the booster is getting ready to fail or not with good certainty? And if so, how much warning are you going to get? This is where a liquid fueled vehicle has an edge, that you can focus your fault detection energies on the engine instead of the entire booster, and it is probobly easier to detect trouble coming in the first place (vibration at the turbopump, regenerative nozzle pressure drop, nets of thermometers, etc).
As far as the actual abort goes, shutting off a liquid fueled engine is much, much better then having to blow the big SRB with a self destruct mechanism, that you don't have to use the ultrahigh-G escape motors unless there is a fuel fire or something really bad. Liquid rockets have failure modes other then "kaboom." Also the entire structure of the big SRB operates at extremely high internal pressures, so if it fails, its always going to fail in a big way. However, the only thing under pressure in a liquid rocket is the combustion chaimber and turbopump which are on the other end of the rocket from you. And say the fuel tanks do ignite and blow up? They are going to be more of a low pressure fireball ("deflagration") rather then a hard supersonic impact explosion, which is definatly preferable. Escaping from a liquid fueled booster in a less-then-violent way is easy with modern gelled fuel throttleable escape rockets.
I am getting worried that Griffin wants to rush to put CEV up there to appease the whiney dog gam good for nothing ISS lovers (if he isn't one himself!!!), and not to pick the best option. If the better option will take a few more years then he wants, then thats just the way it is, and he needs to deal with it.
I am interested in what Lockheed could do with a modified Atlas-V. If you increased the payload just a little bit (say, 2-3MT), you could probobly launch the LEO-only version of the CEV with no SRMs at all. Lockheed is also talking about a refit of Atlas, possibly using the RD-170 engine and enlarged fuel tanks, which would put up the full Lunar-class CEV and then some with no boosters and challenge the Delta-IV superheavy with only one core with SRMs.
I am kinda wondering if Griffin wants to send people to an asteroid or something like the Planetary Society wants.
[i]"The power of accurate observation is often called cynicism by those that do not have it." - George Bernard Shaw[/i]
[i]The glass is at 50% of capacity[/i]
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Been reading the Planetary Society report Bill linked to. Fun stuff.
Of course the argument for Thikol and SDV is made rather strongly, but I noticed something in-between the lines.
Thikol and SDV are the wrong choices.
Yes, Thikol’s “stick” has an impressive launch record. However, any “stick” would have to be redesigned, essentially making it a new launch vehicle. That by itself isn’t the main problem though.
Yes, SDV would have an impressive up-orbit mass capability- only outdone by the now-vanished Saturn. Yet, any SDV would require modifications not only to itself, but to ISS module components (at least with the inline variation), which adds time and cost and complexity to finishing the ISS (we ain’t going anywhere till ISS is complete). If the Shuttle C variant is used (side mount variant), the SDV wouldn’t have much up-lift mass, and the cost is relatively the same.
Now, we can argue the pros and cons of money and complexity till the cow jumps back over the moon. I will argue that the Stick and the SDV are both the wrong choices for one reason, and one reason alone: Single Point of Failure.
The Vision of Exploration, our entire space program, should be one of flexibility that can deal with the unexpected circumstances that cutting edge science and technology often bring. Tying ourselves into one launch vehicle as the means to execute our exploration strategy is a bad idea. We should know better by now.
Why? As an example, take the current situation with the ISS. Because the Shuttle failed, we are unable to continue construction or launch humans into orbit. A single point of failure prevents any further development and constrains the entire space program (well, a great deal of it). The same situation with Hubble. Because the Shuttle cannot launch, we are faced with losing the Hubble, or bending over backwards with increased cost and risk to fix it. All because of a single point of failure. Our launch system.
The Stick and SDV are single point of failure as now proposed. If the stick fails, then we will be unable to launch the CEV- effectively unable to send humans into space until the Launch Vehicle is vetted again (see current Shuttle grounding and post-Challenger grounding for example). If SDV fails, we will be unable to launch the cargo and large pieces that enable human exploration beyond LEO until the SDV is vetted.
