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I cannot speak to the specifics of the Ariane 6 design. There are others who know more than me about that rocket. But, in general, to carry heavier payloads more launch thrust is required as a minimum. More propellant capacity may be required, but if you lengthen the upper stage (or substitute a bigger one), the lower stage must be beefed up to carry it. That is another redesign issue.
There are fundamentally two ways to quickly add thrust to the first stage: (1) add bigger solid boosters, and (2) add more main engines. Despite the apparent cost, big solids offer adding higher frontal thrust density more quickly, simply because the nozzle exit area is a much larger fraction of the added frontal blockage area. Technically, that is very attractive. The cost of buying big solids is not.
The cost problem with solids is nothing fundamental to the solid itself, except in the required mix size. You must mix and cast once (!!!) to make a rocket unit of any size at all! Which means an enormous mix and cast to make a whole big motor, and not quite so enormous a mix and cast (but still big) to make the segments of a segmented motor. There are very few companies making solids with that kind of huge mix and cast capability in the US or Europe, so you are looking at monopoly pricing. Simple as that.
You have a bit more potential contractors available to compete if you go segmented, but you incur tremendous risks with the joint seals, as we saw with the shuttle SRB’s. And you can maintain the competition for only so long as you do not allow your contractors to agglomerate under one corporate roof. That is something we in the US totally failed to do, in virtually all of our government contracting industries, not just solid propellants.
I cannot speak as to competitiveness in Europe, but I suspect they are having the same monopoly pricing problems we are, aggravated further by the deliberate government subsidy-ing of designated contractors as monopolies starting decades ago. Airbus is but one example.
You do have to design-in from the get-go the structural strength to your first stage core to mount the big solid boosters. This would also be true if the boosters were liquid, as SpaceX stumbled over, when they first tried to build the 3-core Falcon-Heavy. But, unless you can fly them back and recover them on land, liquid boosters will be an extremely-expensive item as expendables, because of the cost of the engines.
If instead you add more engines to the first stage core, you are still faced with designing-in extra structural strength from the get-go, it’s just different items and locations that need to be beefier. Plus, you will need to lengthen the stage to add more propellant, and that is a fundamental redesign! This is not (!!!) something easily retrofitted! It is instead a major redesign if a retrofit, one that puts you back to square one with all your reliability ratings, especially any man-ratings.
All in all, it is a major redesign either way you go. You’re basically starting over. And with the big favored contractors now being treated as corporate welfare recipients instead of competitors, I’m not surprised that schedules slip badly and budgets are busted into tiny splinters. That is what is happening in the US, virtually all across all aspects of government contracting. It should be no surprise to see the same thing happening in Europe.
The cost and schedule problems of Ariane 6 (or almost any other launcher anywhere in the world) are more about policy and politics, than anything technical. Trying to convince an elected politician to change his mind on something big is demonstrably futile, here or in Europe.
Your only option is to vote him out, and hope his replacement can make better decisions. If he does not, vote him out, too. He, she, doesn’t matter. That’s what our elections are for! It has nothing to do with what they say. It has everything to do with what they do.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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Ariane 5 Development Budget, from 'Europäische Tragerraketen, band 2', Bernd Leitenberger:
Studies and tests 125
solid boosters 355
H120 first stage 270
HM60 (Vulcain) engine and test stands 738
other elements of the first stage and boosters 95
upper stage and VEB 200
ground support in Europe 80
Buildings and other structures in Kourou (launch pad) 450
Test flights 185
Total 2498
ESA and CNES management 102
This was the budget in million €, as set in 1985. Final cost was on the order of 120% of this budget.
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Thanks for that kbd512. For the Ariane 5, the breakdown for the development costs were provided. But not for the Ariane 6. All we know is the total development was €4+ billion. The costs for the individual components is not provided. For all we know the very same thing could have been done for half that or a tenth that. We don’t know because the ESA provides no accounting for how the money is spent.
Note also you can see the cost for the Vulcain engine quoted in numerous sources as €10 million. But not for the Ariane 6 SRB’s. For that, the question of its cost must not be asked or answered!
Bob Clark
Old Space rule of acquisition (with a nod to Star Trek - the Next Generation):
“Anything worth doing is worth doing for a billion dollars.”
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RGClark,
The bulk of the Ariane 5 vehicle development cost was the very high bar to clear to reliably operate a LOX/LH2 engine. After clearing that hurdle, then it makes more sense to use a singular type of engine, but note how that didn't improve the economics of the Delta-IV Heavy. The Delta-IV Heavy, which was powered by 3 expendable RS-68 LOX/LH2 engines, became almost as expensive per flight as the Space Shuttle, which also used 2 of the largest solid rocket motors ever built, in addition to 3 of the most expensive reusable LH2-fueled engines ever built.
It could be the case that Euros spent per launch vehicle development functional area, is still unavailable for Ariane 6, because the costs of development are still coming in, although they should know what has been spent to date. Nobody can definitively say when developmental costs will end. Assuming orbital flights 1-3 are all successful, we can say with some confidence that the Ariane 6 vehicle is operational, and that any ongoing costs are marginal costs related to ongoing flight operations. This presumes no major changes to upper stages, flight software, avionics, or tweaks to the engines and airframe. After it's flown 10 times, then you get a sense for how it will operate in a normative case. After 100 flights, you can say with a high degree of confidence what a typical flight will cost.
