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For SpaceNut ... none of the four topics about Artemis seemed a good fit for posts about the unmanned test flight
This topic is offered for anyone who might wish to report events as they unfold over the several weeks of the Artemis I test flight.
(th)
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For Monday, August 29, 2022 on Earth, launch of Artemis I has been scrubbed.
(th)
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They planned to send mannequins but the launch was called off.
I don't follow Artemis or SLS news that much. Are there any Diggers, Humanoid Bots, 3-D printers or A.I Truck Excavators that NASA Artemis / Orion plan on launching to the Moon. I know Canada and other nations work close with NASA and the Japanese, JAXA and companies like Toyota are very enthusiastic about their Robot and Car designs.
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News story facts are still in short supply, but I did find 2 things that NASA said caused them to scrub. (1) The hydrogen leak that they had before (!!!), and they thought they had fixed (!!!), was still leaking. (2) One of the RS-25's failed to be able to pre-cool before ignition. That second problem was the fatal problem. I think they might have ignored the hydrogen leak, since I got the impression it was smaller than it was before. I wouldn't do that, but NASA managers have a bad track record about taking stupid risks (Challenger and Columbia).
Having trouble with getting an RS-25 to behave properly for pre-cool would appear to be proof positive of my contention at rocket "science" is only about 40% science (that which was written down), but is some 50% art (that which was never written down), and 10% blind dumb luck (which is self-explanatory). Art doesn't get passed on, when companies get bought and workforces get replaced, because it resides in the older guys, to be passed-on one-on-one on the job. Those older guys are the first ones the new managers get rid of. Sometimes they get rid of all the workers, especially if the acquisition was a former competitor.
This engine has been out there for more than 4 decades now. Almost 5 decades. The real problem is that all the people who made it work back then are all long-retired or dead by now. The people trying to make it work now, are missing about 50% of the knowledge and experience they need. Boeing, NASA, they all suffer from this.
It kind of shows, doesn't?
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2022-08-29 08:44:00)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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It is a pretty sad since this is the legacy section of the ship that should have the least set of problems.
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Hydrogen leaks and pre-cool difficulties with theRS-25 engines caused several launch delays with the shuttle about 1990, according to what I read. They did seem to get past that later in the program. But, all the people who got past that are now long-retired or dead.
Multiple corporate acquisitions have happened since then, to reduce the government's choice of "preferred old-space contractors" to only Boeing, Lockheed, or Northrup Grumman. Given my apparently-accurate estimates of science vs art, and what happens to workforces during acquisitions, then why should the return of these old problem issues surprise anyone?
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2022-08-30 08:32:07)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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It will be at least a week until the Artemis launch team tries again
Google came up with September 2nd as the first available opportunity. However, the article where ** that ** was reported was pessimistic about that date.
In a mood of pessimism, the writer guessed that it might take months for NASA and the contractors to figure out what happened.
In the mean time, I accept the change of focus of the topic from launch attempt(s) to corporate/group knowledge/skill transfer.
In posts #4 and #6, GW Johnson has introduced a subtopic that seems important (to me for sure), so I invite forum members to consider it...
For GW Johnson ....
The issue at hand is entropy, and the need for a capitalist corporation to sustain a flow of income.
The people who create a corporation are (usually) not the ones who have to (try to) keep it going.
You've pointed out that sacrificing wisdom is a consequence of encouraging retirement of older workers.
Encouraging younger workers is absolutely necessary for any corporation to survive.
A significant factor in the Artemis fiasco is the duration of the effort. In a startup such as SpaceX, many of the workers who were there at the beginning are still there.
Another significant factor (with Artemis) is the built-in lack of practice.
The NewMars forum is open to the public. The readership statistics are not available (to me at least), but there is NOTHING standing between the posts of our members and young people who might benefit from them.
So! Let's imagine that a future Elon Musk or Gill Gates is reading this topic ...
What advice would our members offer for planning a corporate culture so that long duration knowledge and skills are successfully passed from the founding generation to successor generations?
I have seen this quandary first hand ... I worked for a 150 year old corporation for several decades. It had reached significant size, under the careful, cautious guidance of highly respected leaders. The keys were turned over to a young whipper-snapper just before I left to try entrepreneurship. I watched from the side-lines as the young whipper-snapper made bad judgments in an effort to increase profits, and within five years the company was gone.
Fortunately for me and other retirees, the buyer has kept the pensions funded, and the buyer is doing well.
