You are not logged in.
I cannot argue with the long list of human motivations in the previous post (733). I would only add that all the different people to which those motivations ascribe are not the people who make decisions in the space business. Those are politicians and corporate executives.
And the dominant motivations for those two types of people who do make the decisions are exactly the politics and money that mentioned in my earlier post (732) as the root cause of the current ISS problems.
GW
It's a problem driven by money and politics, pure and simple! Neither of which is a proper basis for making space crew safety decisions, as we already know from two dead shuttle crews.
GW
BTW, for the crew orbit-to-orbit transport shown in post 420 just above, I did NOT overtly specify an atmosphere. I just specified near 1 full gee at the rim of the two centrifuge disks. There is NOTHING that inherently links atmosphere choice to gee-level choice. I picked 1 gee to ensure that all aboard would be physically fit to endure entry and landing gee levels in the 3-6 range with impunity, as can ordinary untrained Earth citizens.
We have absolutely no experience, or any evidence, to suggest that people acclimatized at 0.38 gee can withstand the 3-6 gee exposures that are inherent for the landing on Mars! In my opinion, the lower gee level is a totally unjustified risk! Suspenders, belt, and armored codpiece! Especially where paying passengers are involved!
In point of fact, I would use about 43%-by-volume oxygen in a two-gas mix with nitrogen, at a pressure in the neighborhood of 0.43 atm. That's my "rule of 43" atmosphere proposal. That atmosphere meets all the long-term and short-term hypoxia-prevention criteria I can identify, while at the same time allowing no pre-breathe requirement for pure oxygen spacesuits down to 3.0 psia suit pressure! There would be no pre-breathe needed for any spacesuit designs at or above that 3 psia figure!
And that's actually lower than the 3.7 psia used in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo suits very successfully! It also makes MCP suit design and operation a lot easier! Dr. Webb designed his at 3.7 psia, give or take a tad. They pretty much become infeasible above about 4 psia.
And, the oxygen concentration (calculated as kg/cu.m) never exceeds that in 77 F air at 1 atm pressure, so any fires are NOT accelerated above the Earthly rates we have fire-fighting experience with, by the 43% oxygen! They would be accelerated at higher pressures with the higher kg/cu.m of oxygen, but not at 0.43 atm. You have to worry about this! It killed the Apollo-1 crew on the pad, remember?
And yet, my proposed atmosphere's oxygen partial pressure does not fall short of that in Earthly air at about 2500 m altitude, above which there are higher incidences of birthing problems and also higher incidences of chronic altitude sickness, but not below! Any settlements or cities we build out there in space or on Mars could use the same atmosphere, and not fear reproductive failures induced by chronic hypoxia!
GW
The notion for the sketch in post 1920 is a flexible blanket bonded to the fairing, and lapping over freely onto the fin, held in place by the wind pressure despite sliding effects, while being flexible enough to stay on the fin as it moves. The hinge line is at the tip of the fairing.
I could not think of a reusable material that is both flexible and capable of turning away near-stagnation heating, which is visible as the glowing shocked layer under the fin in the entry videos. Key was to lap over far enough onto the fin so as to prevent backflow from getting under the blanket, by the simple expedient of putting its downstream edge sufficiently far downstream that the pressure there is much lower than the pressure at the hinge line itself.
So, I combined a couple of layers of ceramic fire curtain cloth with an ablative polymer, one loaded with the right solids so that there is significant char layer retention against fluid shear force effects. Most ablating polymer do not have that char retention ability, but the one I specified does. That selection is just a start-point for the proper development of this item. It will have to be tested and verified, before you trust it. But the item is small enough, and easy enough to fab and install, that it would be a small part of the refurb cost to fly again. We're talking about less than about 40-50 square feet of stuff, not a whole "Starship" heatshield.
GW
Here's a quote from the article I quoted in post 726: "The escaping air originated in a service module transfer tunnel in Russia's Zvezda module that launched in 2000."
I do not know details, but the words would indicate the transfer tunnel is part of the Zvezda module.
Yes, there is a hatch to the Zvezda module that can be closed. Closing it eliminates access to a docking port that is currently often used. The kick force happens whether that hatch is open or closed, if the module is pressurized.