I can't say what all the money associated with the Delta-IV's RS-68s, or Ariane 6's P120 SRMs was spent on, but I know that whatever both programs did, associated costs went far beyond the original estimates. I'm thinking that both designs had some fundamental fatal flaws which doomed the designs to becoming technological dead-ends. Delta-IV and Atlas-V are discontinued for that reason and others.
As we've discussed at length, the booster stage of any rocket must prioritize thrust over specific impulse, merely to leave the ground with sufficient acceleration to avoid burning through all the propellant before achieving the target burnout velocity and altitude. The upper stage provides the lion's share of the raw speed to accelerate to orbital velocity. The quantity of fuel in the upper stage is always considerably less than the first stage, so a very low density propellant like LH2 is far less important than the specific impulse provided. The opposite is true of the booster stage. A low specific impulse solid can get the job done with minimal complexity, but cost typically becomes an issue. A liquid booster using high-thrust RP-1 or LCH4 is pretty close to optimal using known technology, especially if the booster is reusable. Reusing the upper stage is highly impractical, if not impossible.
If ESA transitions away from expendable boosters, then RP-1 or LCH4 are the most practical ways to get there, with paraffin wax hybrid solids an interesting runner-up technology that may or may not be cheaper over time. LH2 is not practical for a reusable booster stage, and it never has been. A fully reusable LH2-fueled booster can work if you throw enough money at the problem, but the goal here is to reduce the cost of the rocket to a level that is cost-competitive with SpaceX's RP-1 fueled Falcon rockets, to reduce the length of the development program, and to reduce or eliminate ground handling hassles and dangers to personnel. RP-1 or LCH4 make a lot more sense than LH2 from that perspective. The performance benefits associated with a LH2-fueled upper stage is considerable, but not a game changer, except for exploration class missions, where there is no acceptable substitute for a higher specific impulse.
Regardless, there's another booster stage development program required for ESA and Ariane Space to compete with Falcon-9 and Falcon Heavy. They'll need to leap forward through another generation of rocket engine and booster technology to compete with Starship- the world's first fully and rapidly reusable super heavy lift launch vehicle. This requires accepting the wisdom of the sunk cost fallacy, but neither ESA nor Ariane Space appear prepared to do that. Only China appears to have accepted that drastically reduced launch costs are required to remain competitive.
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Ariane 6 could have been a good rocket but it arrived to late in a decade already changing, it will perhaps be the last of the European expendable launch system. The French Aerospace with Airbus, Safran and with the Ariane Group have dominated the European launch industry, it has now come to an end, the Italian and Russian rockets also started to fly from Kourou in French Guiana South America. Sanctions were put on the Russians after the invasion of Ukraine and then Ariane-5 was retired.
After the sting of Ariane 6, Europe finally embraces commercial rockets
https://arstechnica.com/space/2023/11/a … l-rockets/
A new deal keeps the Ariane 6 rocket afloat while looking ahead to new launchers.
ESA will fly commercial
"All 22 member states of ESA have agreed that we have to change how we procure the launcher of the future, and this is a very new way of doing it," Aschbacher said. "ESA will launch a competition of launchers without weight class limitations."
Next year, ESA will open a competition to any European company working in the launch business. These companies can submit proposals to ESA through what the agency calls a "challenge" initiative. ESA will select several companies, perhaps up to three, for public funding that will come in the form of commercial service contracts, similar to how NASA works with contractors like SpaceX or United Launch Alliance in the launch arena.
ESA will create a list of payloads it will assign to launch on these commercial rockets. European government ministers did not decide Monday on new funding—it was a meeting to make policy decisions—so ESA will manage the initial stages of the launch competition using limited money already allocated to the agency, then present the winners to its member states at the next big conference in 2025, when European governments will be prepared to open their checkbooks.
"It will be one, two, or three, that we will develop in a competition," said Toni Tolker-Nielsen, acting director of space transportation at ESA. "Perhaps later it will funnel down to two. We shall see how it goes."
The field of startup launch companies in Europe includes German firms like HyImpulse, Rocket Factory Augsburg, and Isar Aerospace; British companies such as Skyrora and Orbex; and Spain's PLD Space, which recently test-launched its first suborbital test vehicle. ArianeGroup has its own small launch startup called MaiaSpace in France, and the Italian company has plans to evolve its already-flying Vega launch vehicle. All these companies, and others across Europe, would be eligible for ESA's new launch challenge.
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Ariane 6 completes long-duration static-fire test
https://spacenews.com/ariane-6-complete … fire-test/
British space companies invited to join race to build Europe’s new rocket
https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/briti … 43679.html
The European Space Agency has vowed to develop a SpaceX-style rocket to help it catch up with the United States
PLD Space Uses Suborbital Flights to Qualify Components for Miura-5 Rocket
https://www.claytoncountyregister.com/n … es/556042/
Rocket Factory Augsburg perceives historic moment for European launch industry
https://spacenews.com/rocket-factory-au … -industry/
Europe is beginning to freak-out about the inability of the Ariane 6 or the Vega-C to compete with SpaceX in price. A translated article from the French:
———————————————————————————————————————
Europe's space rockets on the verge of implosion.