By choosing EELV or multiple launch vehicle capability for both man and cargo, we preclude being grounded due to a single launch vehicle family being grounded. We reduce the chances of a single point of failure. These lessons should be well known to the space community, and is the primary motivation for the current Air force stable of two EELV launches vehicles (Delta and Atlas).
Cheerleaders for the “stick” and SDV, please explain how embracing the single point of failure system for CEV is better. Maybe from an engineering standpoint, there is a great deal of value, but as time has shown, it takes more than engineering to get to the Moon- or Mars.
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Cheerleaders for the “stick” and SDV, please explain how embracing the single point of failure system for CEV is better. Maybe from an engineering standpoint, there is a great deal of value, but as time has shown, it takes more than engineering to get to the Moon- or Mars.
First, the RSRM has been used over 200 times with only one failure and not reading the manual (weather too cold) was a big part of that, and that defect has been corrected.
Second, design the uppermost stage to fit on either the Thiokol booster, Delta, or Atlas.
Third, I do favor t/Space over the Stick which I favor over EELV.
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If the Stick is $100 M per shot and EELV $200 M per shot which do you prefer: 5 sticks plus t/Space funding or 5 EELV and no t/Space funding?
Which option gives greater future flexibilty?
Edited By BWhite on 1118669193
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Engineering aside, one political danger of shutting down shuttle and delaying crewed CEV until 2014 to leave a 4 year gap in US human spaceflight is that the politicians may learn to live with the idea that we cannot send men into space.
Come 2012 a decision to postpone CEV would be easier to swallow if CEV remained non-operational.
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t/Space of course solves all these problems and at $500 million seems a "hedge bet" even/especially if the stick CEV is pursued.
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First, the RSRM has been used over 200 times with only one failure and not reading the manual (weather too cold) was a big part of that, and that defect has been corrected.
First, it is not the engineering I find fault with, it is the program architecture that creates choke-points in the execution of the program. Failure at these choke-points preclude or delay final mission success.
Second, a redesigned Thikol vehicle is effectively a new launch vehicle, which starts near square one in terms of historical reliability. Designing the second stage to fit other launch vehicles is an optimal solution, the more the merrier; however, we will be altering the Thikol launch vehicle to accommodate a new profile, which adds to the cost and complexity of the final launch vehicle. Will it still be 100 million a shot at this point? The cost irrelevant really, my main sticking point is tying us to only one option to launch our CEV or our cargo.
5 sticks plus t/Space funding or 5 EELV and no t/Space funding?
5 EELV and no t/space funding. T/Space makes a lot of promises, and I want to see them deliver. For the amount they are asking, and for the deal they are offering (basically a NASA funded grant that entitles T/Space to the IP when they haven’t done much to prove themselves except enroll Rutan doesn’t merit that deal).
EELV automatically means there are two launch vehicle families to execute VSE. It means flexibility. 200 million a shot is a better deal than 2-3 years of a stalled multi-billion dollar program on a tight deadline. What was the old NASA saying…oh yes, “failure is not an option.” Don’t build “failure” points into the program.
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EELV automatically means there are two launch vehicle families to execute VSE. It means flexibility. 200 million a shot is a better deal than 2-3 years of a stalled multi-billion dollar program on a tight deadline. What was the old NASA saying…oh yes, “failure is not an option.” Don’t build “failure” points into the program.
Are you certain the DoD plan to downselect to Atlas OR Delta is officially dead?
We also need to factor in and amortize the costs of upgrading BOTH Pad 37 for Delta and LC 41 for Atlas to support human crews. Not cheap, that. VAB can support both Pad 39A and Pad 39B.
If EELV is the CEV choice and Pad 39 is scrapped, what if DoD decides its doesn't need or want EELV any more? An already overpriced rocket becames staggeringly expensive.
EELV plus a mythical future clean sheet booster ties our hands more than anything, in my opinion, because (among other things) future budget deficits will alwasy make new programs more difficult to fund than ongoong ones.