Without knowing details of the Boeing situation, I get the impression that the folks given responsibility for an aerospace company have failed to sustain the culture that built a world class company. I ** hope ** that the mistakes of this generation of business school graduates are being fed into the minds of the next generation.
With that in mind, what suggestions might the members of this forum have to improve decision making by the next generation of young whipper-snappers.
(th)
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It looks like saturday will be the next retry.
Take 2: NASA aims for Saturday launch of new moon rocket
During Monday's launch attempt, readings showed that one of the four main engines in the rocket's core stage could not be chilled sufficiently prior to the planned ignition at liftoff. It appeared to be as much as 40 degrees Fahrenheit (5 degrees Celsius) warmer than the desired minus-420 degrees Fahrenheit (minus-250 degrees Celsius), the temperature of the hydrogen fuel, according to Honeycutt. The three other engines came up just a little short.
All of the engines appear to be fine, according to Honeycutt.
The chilling operation will be conducted a half-hour earlier for Saturday afternoon's launch attempt, once fueling begins that morning. Honeycutt said the timing of this engine chilldown was earlier during successful testing last year, and so performing it sooner may do the trick.
Honeycutt also questioned the integrity of one engine sensor, saying it might have provided inaccurate data Monday. To change that sensor, he noted, would mean hauling the rocket back into the hangar, resulting in weeks of delay.
Ok and if this is the same sort of shuttle sensor then they can launch with them so long as some give close reading as they did with shuttle.
Of course GW is talking about the art of those that are over 50...and we do have a topic but its not been posted in for some time now.
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GW,
We're "surprised" because some of us were expecting that the most thoroughly proven and well-tested engines and rocket hardware in existence, which were leftovers from the Space Shuttle era, would take less time and money to develop a minimally capable super heavy lift launch vehicle than the entire Saturn V development program took from start to finish, and at a time when the technology to create it also quite literally had to be created from scratch. In relative dollars, SLS cost more than Saturn V development and will cost more to fly than a Saturn V. I guess when you're playing with someone else's money, results are not as important as when you're playing with your own.
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Kbd512:
Well, any hardware, no matter how "well-proven", has its peculiarities and problems that must be coped-with, if it is to be used successful. That's just life in the real world.
The basic hardware gets well-documented in the reports written during its development and testing. That's explicitly part of the contract. Now, how to cope with the troubles usually doesn't get well-documented, and sometimes not at all. This is because admitting that there are problems to cope with is bad PR. No manager is going to willingly fund writing that sort of thing down, unless absolutely forced.
We outsiders might interpret the contract as requiring it, but that's NOT what usually gets done inside these large government contractor corporations. Only the "good news" gets documented, because that's part of how they work the PR to win the next contract. Simple. Ugly, but simple.
What the business schools have been teaching is only pay attention to the money, and your workers are like bunches of grapes: a dime a dozen. Business ethics classes are an open joke, and they have been for many decades. At the masters level they teach them to maximize the money no matter the constraints or regulations. You are to rely on your high-priced lawyers to save your asses if you go too far with your piracy and somebody powerful enough notices.
That employees-are-a-dime-a-dozen attitude is why most outfits like to get rid of engineers over the age of 40 or 45. Older ones are more expensive, and a pension obligation. So you get rid of them, before your HR "rules" allow them to vest in the retirement system. It really is that simple, and that ugly, at most large corporations.
Musk's SpaceX is an exception, but not unique. They hire no one over age 40 or 45, because older workers cannot physically sustain chronic overtime at the 80-hour per week level. The young ones can, which is why they only hire young ones. The "build it, break it, build another one" approach is exactly how they compensate for the inexperience (and inherent lack of knowledge of the art) among such young workers.
You are looking at workforces that only know what was documented, in a situation where at least half of what they need to know was NEVER documented. And the oldsters who did know were fired before they could teach anybody. At Boeing, Lockheed, and Northrup-Grumman, this shows up in things that don't really work, delivered years to decades behind schedule, and for billions over budgets.
This applies to some "new space" outfits as well. But at the more dramatically-successful outfits like SpaceX, it shows up as a high "blew-up-in-test" rate as the newbies learn the art the hard way. It still causes delay and expense, just not as bad as what has been happening with "old space".
Imagine what they might do if they eased the chronic overtime at SpaceX and hired some oldsters with real knowledge of the art!
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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For GW Johnson .... the problem you've identified and are continuing to discuss (seems to me at least) more involved than hiring people or not retiring them.