By Véronique Guillermard
Ariane 6. S MARTIN / S MARTIN
DECRYPTION - The Europeans are torn apart over public aid for the operation of Ariane 6. Berlin and Rome want to put an end to ArianeGroup's monopoly in heavy launchers.
It is a summit of European space ministers, accompanied by a council of the European Space Agency (ESA), which will be held on November 6 and 7 in Seville, Spain. In the background, the unprecedented European rocket crisis. Europe no longer has independent access to space. Ariane 6, four years late, will not fly before 2024. It is therefore not yet ready to take over from Ariane 5, which carried out its final mission last July.
Vega C, the new version of the small Italian Vega rocket, is unavailable until the end of next year, since the failure of its first commercial mission at the end of 2022. And it is no longer possible to count on Soyuz, since the cessation of cooperation with Russia, in the wake of the aggression of Ukraine.
Rethinking European strategy
Hence the urgency to fundamentally rethink the European strategy in terms of space transport. And, in the short term, to do everything possible to make Ariane 6 a success, by agreeing on its operating conditions. These have given rise, for weeks, to a standoff between the 13 ESA member states out of 22, which finance the program, and ArianeGroup, the prime contractor for Ariane 6, as well as its subcontractors. . The industry is in fact calling for a reassessment of public support, in order to balance the operation of the new rocket. In short: a substantial annual subsidy so as not to lose money on the commercial market. ArianeGroup is asking for 350 million per year, more than double the amount granted in 2021.
Also read|Space tourism, giant rockets, constellations... The rush for the stars is causing risks to explode
However, when Ariane 6 was launched in 2014, ESA and Cnes (National Center for Space Studies), to which the European agency had until now delegated project management of the Ariane rockets, had agreed to leave this responsibility of project management at ArianeGroup, just created by Airbus and Safran. In return, the latter had promised to no longer request public support for exploitation. “Industrialists have not kept this commitment and have requested public support from 2021,” specifies Toni Tolker-Nielsen, director of space transport at ESA.
In 2021, we estimated the need for Ariane 6 at 140 million per year for a launch rate of 9 rockets per year.
Toni Tolker-Nielsen, director of space transportation at ESA
Request accepted due to a profound change in the market since 2014, with the rise of SpaceX, which slashed prices with the Falcon 9 launcher, and the arrival of high-speed internet constellations. Without forgetting the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. “In 2021, we estimated the need for Ariane 6 at 140 million per year for a launch rate of 9 rockets per year,” specifies the director of space transport at ESA. This help covers the first 16 missions.
The rule of geographic return
Since then, manufacturers have had to deal with the return of inflation, the rise in energy prices and the additional costs linked to Ariane 6 delays. “As it is not possible to pass on the entirety of inflation on commercial customers, States are once again called to the rescue,” summarizes Toni Tolker-Nielsen of the ESA. The fact remains that the 13 states do not want to sign a blank check. In particular France and Germany, the two biggest contributors to the Ariane 6 program, from which their industry captures the largest benefits. “Industrialists from these two countries share 50% and 20% respectively of the added value of Ariane 6,” specifies the ESA. “There will be no new subsidy without compensation. It will be give and take,” we summarize.
ESA requires an effort to reduce industrial costs. According to our information, ArianeGroup has accepted “a double-digit reduction in its costs.” Negotiations are proving more difficult with the 600 European subcontractors. They are protected by the Geographic Return (GEO) rule, which states that each State contributing to a program receives a workload aligned with its financial commitment. This benefits its manufacturers, without ArianeGroup being able to choose them or negotiate prices. “Certain price increases made by suppliers are not justified. They must make an effort adapted to their size,” emphasizes Toni Tolker-Nielsen.
Also read|Francis Rocard: “The objective of landing men on the Moon in 2025 with Starship seems unrealistic”
The ESA also requires new governance which gives it the right to review and audit Ariane 6. This is to ensure that all manufacturers respect a fair price policy. And that Ariane 6 is not sold off on the commercial market, to the detriment of institutional customers. The ESA, the European Commission, Eumetsat, which operates the weather satellites, and the States have already agreed to pay more than commercial satellite operators. The Europeans have adopted the same logic as NASA and the Pentagon, who often buy their launches twice as much, so that SpaceX is ultra-competitive on the commercial market. It is therefore via a massive and overpaid public order that SpaceX is in reality also subsidized. The American institutional market is in fact five times larger than the European one.
Price and competition
But, on the Old Continent, “the institutional prices defined in 2021, which have not increased since with significant inflation, cover the launch costs, no more”, specifies Toni Tolker-Nielsen, of the ESA. However, if the price charged to institutional clients increases further, they will be tempted to turn to American, Indian or Japanese rockets. In the absence of an equivalent to the Buy American Act, a federal law that came into force in… 1933, European countries are not obliged to buy Ariane 6, which they nevertheless finance! A grotesque situation. Berlin has never been without it: in April 2021, an observation satellite was entrusted to SpaceX, to the detriment of Ariane 5.