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Since Atlas uses Russian engines already, why not just buy Zenit? If Russian stuff is "off the table" why is Atlas on the table?
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How soon can EELV CEV fly? Especially if Admiral Steidle's preparations are undone?
By late July we should know more.
If the human structures for a EELV CEV "fly-off' are scrapped (and all the people reassigned or let go) EELV CEV will be dead for the foreseeable future.
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http://space.com/spacenews/businessmond … .html]News, from outside the circle. :;):
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and NASA Administrator Mike Griffin are expected to meet toward the end of June and Washington sources say the agenda is devoted to that very issue.
Heh! To be a fly at that meeting. . .
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http://planetary.org/news/2005/garver_r … ml]Griffin appears to have bi-partisan supporters, so it may boild down to how much political capital the Administration wishes to spend to support Rumsfeld and Boeing.
Michoud is a Lockheed facility, right? They win either way except for an all Delta program.
Edited By BWhite on 1118673080
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The Stick and SDV are single point of failure as now proposed. If the stick fails, then we will be unable to launch the CEV- effectively unable to send humans into space until the Launch Vehicle is vetted again (see current Shuttle grounding and post-Challenger grounding for example). If SDV fails, we will be unable to launch the cargo and large pieces that enable human exploration beyond LEO until the SDV is vetted.
First, it is not the engineering I find fault with, it is the program architecture that creates choke-points in the execution of the program. Failure at these choke-points preclude or delay final mission success.
The cost irrelevant really, my main sticking point is tying us to only one option to launch our CEV or our cargo.
So does that mean that if we go the SDV route for the stick or for heavy lift cargo, that we should continue to have the current shuttle with the capability to go online if needed.
Or that just multiple means to carry out the means to the end must be available by and for Nasa or can a partners vehicles do.
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Are you certain the DoD plan to downselect to Atlas OR Delta is officially dead?
Considering that Boeing and Lockheed were practically forced into a merger of their support systems for the EELV, yeah, downselect is officially dead.
We also need to factor in and amortize the costs of upgrading BOTH Pad 37 for Delta and LC 41 for Atlas to support human crews. Not cheap, that. VAB can support both Pad 39A and Pad 39B.
And we need to factor in and amortize the costs of upgrading and modifying SDV and Thikol. It’s a tie, with EELV coming ahead since it offers flexibility. I told you I do not fault the engineering of SDV or Thikol. I fault the program architecture. We can nickel and dime this, compare delta v and up mass to death, but how do you account for the inherent failure choke point of SDV and Thikol?
We are going to launch rockets, and no matter how good we are, no matter how good the science, a rocket will explode. When it does, it effectively stops us dead in our tracks. If we know that a rocket will explode, doesn’t it make sense to account for that in our program design? Yet by pursuing SDV and Thikol, we are basically closing our eyes and crossing our fingers against the inevitable.
I know you don’t want to see the program get derailed, but you are ignoring this point.
If EELV is the CEV choice and Pad 39 is scrapped, what if DoD decides its doesn't need or want EELV any more? An already overpriced rocket becames staggeringly expensive.
I don’t see that happening. EELV is the only way they are going to launch GPS II/III and their Star Wars program. EELV going away is effectively saying Lockheed and Boeing go away.
EELV plus a mythical future clean sheet booster ties our hands more than anything, in my opinion, because (among other things) future budget deficits will alwasy make new programs more difficult to fund than ongoong ones.
Future budget deficits may be an issue, but that will always be the case for any option. We threaten exsisting budgets with SDV and Thikol because failure in development will reduce Congressional support for NASA (as it reinforces the idea that NASA just can’t do space exploration any more). NASA needs assured wins, and it needs a straight path to success that cannot be sidetracked by known failure points. SDV and Thikol is building in future failure.
Since Atlas uses Russian engines already, why not just buy Zenit? If Russian stuff is "off the table" why is Atlas on the table?