As I understand it, the Russians have agreed with NASA to close that hatch, but only "at night".
GW
For you skeptics about the leaking cracks in the Zvezda module, I just added a couple of paragraphs to post 726 just above, describing the consequences if that module busts open.
GW
More on the leak in the ISS:
From the Space.com article summarized in AIAA’s “Daily Launch” for 10-17-2024:
ISS leaks among 50 'areas of concern' for astronaut safety: report
News
By Elizabeth Howell
published yesterday
NASA and Russia are working together on addressing the situation in the wake of an Office of the Inspector General report last month.
NASA and its Russian counterpart have identified 50 "areas of concern" related to a long-running leak aboard the space station, a media report states.
The leak has been ongoing since 2019 in the Russian segment of the International Space Station (ISS) and was the focus of a new report from NASA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) published in September. While NASA and Roscosmos are addressing the leak, it remains a top "safety risk" for astronauts on board, the OIG report stated.
NASA officials, speaking in an exclusive with the Washington Post, said they are tracking four cracks and 50 other "areas of concern" on the ISS. The cracks have "all been covered with a combination of sealant and patches" by Roscosmos, NASA noted in a statement to the newspaper, and fixes are ongoing. Still, the leaking area is the top risk, at a 5 on a scale of 5, in NASA's internal risk assessments, the OIG stated.
"We have conveyed the seriousness of the leaks multiple times, including when I was in Russia earlier this year," associate administrator Jim Free added in an interview with the Post. Since the leaks are adjacent to a hatch, Free added that Roscosmos acquiesced to a NASA request to close the hatch as much as possible: “We've come to a compromise that they close it in the evening."
NASA astronauts also remain on the U.S. side of the orbiting complex to be close to their escape vehicles, in case of the need of evacuation, the agency noted in its statement to the news outlet. That said, NASA has stressed repeatedly that the leak poses no immediate threat to astronauts.
"Not an impact right now on the crew safety or vehicle operations, but something for everybody to be aware of," ISS program manager Joel Montalbano said in a news conference in February 2024 when the leak temporarily increased to 2.4 pounds per day, up from a historic low of 0.2 pounds per day.
The leak has been ongoing for five years and patches have been ongoing since it was first uncovered; agency officials noted in a Sept. 27 livestreamed briefing that repair work reduced the high leak observed in April 2024 by roughly a third.
The escaping air originated in a service module transfer tunnel in Russia's Zvezda module that launched in 2000. Zvezda, along with the rest of the ISS, is aging and requires maintenance to keep going in orbit. The ISS is supposed to last until 2030 to serve both NASA's staffing needs, and also to provide commercial low Earth orbit research. In the following decade, NASA hopes to have a set of commercial space stations ready to take over operations.
NASA's OIG is tracking several other risks that could imperil keeping the ISS going that long, ranging from a sudden micrometeoroid strike to supply chain issues.
SpaceX has been tasked to build a large Dragon-type spacecraft to remove the ISS from orbit, in a contract awarded by NASA earlier this year. The OIG stated it will be looking to learn more about the schedule, costs and risks associated with the new vehicle and the deorbiting plan.
My take on it:
The description of treating the 5 cracks says sealant and patches have been applied. That is NOT the way to fix cracks originating from cyclic loading. The critical step of crack stress relief presumably got left out, because there is no mention of it anywhere in the article. That step is to find and to drill-out the tip ends (plural! there are two ends to every crack!) to relieve the stress. Then (and only then) do you apply sealants and/or patches. Otherwise, the crack just keeps growing longer with time, right out from under your sealants and patches.
This "fix" for fatigue cracks has been known in aircraft design since the early 1950's. It was actually applied (and it worked) to the wing spars of the Lockheed Electra-II airliners, long before they ever became the Navy's P-3 fleet. Somebody (a reporter?) ignorant of this "fix" questioned the technician doing it. The technician replied "did you ever see toilet paper tear on the dotted line?" And THAT is the true origin of that old tale!