The German Spectrum mini-launcher. Isar Aerospace
The ESA hopes to reach an agreement on the operation of Ariane 6 (subsidy, cost reduction, new governance) by next Monday. This new psychodrama around Ariane 6 makes it more necessary than ever to overhaul the space transport strategy. Germany, which dreams of taking leadership from France in heavy launchers, sees this as an opportunity to obtain the introduction of intra-European competition on this market. Which, in the eyes of several specialists, would create emulation beneficial to innovation.
France is not afraid of competition, it draws on decades of expertise in a complex and risky industry
Close to ArianeGroup
In mid-2021, Berlin has already obtained a competitive bid from Paris in the mini and microlauncher segment. ArianeGroup immediately reacted by creating a new entity, MaiaSpace, in start-up mode, with the mission of developing a mini-launcher, ready to fly in 2025. And starting point for a new family of rockets. “France is not afraid of competition, it draws on decades of expertise in a complex and risky industry. But it requires its corollary: total freedom for the industry, which was not the case for Ariane 6, whose difficulties can be explained by maintaining the geographical return,” explains a person close to ArianeGroup.
Also read|“Europe’s spatial disconnection”
Across the Rhine, where it is repeated that the historic manufacturer has not kept its cost and deadline commitments, Berlin is counting on Isar Aerospace or RFA to take the lead. The German outsiders are developing mini-rockets which are expected to give rise to a range of increasingly powerful launchers.
The Italian rocket Vega E. Jacky Huart
In its fight, Germany is joined by Italy. Avio, the manufacturer of Vega, has, on good authority, received the creation of MaiaSpace very poorly. “A decision taken against Italy, aiming to do without Vega rockets,” according to a person close to the Italian group. The latter is developing Vega E, a version 20% more powerful than VegaC, which is due to make its first flight in 2026. It will be a direct competitor to one of the two versions of Ariane 6. This encourages Rome to regain its independence commercial. So no longer go through Arianespace, which markets European rockets, revealed La Tribune at the end of October. In order to calm things down and get Avio on board in preparing for the future, he was asked to become a shareholder in MaiaSpace. Proposal declined at this stage.
Ariane 6 delays and difficulties
For its part, the ESA has decided to rethink its role. The delays and difficulties of Ariane 6 “show that the next launchers will have to be developed in a radically different framework from the one we know today,” predicted, in the spring, Philippe Baptiste, president of Cnes.
Should rockets be taken out of the ESA framework? The idea is promoted by certain manufacturers. From a very good source, launchers should be considered as objects of sovereignty, treated at community level by the European Commission, and not by the ESA. Brussels has already equipped the Union with strategic infrastructure with Galileo (navigation and positioning) in order to free itself from American GPS, Copernicus, the world number one in Earth observation, and the future Iris2 constellation. However, there is no consensus on this path. Or should the ESA be transformed into a real EU agency, modeled on NASA, which buys rockets and manned capsules without getting involved in their design?
Also read|The European space elite joins forces to put the Iris 2 constellation into orbit
On the verge of implosion, Europe's launchers must urgently put everything back together. And create new effective governance and put an end to the GEO return rule, which undermines the competitiveness and speed of execution of the industry, without taking into account real skills. The system is running out of steam. The shock wave caused by SpaceX's successes highlighted this.
In Seville, the Europeans must succeed in going beyond their divisions. Otherwise, they risk fratricidal wars. To the greatest benefit of SpaceX… whose ultra-domination (68 successful launches at the end of October, out of 100 planned for 2023) worries customers, eager to have the choice.
———————————————————————————————————————
Original article in French:
L'Europe des fusées spatiales au bord de l'implosion
Par Véronique Guillermard
https://archive.ph/XldxI
Usually, to make some great advance in a technical field you need the great experts in the field to make the key insights. Quite ironic is that in order to solve the crisis in the European launch industry all it requires is someone, anyone to simply ask some pointed questions.
EU Space Week is this week: https://www.euspaceweek.eu/
Every European space journalist will be reporting on it if not being there in person. Will any journalist or anyone in the audience ask the questions of the ESA:
“Does a single P120 solid rocket used for the Ariane 6 SRB’s and the Vega-C first stage really cost €20 million?” “So that the two SRB’s on the Ariane 62 cost €40 million, and the four on the Ariane 64 cost €80 million?” “So that out of the €115 million ($125 million) recommended price of the Ariane 64, €80 million is just for the 4 solid side boosters?”
For if the answers to those questions is yes, then it becomes clear why the current version of the Ariane 6 is not price competitive to the SpaceX Falcon 9. And it also becomes clear how to get an Ariane 6 version that matches the Falcon 9 both in payload and price:
Towards return of Europe to dominance of the launch market.
https://exoscientist.blogspot.com/2023/ … nance.htmlBob Clark
Some news on Vega rocket and Isar
Norwegian Andøya Spaceport opens for Isar satellite launches
https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/ … s-2023-11/
Italy, France and Germany agree on launches of Ariane 6 and Vega-C
https://www.reuters.com/technology/spac … 023-11-06/
Last edited by Mars_B4_Moon (2023-11-24 05:56:01)
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Beyond Gravity Unveils Reusable Fairing Concept
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CNES Boss on Damage Control for ArianeGroup on Ariane 6 Failures.