Russian stuff might be on the table given a change in law. Other than that, it makes more sense to keep our rockets in-house (reduces outside influences that may constrain our ability to execute our plan- see Russian Soyuz rocket ride as example).
As for the make-up of the Atlas [shrug], I don’t make policy.
How soon can EELV CEV fly? Especially if Admiral Steidle's preparations are undone?
EELV is being acclerated, and Steidle’s preparations are not really being undone- his preparations was paper studies, which have been redone and remodeled. It will have more effect on spiral 2 and 3 than on spiral 1.
If the human structures for a EELV CEV "fly-off' are scrapped (and all the people reassigned or let go) EELV CEV will be dead for the foreseeable future.
And the first mistake of VSE will have been made. So July it is. Want to bet?
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Any bet should be carefully defined.
The ability to fly CEV on Delta & Atlas as well as Thiokol is not a bad thing and might actually happen. Griffin may also find a way to squeeze a stick CEV into the ISS / STS funding AND continue EELV CEV development.
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http://www.thespacereview.com/article/392/1]This is interesting:
Roger Launius, former NASA Chief Historian and now with the National Air and Space Museum, described how Houbolt’s approach in 1961–1962 was the kind of thinking that is needed today: “In many ways, the lunar mode decision was an example of heterogeneous engineering, a process that recognizes that technological issues are also simultaneously organizational, economic, social, and political,” he wrote. “Various interests often clash in the decision-making process as difficult calculations have to be made and decisions taken.”
Since that is an accurate description of the current state of NASA efforts to plot its future paths through space, it is sobering to realize that many historians argue that without the Houbolt-led push for LOR almost half a century ago, the entire manned lunar landing program might never have succeeded. And without somebody taking on the Houboltian mantle today and bringing sanity to the current planning chaos, the prospects of a successful human breakout from near-Earth space remain dubious at best.
The question may be whether Michael Griffin can be the Houbolt of this current vision-quest.
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I know what you mean Clark, but it really does boil down to the dollar signs. That designing your vehicles to fit two different sizes of launch vehicle and the cost of maintaining two seperate rocket lines when there is only enough business to efficently use one, is more then NASA can afford. The economies of scale are really vital here, that NASA can affrord Delta/Atlas or SDV, but probobly not both.
Simply put, the risk is one that NASA just has to live with if it is going to afford to do much in space. The chance of a delay is not worth the cost of trying to use both rockets.
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Use Zenit? Zenit's track reccord is not that great, its upper stage Isp is low, and most of all it isn't built here. Thats a silly question Bill. Give Russia veto power over VSE? Yeah, thats lovely... and certainly not worth the money.
We can build RD-180 here, RD-170 isn't but a pair of 180's glued together.
And I have to agree with the T/Space skepitcs, that we shouldn't give them half a billion dollars unless they can prove they can do more then make pretty pictures... don't you recall how they convienantly forgot about a little thing called fuel boiloff for the Lunar Lander refueling system?
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Rushing to get CEV in flight to keep congressmen from axing NASA seems like a bad tradeoff to me versus doing CEV right, especially when the only justification for early CEV also justifies the ISS.
[i]"The power of accurate observation is often called cynicism by those that do not have it." - George Bernard Shaw[/i]
[i]The glass is at 50% of capacity[/i]
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Use Zenit? Zenit's track reccord is not that great, its upper stage Isp is low, and most of all it isn't built here. Thats a silly question Bill. Give Russia veto power over VSE? Yeah, thats lovely... and certainly not worth the money.
We can build RD-180 here, RD-170 isn't but a pair of 180's glued together.
Rhetorical questions need not always be answered. :;):
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Why do we believe there will be sufficent launches to support BOTH Atlas V and Delta IV? Will we pay to upgrade both Pad 37 and LC 41 to support a hypothetical desire for redundancy?
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While I could put this link else where I believe it is to the point on both lockheed and of Boeing in that they both believe they should be the one...