So, either both NASA and Roscosmos are ignorant of design practices for dealing with fatigue in duralumin alloys that date back almost 7 decades (which I doubt), or Roscosmos just wants to limp along risking a blowout rather than spending what it takes to fix the trouble. Which is either drill out the cracks or replace the module. What's truly disappointing is that NASA is not calling them out over this.
And y'all already bloody well know I am right about this! Any pressure vessel with growing holes in it, will eventually burst suddenly. Y'all know that, too. The risk here is a dead crew from a sudden explosive decompression that sucks all the air out of the station in only several seconds! Close the damned hatch, and keep it closed! Or fix the bloody problem, but do it right!
I hope someone at NASA reads this post!
GW
Update 10-18-2024:
If you don't believe the Zvezda module cracking apart would depressurize the station suddenly, killing the entire crew, then consider this. Think about the "PA kick load" that happens like an impact force when two sections of a pressure vessel part from each other. ISS operates at about 1 std atm internal pressure, which in US units is 2116 lb/sq.ft. I don't know the diameter in Zvezda where the cracks are located, but let's just presume it to be about 6 feet. If circular, the cross sectional area is near 28.3 sq.ft. The PA kick load is pressure x area upon which it acts, or some 59,830 lb = 27.1 metric tons-force. Bigger diameter, bigger force, proportional to diameter squared! Twice the diameter is a 4 times bigger force!
The effect that load has upon adjacent structures is a sudden impact, not a gently-applied steady load, so you must at least double that value for estimating stresses in related structures, to around 120,000 lb or 54.3 metric tons-force! A sudden impact that large will break up much of the station, tearing module from module, and letting all the air out of them, pretty much all at once! No one in the crew will have time to shelter anywhere!
And THAT is why I think the risk of these propagating cracks is so severe! And so urgent to address!
What's in post 420 is a sketch I created that pertains to a manned orbit-to-orbit transport between Earth and Mars, of an approach different from what was in my Mars mission plan from 2016. This one is bigger, and uses rifle-bullet spin for artificial gravity, instead of baton spin, as in the 2016 plan. But this is NOT a "large ship", this is for smaller crewed missions, not passenger service for settling the planet. What's in the two counter-rotating disks are work stations, gymnasiums, eating facilities, and such like, not staterooms. This thing could either fly orbit-to-orbit with a large propulsion stage, to be refilled on orbit at Mars with pre-positioned propellant supplies, or it could serve as a cycler station with a smaller propulsion unit for course corrections. I have NOT sized power supplies or propulsion units for it.
The cargo delivery vehicle NOT shown in post 420 is unmanned, and travels one-way from LEO to a direct entry and landing at Mars. There is a transit vehicle composed of cargo containers and propulsion cores, with heat shielding on the bottoms of the cargo containers. There is a reusable tug departure stage that assists the transit vehicle to depart from an extended elliptic orbit to reduce the transit propulsion requirement. The cargo containers also serve as enormous landing pads in a configuration designed around rough field stability and low bearing pressure for soft field suitability. This thing delivers about 39 metric tons of dead-head cargo inside the containers per flight. The cargo container doors are at ground level after landing, for unload not unlike shipping containers here. The loaded transit vehicle is about 115 tons, and the tug departure stage about 70-75 tons. That design is pretty much roughed-out, and meets all requirements in its final form.
GW
For "Starship" to land on Earth, it either needs landing legs or to be caught by the tower, or else wings to land aerodynamically on a runway. I've seen things indicating SpaceX wants to catch it with the tower.
For "Starship" to land on the moon, it has to have landing legs, and they cannot be the little "peg legs" the early single-stage flight tests used. Landing on the moon is a soft field, rough field problem. The max allowable static bearing pressure is about 0.1 MPa. And the cg height is way too high for anything resembling the "peg legs" to be stable against overturn. There are no towers or hard landing pads on the moon. There won't be for a long time yet.
For "Starship" to land on Mars, it has to have landing legs rather similar to those it has to have on the moon. That atmosphere is way too thin for wings to be of any use at all. There are no towers or hard landing pads on Mars. There won't be for a long time yet.