By Andrew Parsonson -
November 6, 2023
In a startling revelation, Baptiste pointed to one “large subcontractor” in particular “from a neighboring country” that he says is “demanding price increases of nearly 60% from ArianeGroup, while the same country’s space agency vehemently criticizes the cost of the programme.”
France neighbours Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy. There are subcontractors from all five countries working on Ariane 6. However, considering the size of the contributions of each country, large Ariane 6 contractors are probably limited to Germany and Italy. As far as I know, neither ASI nor DLR has openly criticized the price of Ariane 6, but the bad blood between France and Italy when it comes to their respective launcher programmes has been well documented. And the only Ariane 6 subcontractor of note from Italy is, of course, Avio. The company is contracted to contribute to a number of Ariane 6 systems but is most notable for its contributions to the development and production of the P120C solid boosters through a joint partnership with ArianeGroup called Europropulsion. This is far from confirmed, but it is possible that this is the subcontractor Baptiste was referring to.
https://europeanspaceflight.com/cnes-bo … -failures/
The Ariane 6 SRB manufacturer demands a 60% price increase. European tax payers paid billions of dollars for the development of the Ariane 6, but they are not permitted to know the cost of the components of that launcher: 60% higher than what?
What is the price now being demanded for the SRB’s?
If you look up cost of Vulcain engine used on the core that is openly given as €10 million. But the cost of the SRB’s? That must not be asked or answered!
Robert Clark
Last edited by RGClark (2023-12-03 06:36:24)
Old Space rule of acquisition (with a nod to Star Trek - the Next Generation):
“Anything worth doing is worth doing for a billion dollars.”
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Politics always trumps common sense. We've already seen that in countless way.
And, monopoly suppliers always charge high prices. They just don't want it publicized how they rip everybody else off.
I see no surprises here.
The rocket could work technically. But with the politics and monopoly pricing for its SRB's, it will never compete economically. All it can be is corporate welfare. Same as SLS.
The fault for that is government incompetence, not anything fundamental about the solids themselves.
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2023-12-04 10:13:40)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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misplaced a some giant propellant tanks?
What happens in Vega didn’t stay in Vega, as key rocket parts went missing
https://arstechnica.com/space/2023/12/i … e-trashed/
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Thanks to Mars_B4_Moon for finding and posting the link to the AVIO story in #135 .....
I wonder if the individual responsible for trashing those two flight-ready tanks will be held accountable.
The story ends with a cliff hanger ... it will definitely be worth a follow up when the question is resolved.
(th)
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misplaced a some giant propellant tanks?
What happens in Vega didn’t stay in Vega, as key rocket parts went missing
https://arstechnica.com/space/2023/12/i … e-trashed/
Blessing in disguise? Avio is charging more for Vega-C than a REUSED Falcon 9 that has 10 times bigger payload:
Andrew Parsonson @AndrewParsonson
During the interview, Ranzo also explained that flights aboard Vega-C cost approximately €45 million. I'm not sure Avio has ever stated that figure publicly before.
6:59 AM · Nov 7, 2023
https://x.com/andrewparsonson/status/17 … 96373?s=61
Accelerate towards reusability!
Towards return of Europe to dominance of the launch market.
https://exoscientist.blogspot.com/2023/ … nance.html
Bob Clark
Old Space rule of acquisition (with a nod to Star Trek - the Next Generation):
“Anything worth doing is worth doing for a billion dollars.”
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ArianeGroup CEO Finally Says Quiet Part Out Loud
By Andrew Parsonson - December 8, 2023
https://europeanspaceflight.com/arianeg … -out-loud/
Quite astonishing. The ArianeGroup CEO suggests the previous design of the Ariane 6 using two large SRB’s for its first stage instead of a liquid-fueled core would have been better. He hasn’t gotten the point reusability is essential to be competitive with SpaceX.
It’s like Tory Bruno head of ULA questioning whether reusability is worthwhile. Here it is with SpaceX beating ULA into the ground with their price cuts from reusability, with ULA being driven to the brink of bankruptcy, and with ULA opening themselves up for sale to forestall going under, and the CEO doesn’t know why.
The New Space starts-ups all recognize the importance of reusability. Old Space has become old and decrepit.
Bob Clark
Last edited by RGClark (2023-12-09 14:45:39)
Old Space rule of acquisition (with a nod to Star Trek - the Next Generation):
“Anything worth doing is worth doing for a billion dollars.”
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Bob:
I’m inclined to agree with you. Here’s why:
This following part of the CEO’s unexpected responses relates directly to my adage that “rocket science ain’t just science, it’s only about 50% science, the part that was written down. It’s about 40% art, the part that was never written down because no managers want to pay for all that. And it’s about 10% blind dumb luck. And that’s in production work. In development work, the art and luck portions are higher.” If you have rapid turnover, the art does not get passed on, one-on-one, on-the-job. Pointing at “25 years with no one left who worked on Ariane 5” identifies rapid turnover. Someone age 25 back then would only be 50 at the time of the Ariane 6 effort.