Boeing and Lockheed Martin Push Separate Designs for Possible Moon Missions
for Boeing's Delta 4 team and their counterparts at Lockheed Martin, the focus is on finding a stable government customer for the EELV besides the Air Force, which is straining to keep both rockets in service.
As others have noted with where the control of the vehicle of preforance might be:
Both Lockheed Martin and Boeing officials stress sharing the cost of launch infrastructure with the Air Force as one of the big advantages of EELV-derived solutions. That position is shared by White House officials who crafted a U.S. space transportation policy that nudges NASA toward using the EELV for its future launch needs, which include placing some 100 metric tons of hardware into Earth orbit for lunar missions. The policy, released in January, also bumps the decision for meeting that heavy-lift requirement up to the White House and directs NASA and the Pentagon to come together on a joint recommendation.
As previously mentioned by GCNRevenger upgrading delta IV for the cev :
The "most straightforward approach" to boosting the Delta 4-Heavy's performance would be to add six solid-rocket strap-on boosters, Harvey said. But given that some NASA officials are less than enthusiastic about adding a half-dozen solids to a rocket launching humans, Boeing has done extensive analysis of two other upgrade options: modifying the Delta 4's upper stage or upgrading the RS-68 engines that power the rocket's main stage.
The Delta 4's upper stage is powered by a single RL10 engine capable of producing 22,000 pounds of thrust. Harvey said a Delta 4-Heavy could lift a 25-30 metric ton CEV with a new upper stage that uses three RL10 engines or one of the 60,000-pound-thrust engines that Boeing has on the drawing boards.
Making these modification do get us to 50 but not to the 100 metric ton which some say we need.
Simular options are possible on the atlas 5 as well.
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I know what you mean Clark, but it really does boil down to the dollar signs. That designing your vehicles to fit two different sizes of launch vehicle and the cost of maintaining two seperate rocket lines when there is only enough business to efficently use one, is more then NASA can afford.
So along these lines, NASA pursuing EELV means cost savings as part of the support costs are borne by the Airforce. If SDV and Thikol are chosen, NASA is bearing the full cost alone. How is that stretching the value of the budgetary dollar?
And like it or not, NASA is supposed to be helping the aerospace community- building their own launch vehicles (which will not be pushing technology development) does nothing to help the US aerospace industry. So we are losing out two fold by choosing SDV and Thikol.
At least with EELV we can push the technology development of those rockets, as well as improve the business prospects of American aerospace. That usually translates into jobs in the private sector for engineers and other aerospace egg heads.
Simply put, the risk is one that NASA just has to live with if it is going to afford to do much in space. The chance of a delay is not worth the cost of trying to use both rockets.
Really? SDV and Thikol will result in a delay, at some point, down the line. Look at ISS. Billions are wasted and our space program spinning because of the exact problem we will repeat with SDV and Thikol. Now imagine a potential lunar or Mars program where we are dealing with on orbit assembly (of some sort). Fuel or people waiting in space, missions delayed for years as we ascertain the small overlooked fault in the complex systems that blew up.
We know this is going to happen. We expect this to happen. Yet it gets nothing more than a shrug? For what? The apparent short term expediency that will cost us more in the long term? It was exactly that thinking that put the ISS at a 51 degree orbit. It was exactly that thinking that made the Shuttle useless as they tried to give it cross-range functionality for an Air force that didn’t want it.
It also invites future disaster as we now face- the one where the Russians have us over a barrel. Precisely because we have no redundancy in our launch vehicles, we have to deal with Russian demands. We have to bow to the dictates of other countries. This is incredibly stupid.
Why do we believe there will be sufficent launches to support BOTH Atlas V and Delta IV? Will we pay to upgrade both Pad 37 and LC 41 to support a hypothetical desire for redundancy?
There will be sufficient launches over the long term. The “pay as you go” approach favors launching what we can, when we can- not the “here is a billion dollars, launch the big bird”. Testing alone of spiral one (and then ISS taxi duty) will be several dozen launches by the end of the decade.