All that being said, I think there might be a solution to the hinge line burn through problem. That would be a flap of flexible heat shield material (perhaps a ceramic blanket?) extending from inboard across the hinge line to a bit outboard, on the windward side of the fin. The pressure is dropping in that direction, so there cannot be backflow under this flap of material toward the hinge line. But it does need to be impermeable.
Combine that with the right legs, and you have a solution for the moon, Mars, and for off-site abort landings on Earth.
GW
Starship/Superheavy Flight Test 5, 13 October 2024
I found out after the fact that the test took place this morning. I watched the SpaceX videos to find out what happened. While not perfect, the test was a resounding success!
The launch was normal with all 33 Raptors working in the Superheavy booster stage. Hot staging was successful, and they seemed to keep control of the propellant ullage problem by running 3 booster engines all during the staging event and the flip-around. The Starship upper stage pulled away on all 6 of its Raptor engines successfully. Staging took place at approximately 67 km altitude and 5200 km/hr (1.44 km/s) speed (which is actually a bit less speed than I expected to see).
The booster successfully flew back to the South Texas “Starbase” facility, and successfully made the landing burns (initially 13 engines, finally 3 engines) and the tower catch, which was utterly amazing to see! I did see the methane plume from one vent burning with air along one side of the stage near its base. That vented material continued to burn for some time after the landing. (They might consider adding a water spray on the tower to put such fires out.)
The Starship upper stage successfully made the same kind of almost-an-orbit suborbital trajectory, to come down in the ocean on the other side of the world. There is no need for a deorbit burn on this trajectory: entry is automatic. The video was astonishingly good. I saw no visible plasma effects at the nominal entry interface altitude 140 km. Speed was somewhere around 27,000 km/hr (7.5 km/s) at this point, although I did not recover the speed data on the screen.
I saw a visible plasma glow under the tail and portside aft flap, starting at about 102 km altitude and at a speed of about 26,727 km/hr (7.43 km/s). The announcer said the flaps were in control of vehicle attitude at about 85 km altitude and 26,720 km/hr (7.42 km/s). I started to see the speed readout begin dropping at a noticeable rate (indicating significant deceleration beginning) at about 75 km altitude and 26,350 km/hr (7.32 km/s). The vehicle is generating lift at about 60 degrees angle of attack, which shallows the descent angle and makes the entry process longer in time.
When the announcer said peak heating occurred, the ship was at about 70 km altitude, and about 25,500 km/hr (7.08 km/s) speed. This always occurs before the “max dynamic pressure” (or max deceleration gees) point. I never heard the announcer say where max dynamic pressure occurred. But I saw one of the flaps develop a hinge line burn-through! I’m not sure which one, there were 4 views of 4 flaps, the other 3 were unlabeled as to which they were. That was at roughly 45 km altitude and 9500 km/hr (2.64 km/s), probably substantially after the max dynamic pressure point. There is still very significant heating going on, just not the maximum amount.
According to the announcer, the ship was down to about Mach 2, which I read off the screen as about 25 km altitude and 1400 km/hr (0.39 km/s) speed. He indicated the ship was in the subsonic “belly-flop”, for which I read the screen as 3 km altitude and 400 km/hr (0.11 km/s) speed.
The ship fired up its 3 sea level Raptors successfully, and flipped tail first rather quickly, at very low altitude (apparently per plan), and touched down on the ocean in the proper attitude (nose high). It hit the target zone, and a camera on one of the target zone buoys recorded a huge steam cloud obscuring everything, then a fiery explosion. Apparently the ship broke up and exploded when it tipped over onto the water. There was burning cylindrical wreckage visible, sticking up out of the water at about a 45 degree angle. The last recorded speed, which I took to be speed at touchdown, was 8 km/hr (2.2 m/s).
All in all, this was an astonishingly successful test flight. Kudos to SpaceX, they did good, really good! And, they are doing things no one has done before, and accomplishing them faster than anyone has a right to expect. Well done!
The heat shielding at the flap hinge lines obviously still needs some improvement. I do believe it is time to try landing and recovering the Starship on land, and it is time to try doing Raptor restart burns in space. Solve those issues, and they are ready to attempt propellant transfer tests “for real”.