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Next, Sion identified a lack of skilled engineers within its ranks, stating that many who had worked on Ariane 5 had, by the start of the development of Ariane 6, retired.
“We also had to recreate skills that we had lost. Indeed, between the decisions to launch the two launchers, a generation of engineers had passed, Ariane-5 having been decided in 1988, more than twenty-five years earlier.”
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As the following part indicates, what this team originally came up with was a nearly-all solid design. Two solid strap-ons to a core whose first and second stages were also solids. Only the core’s 3rd stage was a liquid. The CEO doesn’t say this was rejected for a high large solids price, she says they were worried about work for their liquid engine makers. That indicates the politics of “plums in this or that district” was more important than anything technical or financial. The high price of large solids (because of monopoly or near-monopoly supply) apparently was not an issue that worried them at the time.
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With this decision, ESA member states rejected a concept that teams of engineers had worked on for more than 18 months. This concept called for two solid-fueled boosters that would have been nearly identical to the rocket’s solid-fueled first and second stages. A Vinci-powered third stage would have completed the rocket. The economies of scale involved in manufacturing so many identified solid-fueled motors was a key element in ensuring the design could achieve the then ESA-mandated price of €70 million per launch. This carefully studied alternative was rejected, and all the planning and derisking that went into the design along with it.
Would this rejected concept have been substantially better than the current Ariane 6 design? It’s difficult to say. It would have undoubtedly meant that the centres focused on developing liquid fuel engines would have been negatively affected.
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I have to conclude from remarks like that, that reusability and competitive pricing were not even considered as the top issues. What that really says is that Europe’s equivalent to the US’s “old space”, is just as clueless as the US “old space” is, about where the launch business is really going. And that is reusability and lower prices. Europe’s problem is that it does not yet have a “new space” that believes that, the way the US does.
All that being said, if the design uses smaller solids, high price is not an issue, because there are more makers of small solids, so they compete. That holds prices down and quality up. I know this to be true, or else no government could afford all the small solid rocket weapons their militaries use. Only the big ICBM's are expensive, because only 1 or 2 outfits in the entire free world can make them. Monopoly!
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2023-12-10 09:42:59)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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I think the use of solids had very little to do with the outcome. The mindset of the decision makers and the basic vehicle design was wrong for competition. Ultimately, competing meant implementing reusability. There was no thought given towards reusability, which meant competing with other launch service providers like SpaceX was never a consideration. Even if a launch price of €70M was feasible, studies have indicated that SpaceX's marginal launch costs for Falcon 9 are between $20M and $30M, most being closer to $20M than $30M. In a best case scenario, a fully expendable Ariane-6, in whatever incarnation, would be more than twice as expensive as a rocket with a reusable booster stage.
I'm still mystified by what everyone else thought was going to happen. Did they think SpaceX was simply going to give up? Did they imagine that they were going to abandon the reusability concept due to initial cost? The only reason for them to attempt reusability to begin with was specifically due to cost. The very first attempt to implement reusability was bound to be highly imperfect and perhaps more expensive because a government was doing it. The results achieved with the Space Shuttle were not indicative of how reusability was originally envisioned to work. Even amongst the Space Shuttle design team, they thought they'd have the option to use in-line liquid-fueled fly-back booster stage based upon F-1 engines, and a much smaller orbiter. What was actually implemented bore little resemblance to most of the earliest Space Shuttle design concepts, which were correctly design for orbiter and booster stage reusability. SpaceX was able to make that work, and no doubt NASA and the Old Space contractors could've made it work in the early 1980s, had no political decisions to use very large solids been involved.
It's fun to think about how a proper Space Shuttle design would've featured reusable F-1s in the booster stage, an upper stage with a single F-1 engine, and no main engines on the orbiter itself. The vehicle design wouldn't have tickled anyone's technological funny bone, but it would've been drastically cheaper to build and operate. Alternatively, for full reusability the upper stage / orbiter could've been a giant gas tank with a lesser number of main engines, exactly like Starship. All the "bright ideas" from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s are still the correct concepts to reduce cost and increase flight rates.
The Soviets / Russians milked their 1960s to 1980s engine tech for everything it was worth. I wonder how much more we could've achieved by continuing to refine our F-1 and J-2 engine designs, in conjunction with larger reusable vehicles. The 1980s could've and should've been a near-magical time to be an astronaut.
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Kbd512:
I think we're in agreement about this.
GW
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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I once jokingly said if asked how much the Ariane 6 SRB’s cost, ArianeSpace and ESA would respond, “We’re not going to tell you that!” Turns out that wasn’t far from the truth:
Ariane's New Price Tag Is Bad News for Airbus, Great News for Boeing and Lockheed (and SpaceX).
By Rich Smith – Dec 23, 2023 at 7:07AM
Recall that Ariane originally targeted a 50% cost reduction between Ariane 5 and Ariane 6. Asked about the price at a press briefing earlier this year, though, Arianespace CEO Stéphane Israël first blamed inflation, complaining that Ariane has to work with a "real economy," then flat-out declined to say how much the rocket will cost, telling reporters to "speak...with our customers," as Ars Technica reported in September. Taking the hint, Ars dug up a June speech from ESA Space Transportation Director Toni-Tolker Nielsen, who confided that Ariane 6 is looking likely to cost about 40% less than Ariane 5 -- not 50%.