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There will be sufficient launches over the long term. The “pay as you go” approach favors launching what we can, when we can- not the “here is a billion dollars, launch the big bird”. Testing alone of spiral one (and then ISS taxi duty) will be several dozen launches by the end of the decade.
By analogy, to taxi an aircraft at 80% of takeoff speed accomplishes nothing. "Sorry sir, we reached 80% of takeoff speed and ran out of money."
If "go as you pay" doesn't get us anything except more flags and footprints, the money is 100% wasted. If you can't afford the tip don't order the meal. The mission, in my opinion is to return to the Moon, and this time "we stay" withe the Moon, Mars and elsehere being assimilated into a permanent sphere of human presence and activity.
We SHOULD NOT embark on "go as we can pay" unless we know we can afford to pay enough to do something useful, other than subsidise AIr Force buying Delta IV. My cynical fear is that we will "pretend" to have a civilian space program while using NASA money to support Defense Department needs.
And I believe EELV cannot sortie enough mass fast enough and (cheaply enough) to do anything useful on the civilian side of the space exploration equation.
=IF= we cannot get SDV costs down, then our current budget at $16 billion is simply insufficient to accomplish meaningful space exploraion. Perhaps that is true.
I believe Michael Griffin knows this and does not intend to supervise a NASA that accelerates to 80% of take off speed and then runs out of fuel.
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But remember the narcissim of petty differences - - powerless people arguing over tiny points.
I would like to hear a complete transcript of the Rumsfeld - Griffin conversation, though.
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By analogy, to taxi an aircraft at 80% of takeoff speed accomplishes nothing. "Sorry sir, we reached 80% of takeoff speed and ran out of money."
You obviously never flown out of Orange County... :laugh:
If "go as you pay" doesn't get us anything except more flags and footprints, the money is 100% wasted. If you can't afford the tip don't order the meal. The mission, in my opinion is to return to the Moon, and this time "we stay" withe the Moon, Mars and elsehere being assimilated into a permanent sphere of human presence and activity.
You want assurance and guareente's? Okay, death and taxes, the rest is in play. Like it or not, Bush did his part. He gave the space community exactly what they wanted- and he didn't have to even do that much. He gave the executive will and he got NASA a realistic budget that at least has some bipartisan support.
But the fisherman wants more from the talking fish! :laugh:
We SHOULD NOT embark on "go as we can pay" unless we know we can afford to pay enough to do something useful, other than subsidise AIr Force buying Delta IV. My cynical fear is that we will "pretend" to have a civilian space program while using NASA money to support Defense Department needs.
What do you think NASA has been doing for the last 50 years?! SR-71 Blackbird? The sats? The Shuttle? Space Station Freedom?
Look at this cynicaly if you want- US is going to complete the ISS the same way it is going to retire the Shuttle with "honor". USA does not accept failure, and if the VSE and Moon destinations are accepted as valid, we will go, the same way we kept flying the albatross of the Shuttle.
And I believe EELV cannot sortie enough mass fast enough and (cheaply enough) to do anything useful on the civilian side of the space exploration equation.
Hmm, looks like both Delta and Atlas can match current Shuttle metric tons to LEO with some modifications. How much we can send up in one go is simply an engineering constraint some bright people will have to work around. It dosen't preclude our ability to do what we need to do.
=IF= we cannot get SDV costs down, then our current budget at $16 billion is simply insufficient to accomplish meaningful space exploraion. Perhaps that is true.
It is, which is why we keep looking at all possible alternatives. Which, in a way, is a goof thing.
But remember the narcissim of petty differences - - powerless people arguing over tiny points.
I would like to hear a complete transcript of the Rumsfeld - Griffin conversation, though.
If I had to bet, the conservative bet would be: Griffin gets SDV but EELV must be used for manned CEV and high-value cargo/modules.
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Well if you are concerned for the jobs of American aerospace companies, then you would be pushing for SDV clark, and not EELV.