How people transfer knowledge and skill between themselves is something else that is not "written down" ...
Even if you have older workers with experience, I don't see a way to guarantee you have the right experience available in a person with the communication skills, and at the same time a younger person with the capability to learn (a) and willingness to learn (b).
If you load up on experience, and 99% is not needed, that is a burden on the organization just as having NO experience is a burden.
(th)
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My answer is that every company (or division within a large company) has people working certain projects that it recognizes are the experts concerning those projects. The youngsters learn on-the-job from these experts as oldster and newbie work the project together. The art gets passed on verbally in simple communication from one person to another as they work.
What's critical here is workload management. Somebody approaching age 50 is still usually quite heavily loaded with job assignments to accomplish, and consequently has little time to teach newbies one-on-one. But after about 55, that pace slows down, and he has more time to teach on the job instead of just having to "do". Smart managers plan for this, stupid ones do not (and there are a lot of stupid ones,
all the way up the pyramid).
Myself, I found I could teach better than most, and so was able to train young engineers on the job at an earlier age, while still being burdened by a heavy workload. But I was the exception in that regard! And, for a lot of that time, I was both the low-level group manager and a key engineering worker. That gave me some freedom to accomplish what I had to do.
Which was to do what I did, plus to train younger engineers how to do what I did, and survive, in an explosives plant. Nobody got hurt on my watch. And yet we chronically did (successfully) things that no one had ever done before. Some of which is still classified to this day.
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2022-09-01 10:02:10)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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Have found that many just do not want to share or teach what they might know as that's not what they were hired for. Some of this is the kingdom building where knowledge is power.
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Well, Saturday's attempt scrubbed. Still leaking hydrogen from the supply piping that fills the rocket, just like last Monday's scrubbed attempt. They have decided the not-cold problem with one engine was a bad sensor, and will ignore that reading.
It is quite clear that the propellant-loading infrastructure on that launch pad has deteriorated, and nobody checked it out adequately before moving the big rocket to the pad. The launch director said they wouldn't know until they hooked it up and flowed hydrogen through it, whether it would leak again.
Bullshit! Put a blank-off flange on the 8-inch quick-disconnect line connection at the rocket, and pressurize the line with gaseous hydrogen, from a welding gas bottle if nothing else! If there are leaky seals, that and some soapy water in a hand spray bottle will find them, whether there is flow in the line or not. If chilling it down provokes leaks that don't show up warm, then your seal designs are bad engineering: stand down and replace them.
It is also clear that nobody checked out the sensor on that rocket engine for functionality, before installing that engine on the rocket. Which (of course!!!) raises the question of what else did they not check out, before installing it? Or the others?
This travesty looks like nothing so much as the learn-it-the-hard-way experiences blowing-up rocket after rocket back in the 1950's and 1960's. Which just goes to prove what I have been saying about art vs science and bad workforce management practices that ignore the need to teach the art on the job.
40% science (written down), 50% art (never written down), and 10% blind dumb luck, in production work. In development work, the art and luck percentages are higher. This is development work, don't kid yourself about that!
If you fire your oldsters before they can teach the art to the youngsters, then your youngsters are carrying on with less than half the critical knowledge that they need to do their jobs. Maybe far less than half. Stupid! Stupid! Stupid!
Accordingly, I have little confidence in today's NASA or the "old space" contractors it still prefers, since most of NASA (not JPL) and those contractors have been infected with this mismanagement for decades. I think it more likely than not that this rocket will blow up, rather than fly. Just like they did back then before anyone knew very much about how to really do this kind of work.
JPL is demonstrably unaffected by this mismanagement: JWST worked. Their workface is stable with a mix of oldsters and youngsters. It really shows!
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2022-09-03 11:09:09)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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Jet Propulsion Laboratory is ** NOT ** a for-profit organization.
In trying to discover information about the organization, I ran into snags due to the age of the equipment I am using at the moment.
If someone in the membership is willing to document the differences between JPL and other organizations, it seems to me that would be time well spent, and the results would be of interest to a few members, and perhaps a few non-member readers as well.
The issue at hand is how to design a human organization that can perform well over multiple generations.
The key seems to me to involve selection of young people to assume top leadership.
I have seen first hand that the wrong choice of a young leader can cause an organization to fail in a catastrophic way.
JPL has (somehow) managed transition from the founders to current management.
Boeing has (obviously) failed the transition.
The difference may lie in the makeup and motivations of the Board of Directors.