But now, even 40% looks over-optimistic.
https://www.fool.com/investing/2023/12/ … or-airbus/
Bob Clark
Old Space rule of acquisition (with a nod to Star Trek - the Next Generation):
“Anything worth doing is worth doing for a billion dollars.”
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NASA identified reusability as necessary back in 1968. They intended to replace big dumb rockets with a fully reusable space shuttle. The shuttle was supposed to have a piloted fly-back booster and lifting body orbiter. It wouldn't lift heavy cargo, but they could still use Saturn 1B for that. Or Saturn V if something had to be really big. But Skylab was supposed to be launched on Saturn 1B.
The workshop would be launched wet. Living space was the liquid hydrogen tank, the liquid oxygen tank would be clean and filled with LOX during launch but once on orbit used as garbage dumpster and septic tank. Skylab was the upper stage of Saturn 1B, Wich would launch itself. Airlock would be added later; first mission would be an Apollo CSM launched on another Saturn 1B, with the airlock carried where the LM would normally go. The second mission would carry the multiple docking adapter that way. The wet design of Skylab didn't have the telescope mount.
But Richard Nixon slashed NASA's budget. He told NASA and the military they couldn't have separate launch vehicles, they had to share. So they didn't have enough money for both the orbiter and fly-back booster for Shuttle. So they replaced the booster with a drop tank. That's what the external tanks is. Then a Senator for Utah said his state has a company that makes segmented SRBs for the Titan III rocket for the military. With that cancelled, where do SRBs go on the new Shuttle. NASA said they don't. The Senator said no SRBs, no Shuttle. He got himself made chair of the appropriations committee. So we had the Challenger disaster. By the way, recovering, refurbishing, and refuelling Shuttle SRBs cost 90% the price of new SRBs.
But the military needed spy satellites in polar orbit. If Shuttle entered the atmosphere over a pole, there are no airports to land. So glide distance had to be increased to reach an airport. So they changed from lifting body to delta wing and fuselage. That increased weight. And the cargo bay had to be expanded to accomodate the military's then-new spy satellite. That increased weight further. Ironically, Shuttle never did fly a polar mission. They did build SLC-6 at Vandenberg, and Shuttle stack was assembled there to prove they could launch, but it never did.
We could have had a fully reusable Shuttle. Lockheed's bid was Shuttle LS-A, with a lifting body based on X-24A.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation's bid was Shuttle MDC, with a lifting body based on HL-10.
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Part of my point is a question whether a land-on-tail rocket is safe for human flight. A winged or lifting body is safer. NASA would not let SpaceX Dragon land propulsively. New Sheppard separates the capsule, lands the rocket propulsively but unmanned. The capsule lands with parachutes and last second rocket. Boeing Starliner uses parachutes and air bags.
Elon wants Starship to be used for Earth-to-Earth. Will he ever be allowed to use it that way?
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Rob:
I think the answer to your question is "it depends upon exactly how they do it", plus some "not invented here" resistance from NASA that can be overcome.
As to how they do it, consider the V-22, which is proving to be somewhat problematic, precisely because if something goes wrong with the power transmission in the wing, the vehicle is lost. There is no glide, there is no autorotation. There is no way out. And that transmission has proven less reliable than hoped, which demonstrably kills crews.
As for rocket vehicles landing on their tails, what it depends on is whether a hover capability is provided or not. If you cannot stop-and-hover, to divert a little laterally to recover from the unexpected, then if your landing site proves unacceptable at close range, you are screwed.
The Falcon cores cannot hover, they can only decelerate to zero speed at zero altitude, with a thrust always much greater than weight during the landing. There is no hover capability there. I am unsure whether Starship can hover and divert.
But the Apollo LM could hover. Armstrong diverted from a certain crash in a gigantic boulder field. Which shows the value of hover, and why it can provide safer operation of a manned craft.
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2023-12-26 21:18:41)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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V-22 cannot glide not autorotate? I expected it would do both. It should be able to glide if engines oriented forward, flaps and slats up. And should be able to autorotate if engines are oriented up, like a helicopter. Best of both worlds. You're saying it can do neither?
Transmission was complicated. Designed so just one engine can drive both propellers. To give it engine-out capability. I was concerned about such a complicated system, but marketing video made it sound reliable.
Reminds me of a computer job I worked on. I was a software developer from 1981 thru 2007, computer repair 2008-2017, but have been a field technician since 2017. One site was concerned with security. They had more digital security cameras than saw before. My job was to connect all the cables to patch panels in the server rack. Two network switches, and two servers, each with battery backup. Two different internet service providers, with a third ISP using cell phone wireless. Alarm system and security cameras monitored remotely by a security service. Everything was supposed to automatically fail-over to backups. I was sent in on a Sunday morning when their alarm went off. Fail-over didn't work. Well, they had a network architect, I was just eyes and hands on-site. I did as I was told. Police showed up as I was in the server room, moving cables as I was told in attempt to fix it. Police were polite, talked to store personnel to confirm I was supposed to be there. Left me to fix it. But their wonderful multi-level backup didn't work.
