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So what is stopping them from developing there own launch pad if not here maybe in a more favorable nation, say french guiana where the russians are building one for them.

American export laws. Most rocket technology in the US is heavily regulated and controlled. You need federal approval for foriegn launches.

If the CEV benchmarks are fly by 2010 and weigh 30MT can EELV possibly compete?

The sad thing is that we probably could have flown "da' stick" launch stack (RSRM plus RL-10s) this week if we had started working on it in January 2004. (Its not like the Thiokol people and the VAB staff and the crawler drivers - - who were not part of RTF - - were real busy these last 16 months.)

I don't like the sound of this... Mikey-G keeps on saying things like this that amounts to a Shuttle-Army "group hug" then he needs to be un-confirmed as soon as possible.

Simple Bill, that the "Stick" can only carry 20MT as advertised, and if that number falls from the advertised payload, then the Stick will be too puny to fly to CEV.

Then there are still the safety issues, that big huge mega solid engines would fail "in a big way" with no way to avoid it.

Bills of attainder evolved into a convenient way for the King to convict subjects of crimes, and confiscate their property, without the bother of a trial--and without the need for a conviction, or indeed any evidence at all.

So what is the stopping point for the Thiokol people from making "da' stick" for spiral 1 of the vision or for that fact anyone else?

GregM, fair enough. Pretty good reasons you have there.

So let’s see how they hold up though…

1) Griffin has testified to congress that he cannot envision doing the VSE without heavy lift capability.

Well, no, he can’t do VSE without HLLV because he needs to be able to go beyond the Moon, eventually. That doesn’t mean he needs SDV to do VSE. Griffin has made a lot of statements to Congress, prior to becoming Administrator- would you happen to have a link to his testimony (or if anyone else does, please provide). Not that I doubt the accuracy here, just want to review.

While Griffin’s opinion is known, how does that translate into being able to secure the SDV development? (After all, Goldin ostensibly wanted to a more robust space program, but had to take his marching orders from the President)

As the Space Shuttle resumes its mission, NASA will begin tackling an equally challenging assignment – ensuring a safe and orderly retirement of the Space Shuttle system by 2010 and a graceful transition of the Space Shuttle knowledge, workforce, and assets to future exploration missions. We need to maintain a robust program that is capable of safely executing the remaining Space Shuttle missions while, at the same time, not displacing the orderly pursuit of necessary transition activities.

This effort could very well be one of the largest single planned transitions NASA (or any federal agency) has ever undertaken. The Space Shuttle program occupies 640 facilities, utilizes over 900,000 equipment line items, and directly employs over 2,000 civil servants and more than 15,000 work-year-equivalent prime contractors, with an additional 3,000 people working indirectly on Space Shuttle activities at all NASA Centers. Thousands more are employed at the subcontractor level in 43 states across the country. The total equipment value held by the Program is over $12 billion. The total facilities value held by the Program is approximately $5.7 billion (approximately one-third of the value of NASA's entire facility inventory), mostly at the field centers. There are also approximately 1,500 active suppliers and 3,000 – 4,000 qualified suppliers that directly support the Space Shuttle program.

Of all these assets, the most important are, of course, the people. Space Shuttle transition will have an unavoidable impact on NASA's workforce. The early transition of workforce elements, the need to retain segments of that workforce, and the transition of program knowledge to future programs must all be addressed. We will ensure that this transition treats these dedicated people with the respect they deserve, and that their knowledge and experience will be captured or converted as we begin the next phase of exploration. There will be challenges, but we will ensure that critical skills are retained for safe mission execution through the operational life of the program.

NASA and the Space Shuttle program will also face significant challenges in terms of balancing different technical and programmatic requirements: (1) maintaining access to the necessary equipment, facilities, and vendors needed through Space Shuttle flyout; (2) identifying and maintaining those capabilities that may be needed for next-generation exploration systems activities, and; (3) retiring unneeded capabilities to free resources that will support future exploration. For example, because the amount of flight hardware accumulated (including spares) will be sufficient to meet the current mission manifest through 2010, several key Space Shuttle hardware vendors and sub-tier suppliers will be ending their relationship with the program prior to 2010. Draw-down decisions need to be made with regard to equipment and facilities which currently support (and are supported by) the Space Shuttle program. These resources will need to be characterized and dispositioned in such a way that either supports exploration goals or removes them from NASA's books.

Many of these decisions depend upon the role that Space Shuttle knowledge, workforce, hardware, and infrastructure will play in follow-on launch vehicles. NASA is continuing to analyze next-generation crew and heavy-lift launch requirements in support of the Vision for Space Exploration, including the degree to which those requirements could be met by boosters derived from existing Space Shuttle propulsion components and systems. Flight-proven Space Shuttle propulsion elements (including the Space Shuttle Main Engines, the Solid Rocket Boosters, and the External Tank, as well as some of the existing Space Shuttle infrastructure and workforce) will be carefully evaluated, as their use may enable more rapid development of crew and heavy lift capability than other alternatives like Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Delta IV and Atlas V). A decision to use Space Shuttle propulsion elements as part of our next-generation space transportation architecture would have a significant impact on Space Shuttle transition planning. However, since these launch vehicle requirements are not yet fully defined, current Space Shuttle transition planning must take into account the risks of prematurely terminating Space Shuttle vendors and retiring equipment and facilities that could possibly be needed to fulfill these requirements.

It seems to me that if the plan is for the White House or DoD to force Griffin to reverse course on that opinion and go EELV, then we would be hearing very different things from Griffin, today, and Admiral Steidle would not have resigned.

Perhaps the show down with Steidle is two fold- to remove the onus of the tanker deal coming in to cause Congressional oversight of the CEV contracts, and friction over how best to implement the VSE in the context of the Aldridge Commission findings.

I doubt Griffin could have moved Steidle without the White House’s approval or understanding. And Griffin is quickly ignoring many of the recommendations made by the report in lieu of a more NASA centric program (to be expected, ask for Mars, get the Moon).

However, how can Griffin manage CEV development, procurement, a nominal level of hard science, ISS construction and completion, AND SDVL development while operating an idle main stack plant?

Where is the money going to come from? (and if you say TV Bill, I will throttle you. )

Griffin said he, and people in the executive branch, were not happy with a timeline that called for the proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle to take almost a decade to get off the ground. Griffin deemed it unacceptable that the shuttle would retire in 2010 and the new ship would not fly humans until at least 2014, creating a four-year gap during which the United States would not have a manned spacecraft.

Griffin is speeding development to field the CEV by 2010, if possible. The new administrator also has assigned a small team of people he trusts to review most of the planning and decision-making to date related not only to the crewed spaceship but the entire moon-Mars initiative.

William Claybaugh, Owen K. Garriott (team co-leader), John Garvey, Michael Griffin (team co-leader), Thomas D. Jones, Charles Kohlhase, Bruce McCandless II, William O'Neal, Paul A. Penzo

One of the top issues Griffin addressed was the feasibility of a human mission to Mars as part of the administration’s “Moon, Mars, and Beyond” initiative. In response to a question from an Orlando Sentinel reporter, Griffin said: “Everything that I know to date about what it will cost us to do a Mars mission . . . is summarized in a Planetary Society report that Owen Garriott, an old and good friend, and I chaired on behalf of the Planetary Society with numerous coauthors.”

To partially echo the sentiment that we ought to pay more heed to actually getting started, and in the words of one of Bill's hopeful future AltSpace financiers, just do it.

Sure thing Bill... except you'll need an Energia's worth of rocket fuel to push that Soyuz and lander there and back, and you'll have  little or no payload other then those three men.