Boeing sealed it's fate when it became a public corporation.
(th)
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I never said JPL was a for-profit enterprise. Supposedly, the rest of NASA isn't, either. However, both are still subject to overwhelming budget pressures, which essentially has the same effect as being for-profit.
It's just that JPL doesn't manage itself the same way that most of the rest of NASA does. Uniquely, they are sort of an independent group within NASA, and get to manage themselves, within their budget allocation.
Their practice of keeping seasoned folks aboard falls right in line with the extreme durations of the active planetary probe missions they have been running. There's a positive feedback there, and it has been very beneficial to their capability and their success track record.
Not perfect, but far above the rest of NASA, no matter which decade you look at. And way-to-hell-and-gone better than the track records of a Boeing, a Lockheed, etc, in recent decades. Even better than SpaceX.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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Sounds like they are afraid to put their heads up under the hood... They would rather wheel it back into the vertical high bay to fix it....GW is right same thing works for all gas appliances....a little soap and look for the bubbles on the seams or wherever you apply it to look for the leak.
Add color UV sensitive dye to it and view it for sure.
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The reporting has been sparse about the precise nature of the leak problems. That probably reflects the technical ignorance of the reporters, but so be it.
What little I have gleaned suggests NASA is concerned about the quick-disconnect joint between the pad piping and the plumbing that is part of the rocket stage. There's an 8-inch quick-disconnect coupling there that lets go as the vehicle lifts off. Maybe that's the leak, and maybe it's not.
That piping arm has to swing back out of the way once it disconnects. Which means there are swiveling joints in those piping arms. The leaks could just as easily be there. I have not heard one single word about that. But it is EXACTLY why I suggested closing off the valves in the rocket and at the pad source, and pressurizing the piping arm assembly with gaseous hydrogen, then using soapy water to find out where the leak(s) really are.
The actual answer(s) might surprise even NASA, because hydrogen is so notoriously-easy to leak through the slightest flaws anywhere.
Spacenut is right, the soapy water technique works great finding leaks in natural gas, propane, and LPG lines and equipment. It also works finding leaks in tires. The dye thing works better looking for leaks in air conditioning refrigerant lines and equipment. You use a dye that fluoresces under UV light, and a UV flashlight. Not hard at all.
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2022-09-04 12:19:45)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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If this was the sort of leak that was so slight that soapy water would show the source, then it probably wouldn't need to be addressed for the handful of minutes that the rocket will be operating over. I'm guessing it's spewing out like a fire hose. Some part is probably incorrectly dimensioned, probably a failure to account for the dramatic temperature differences.
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Well, I can think of one possibility. If there is a slow leak, it mixes with air, and is flammable from 4% by volume to about 74% by volume. It also rises up due to buoyancy.
There is the possibility of leaking hydrogen vapor accumulating inside the engines. Try to light them, it may explode. And that might crack open a bell. Best not to take the risk.
Spacex just ran into a similar problem with its first static fire of the Superheavy the other day. That was some sort of methane-air explosion underneath the rocket and around or inside the engines. Methane is also buoyant in air. It just has a narrower range of inflammability.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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From Daily Launch for 7 Sept 2022:
NASA To Replace Leaking Artemis 1 Seal
SPACE (9/6) reports that the Artemis 1 team “has decided to replace the seal on the misbehaving quick disconnect, agency officials announced in an update on Tuesday evening.” The work “will be done at Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida, where the Artemis 1 stack has been perched for the past three weeks.” However, Artemis 1’s flight termination system (FTS) has only been certified for a 25-day period, and testing needed for the recertification necessitates a return to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), thus putting the September 19-October 4 launch window out of reach.
Space News (9/6, Subscription Publication) reports that NASA “said that technicians will proceed with plans to replace the seal for the interface called the quick disconnect between a liquid hydrogen feed line and the core stage of the SLS. That work will be done on the pad rather than rolling the vehicle back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at the Kennedy Space Center.”
CNN (9/6) reports that a launch planned for September 19-October 4 will potentially conflict with the Crew-5 mission, scheduled for launch October 3.
My take: risking the cert on the flight termination system, and a conflict with the Crew-5 launch, looks like poor management decision-making to me, in the absence of any other published mitigating information. However, this is the first news report I have seen, that definitely pins down the leak to the quick-disconnect fitting on the vehicle, that lets the fueling arm go.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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Launch pad test with liquid hydrogen after repair is why they will move it back to the VAB after sucess as the batteries in the items will all need changing before it can be launched.