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If the wing is down, you can glide, but you cannot land. The blades hit first, tipping you nose down for a crash.
If the wing is up, you cannot glide. If you try to autorotate, the drag of the transmission slows the rotors very quickly. Too quickly.
If the transmission were 100% reliable, those problems go away, because 1 engine can drive both rotors. But it is proving to be less reliable than they hoped. There's not a lot of experience out there to draw upon, the last tilt-wing aircraft so equipped (also the first) being the XC-142 back in the 1960's. And it had transmission problems too.
The tail rotor drive for helicopters is no guide. Not in the same power class. That's something we should have plenty of experience with, but it was the cause of a fatal XC-142 crash in the 1960's. I canoed to the crash site in the swamp 2 weeks later. It was still dry from the heat of the fire.
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2023-12-27 11:22:01)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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This topic appears to be branching to aircraft design, and specifically to the X22 tilt wing aircraft (Osprey).
I'd like to see a topic along those lines, because it seems to me the military (all militaries) need the capability.
Is there any interest in creating such a topic?
I assume it should be in Planetary Transportation.
I'm not sure what the title might be .... the essence of the Osprey is the ability to combine both helicopter and fixed wing functionality on one vehicle.
Electric motors would solve the transmission problem.
Would they also solve the autorotation problem?
Here are topics we have with "air" in the title:
Balloon or dirigible for Mars "hot air" or gas filled by tahanson43206 [ 1 2 ]
Planetary transportation 36 2023-12-23 12:37:55 by SpaceNutAlternative fuel aircraft by Calliban [ 1 2 ]
Planetary transportation 45 2023-12-03 20:02:27 by Mars_B4_MoonPractical Electric and Gasoline Powered Aircraft by kbd512
Planetary transportation 11 2023-11-28 21:16:18 by SpaceNutElectric Airplane by tahanson43206
Planetary transportation 17 2023-10-28 16:41:02 by kbd512Air breathing engines on Mars by RobertDyck [ 1 2 ]
Planetary transportation 43 2023-04-23 08:47:25 by tahanson43206Lighter than Air Aircraft by tahanson43206
Planetary transportation 9 2022-10-04 07:58:31 by Mars_B4_MoonPages: 1
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Tom:
I only used the troubles with the V-22 as an example of what not to do (deliberately eliminating "a way out" from potentially-fatal trouble). Rob apparently mistakenly thought it was a safer craft than it is proving to be. As to whether we need a topic for it, I dunno.
Look at the very last paragraph of post 145. THAT is what SpaceX needs to be able to do with Starship landings, if they are to get approvals from the government to carry people with it! They have to be able to do that not only here on Earth, but also on the moon and Mars, too. Or wherever it is to land, by thrust.
Now, think about SL Raptor thrust levels in the 200-230 m.ton-force class, compared to a no-cargo dry-tanks vehicle mass in the vicinity of 120 m.tons. BTW, a m.ton-force is the Earth weight of 1 m.ton of mass. That force measure does NOT scale with local gravity, although the weight of that m.ton of mass does. Not SI, but widely used, including at SpaceX.
On Earth, hover for last-second divert can be achieved at a throttle turndown ratio of about factor 2 (to ~50% thrust), or about 120-ish m.tons-force of thrust. On one single engine. If the achievable turndown ratio is closer to 4, you could do it on two engines at 25% thrust. Takes a higher setting and/or more engines burning, if you have cargo aboard, and/or significant unburned propellant.
Before all the technical info disappeared off SpaceX's website, their claim for Raptor was "factor 4 turndown". But that claim was in the Raptor-1 days, which never achieved the design chamber pressure of 4400 psia (300 bar), because the turbopump design had inadequate capacity, as it turned out. I never saw an actual thrust vs power setting curve from SpaceX.
They got there (to full Pc) with the new turbopump design on Raptor-2 (which I think without evidence is also on Raptor-3). But I have seen absolutely nothing from SpaceX about how much turndown they get with it. Or anything about the Raptor-3 they are working on. I do know they no longer light Raptors at full power setting. I no longer hear the "boom!-rumble" that caused.
Further, at sea level, Pc-turndown by factor 4 is more-than-a-factor-4 turndown of thrust. They are just about the same in vacuum, but not at sea level! And the disparity is quite different for a sea level design vs a vacuum engine designed such that it can be fired at sea level. So you have to ask which definition and which type of design is being quoted when a turndown figure is claimed.
How and why that is so (and it really is so, more than anyone would want to believe), is well covered in the lesson and example problems of lesson 9/9B of the orbits+ course materials. Anyone can use those materials to reverse-engineer what is going on, with pretty much anybody's rocket engine design. Don't believe published specs! They are marketing hype (spelled "lies").
It is for that same reason that I disbelieve the published tables of Isp capability for propellant combinations seen in a lot of texts and reference books. They are only useful for comparisons across combinations. They are NOT reliable enough to be useful as engine performance predictors!
GW
Last edited by GW Johnson (2023-12-27 15:39:44)
GW Johnson
McGregor, Texas
"There is nothing as expensive as a dead crew, especially one dead from a bad management decision"
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