That said, it is possible that SDV will be cost competitive or even superior then EELV even with limited vehicle sharing with the USAF. The bennefits of heavy lift to simplifying missions and permitting larger payloads by volume (8-9m+ versus 6.5m dia) aren't likly nessesarry for the Moon, but they are certainly required for Mars, so there may be a substantial cost savings there, particularly versus a clean-sheet EELV-derived HLLV rocket. The SDV option is worth consideration. This is not simply a matter of expediance, it is quite possible that SDV is by virtue of its merits the better choice.
"SDV and Thikol will result in a delay, at some point, down the line."
Well no, not really. The only way in which there will, with absolute certainty, be a loss of a vehicle is if the rocket is flown forever, otherwise you are just talking about a probability. Considering the relativly small number of launches being talked about, it is quite possible that we won't see a single failure for a very long time... perhaps the life of the design even, and very possible only after many flights.
And even if there were a failure? Boeing didn't stop flying Delta-II's the few times they failed, nor did the USAF stop flying Titan with its lousy reccord, so why would NASA? The huge delays caused by the Shuttle nightmare have been because the life of the crew is directly tied to the reliability of the vehicle, and because each orbiter is irreplaceable unlike an expendable rocket. This is simply not the case with expendable rockets with good escape systems, so yes I expect NASA to quite simply shrug and be prepared to lose a launcher or two. It is not the least bit stupid, it is simply accepting a risk inherint to the business... NASA must get over its hypersensitivity to vehicle loss, or its never going anywhere, no matter what rockets are available.
The notion that CEV will require "dozens" of launches to test is also nonsense.
Bill is also talking about the EELV flight rate, and not so much the payload each. Best case senario, Delta-IV HLV will reach about half the payload as SDV will, so you are going to need to fly it twice as fast. Opening a second launch pad to fly would be a capital and overhead cost that would be too expensive.
Edit: NASA can't operate the way it used to with a "pay as you go" aproach. That will fail, and that is all there is to it. NASA doing the status quo thing will inevitibly lead to its own destruction.
[i]"The power of accurate observation is often called cynicism by those that do not have it." - George Bernard Shaw[/i]
[i]The glass is at 50% of capacity[/i]
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When considering the "NASA pursuing SDV versus EELV means cost savings as part of the support costs are borne by the Airforce." One must also consider that the civilian sector will not be allowed access to military items only Nasa can at this time. Since all of the discussed companies are privately owned then the chances of one of them doing any CEV creation without a contract will be none.
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Well if you are concerned for the jobs of American aerospace companies, then you would be pushing for SDV clark, and not EELV.
I would if I saw a NASA centric launch vehicle as part of the American aerospace industry. I don’t. If NASA is going to build something, then it should be experimental, and it should be cutting edge. NASA should be helping to lead the way, not getting and staying in the game. It is a waste of resources and a poor use of the talent available in NASA.
That said, it is possible that SDV will be cost competitive or even superior then EELV even with limited vehicle sharing with the USAF. The bennefits of heavy lift to simplifying missions and permitting larger payloads by volume (8-9m+ versus 6.5m dia) aren't likly nessesarry for the Moon, but they are certainly required for Mars, so there may be a substantial cost savings there, particularly versus a clean-sheet EELV-derived HLLV rocket. The SDV option is worth consideration. This is not simply a matter of expediance, it is quite possible that SDV is by virtue of its merits the better choice.
I grant the engineering point of view, that is not my point. From an engineering stance, yes, SDV and Thikol and t/Space make the best sense. But it isn’t all about numbers, and engineering alone isn’t always the best way to get something done.
SDV is the Shuttle system under a different guise. It is the same old NASA configured differently. SDV does not increase flight rates, it merely saves them all up for one big throw. Without continued and persistent launches, there is less to publicize in terms of space exploration (attention factor). Then when there is a launch, and if there is a failure, it is magnified by the fact that the launches are so few and far between, and so exspensive when they fail (look at the complaints related to Mars probes that fail). Then there is the wasted time during idle times, when we maintain the staff for a rocket that launches once a year, or fewer than three times a year.