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From Daily Launch for 8 September 2022:
NASA SLS Rocket’s Flight Termination System May Further Delay Launch
The Washington Post (9/7) reports on the Flight Termination System for NASA’s Space Launch System, a “detonation system designed to destroy the rocket in case it starts to veer wildly off course and threaten people on the ground.” The system, while “a vital and ubiquitous” safety component, is “creating a bit of a headache for NASA as it struggles to launch the SLS rocket for the first time.” Although the Space Force “requires the batteries on the SLS’s termination system to be recharged” regularly, this task can “only be done in the rocket’s assembly building,” further delaying “a launch that last week was waived off twice because of other technical problems, including a massive leak of the liquid hydrogen the rocket uses for fuel.” The Space Force had already extended its battery charging time window, and NASA is in discussions “for a waiver that would allow the time frame to be extended yet again,” although the waive would “have to extend the initial 20-day requirement to over some 40 days, since the earliest NASA could attempt a launch is a two-week period that begins Sept. 19.”
Spaceflight Now (9/7) reports that Kennedy Space Center technicians “will repair a leak in a liquid hydrogen fueling line on the Artemis 1 moon rocket [at] the launch pad rather than inside the Vehicle Assembly Building, a decision the agency says will enable teams to test the repair under cryogenic conditions. NASA’s launch team detected a leak in a quick-disconnect fitting on an 8-inch liquid hydrogen line during a launch attempt Saturday, forcing managers to stop the countdown.” Ground teams “will replace the seal on the quick-disconnect interface where the liquid hydrogen fueling line from the mobile launch platform hooks up to a hydrogen line on the core stage of the Space Launch System.”
My take: they are finally beginning to confront the flight termination system issue, and finding no way out that does not either require managers to over-rule safety, or else take it back to the assembly building. We also finally are learning exactly where the leaky fitting is: on the rocket, not on the launch pad fueling arm. They are “fixing it” out in the weather on the pad, not in the assembly building. That issue combined with the other says (in no uncertain terms) take it back to the assembly building. They know what they need to do, they just don’t want to do it.
I think Spacenut agrees with me: they should move it back to the assembly building, and fix everything the "right" way.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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For GW Johnson re #23
Thanks for additional news, and your perspective on Artemis I and it's troubles.
I am picking up on the issue of recharging batteries ... I would put this in the penny wise, pound foolish category.... Someone somewhere made the decision NOT to install a charging system in the rocket with those batteries. I can just hear the penny wise individual asking why you need a charger? Surely the launch will happen within a day or two of movement from the assembly building.
I don't (of course) know what kind of batteries are used in this application, but I'll bet that a charging system could have been installed at a modest penalty of weight.
It is ** even ** possible to install the charger in the launch tower, and the only penalty of weight would be a wire to a quick disconnect connector.
It is ** even ** possible the existing power supply umbilical from the launch tower could have provided current to recharge the batteries.
I wonder how may other "penny wise and pound foolish" decisions are going to show up over time.
Some might well argue that the entire sorry episode is a gigantic example.
(th)
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From Daily Launch for 9-9-2022:
NASA Eyes Late September For Third Artemis Launch Attempt
The Wall Street Journal (9/8, Subscription Publication) reports NASA may attempt to launch its Artemis I mission between September 23 and September 27, and has asked the Space Force to reserve those dates at Cape Canaveral. In the meantime, however, the agency must complete necessary repairs and tests on the rocket’s components. The New York Times (9/8) reports that after replacing leaky seals which “halted a launch attempt of its new moon rocket last week, NASA said on Thursday that it hoped to try again later this month.” At a telephone news conference “on Thursday, NASA officials announced two potential launch windows: Sept. 23 from 6:47 a.m. to 8:47 a.m. Eastern time and Sept. 27 from 11:37 a.m. to 12:47 p.m.” However, NASA first will “conduct a test to ensure that the repairs worked by filling up the rocket’s huge tanks with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.” The test is scheduled for September 17. NASA also needs a “waiver for the batteries in the rocket’s flight termination system, which would destroy the vehicle if it went off course.”
My take on it: They have made their decision: to make the repair on the pad, and then fly with batteries in the flight termination system that are factor 2+ past the specified life. Which really means that if this thing goes off course after launch, they may not be able to blow it up. That’s the risk they are taking, assuming they actually fixed the leak, and this thing gets off the ground at all.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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