"SDV and Thikol will result in a delay, at some point, down the line."
Well no, not really. The only way in which there will, with absolute certainty, be a loss of a vehicle is if the rocket is flown forever, otherwise you are just talking about a probability. Considering the relativly small number of launches being talked about, it is quite possible that we won't see a single failure for a very long time... perhaps the life of the design even, and very possible only after many flights.
The probability that there will be a failure is certain. We will fly these rockets for the next 30 years (at least SDV until Mars, and probably try for Mars using SDV…which is sub-optimal). And even if I am incorrect, it is foolish to make a long range plan that assumes no rocket failures. This isn’t about the next 5 years, this is about the next 30. We need to start looking backwards and make the choices now which we wished we had in the first place.
And even if there were a failure? Boeing didn't stop flying Delta-II's the few times they failed, nor did the USAF stop flying Titan with its lousy reccord, so why would NASA? The huge delays caused by the Shuttle nightmare have been because the life of the crew is directly tied to the reliability of the vehicle, and because each orbiter is irreplaceable unlike an expendable rocket. This is simply not the case with expendable rockets with good escape systems, so yes I expect NASA to quite simply shrug and be prepared to lose a launcher or two. It is not the least bit stupid, it is simply accepting a risk inherint to the business... NASA must get over its hypersensitivity to vehicle loss, or its never going anywhere, no matter what rockets are available.
NASA is not Boeing, and it must respond to Congressional oversight. Congressional oversight ALWAYS occurs when billions are involved. SDV is 5-600 million a shot, just the rocket. The cargo it would carry… 100 tons? Billions. When the system used is the only way to proceed with another launch, NASA will not be allowed to fly again until they can identify what went wrong last time, and assure that they have fixed it. It is Shuttle-redux.
A failure with an EELV system means we switch to alternative launch vehicle while we research what went wrong the last time. It means there is no 2-3 year delay of our projects to answer “what went wrong.” It means continual progress because we assumed that something might go wrong and built in the flexibility to the program to account for that.
While working on Apollo, we were working on Gemini. We could have gone to the Moon with Gemini. We had alternative options to execute the mission for success. Mission success must be assured and it cannot be with the currently proposed SDV/Thikol scenario. SDV is not Saturn, it has no engine out capability. It is foolhardy to believe that everything will just be fine.
The notion that CEV will require "dozens" of launches to test is also nonsense.
If you say so. Testing will be at least three before they put a person on board. They they will ramp up testing with more people. Then they will do a full mock-up. Then, after it is vetted for orbital launch, they will do modifications on the baseline, and test some more. After it is vetted, it will be used for ISS duty.
Bill is also talking about the EELV flight rate, and not so much the payload each. Best case senario, Delta-IV HLV will reach about half the payload as SDV will, so you are going to need to fly it twice as fast. Opening a second launch pad to fly would be a capital and overhead cost that would be too expensive.
They have years (about a decade) to build the infrastructure. They don’t need to go to the Moon tomorrow. They need the flight rate you are talking about in the 2015-2020 time range.
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Lockheed CEV design has won preliminary approval as one of the contractors? HA! :laugh:
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Lockheed CEV design has won preliminary approval as one of the contractors? HA! :laugh:
An announcement http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2005/ … en.html]of an announcement?
Someone has to build the CEV and the upper stage no matter what. Thiokol don't make spaceships, just boosters.
Edited By BWhite on 1118696232
Give someone a sufficient [b][i]why[/i][/b] and they can endure just about any [b][i]how[/i][/b]
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http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.htm … 105]Boeing, Lockheed & Grumman except for t/Space (and I do understand they lack ANY proven experience and have a difference of opinion about the intellectual property arising from the project) who missed the cut?
Give someone a sufficient [b][i]why[/i][/b] and they can endure just about any [b][i]how[/i][/b]
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