GW
I retrieved the Wikipedia article about Mars cyclers using the posted link. Thanks. I cannot yet say I understand how this works. It does not look like much of a dV savings, except that you don't have to launch the large cycler hab but once. The dV's to get on at Earth, and particularly off at Mars, look to be rather large, but the vehicles for those functions can be much smaller.
GW
Tom:
I think the end result of my thinking about cyclers, limited as it is, is that you are likely better off with a large artificial space habitat placed in the correct cycler orbit. It is unlikely in the extreme that there will be an asteroid in the correct orbit to use. As near as I can tell, there is one and only one possible orbit that could host an Aldrin cycler between Earth and Mars. The odds of any sort of celestial body actually being in that exact orbit are pretty much zero. The cycler will need propulsion for course corrections, because every planetary close pass will disturb the cycler from its proper orbit by the 3-body effect.
Meanwhile, I have also been looking at the process of moving from exploration to colonization of Mars (or anywhere else). As presented in my convention paper at the Phoenix convention, I still maintain there are 3 distinct phases to this, with different mission requirements, different vehicle design constraints, and different levels of appropriate governmental involvement. Those phases are exploration ("find out what all is there, and where exactly it is located"), experimental permanent bases learning how to live off the land, and what everybody thinks of as real colonization: building big settlements. There is some overlap of vehicles between exploration and experimental base, but none with settlement.
To that end, I have re-looked at the exploration vehicles, particularly one-way unmanned cargo delivery, to incorporate the Void idea of using cargo containers as soft, rough field landing pad surfaces, plus elliptic departure tug assist, with a reusable tug stage. It's starting to make real sense now, simpler than what I came up with before, and smaller. I have a transit vehicle of about 115 tons that delivers 39 tons of dead-head cargo by direct entry and rocket braking. This thing needs a reusable departure stage tug around 90-100 tons in size. I did not push the state-of-the-art in either rocket performance or in reducing inert masses. The transfer stage uses NTO-MMH. The reusable tug uses LOX-LH2, and I tried to account for evaporative losses on a 4-day elliptic departure orbit. It took two attempts before I found a feasible solution, and then I had to refine that.
I'm putting all this together as a series of PowerPoint slide sets first. I can write documents from those, once the stories "gel". I am one hell of a long way from done. But this does suggest another book of some sort.
GW
Bob:
If you look up old issues of Aviation Week from the 50's and 60's, whatever the magazine's name was back then, bear in mind that this was a sort of industry trade journal. You sort of have to read between the lines to figure out what was really going on. This sort of "reporting" was as much about chest-puffing and advertising as it was actually reporting facts. It's all mixed together in trade journals like that.
But you can see in the early 1960's illustrations what the Apollo plan was up until about 1965: two Saturn 5 launches per mission to the moon, with one a tanker to refill the other in LEO. The entire Apollo capsule and a huge service module were to be landed direct upon the moon. After about 1965 that shifted to cluster we actually used, which had the separate lander, and one launch per mission. Somewhere about 1964-1965 there was even a notion to send a man one-way to the moon in a Gemini capsule (fortunately that went nowhere).
If you look at issues from the late 1950's, there were occasional illustrations showing the one-way-to-Russia troop transport that was the original paper design for the Saturn-5. There's a lot of aviation and space concept proposals illustrated in that magazine that never came to fruition as proposed. Things almost always turn out quite different than the original proposals.
GW
Calliban:
Actually, I agree with you in many ways. You use what is there. Wherever it is.
I don't know of what usefulness there is to C- and S-type asteroids, since you have to heat the particles past incandescence to extract the steam and the carbon. But the M-types might be very useful for extracting metals. The energy cost of refining products from those raw metallic materials would be comparable to refining on Earth, although conditions in space are tougher. However, the quality of the ore is likely very much higher, with low oxide content. That would be a distinct advantage.
The M-types apparently are more like a monolithic object, and the known ones are usually quite large, so we might need to do our ore extractions with some sort of "death ray" to cut pieces of manageable size loose.
If carbon and water ice are the goal, I would point to the larger moons of Jupiter and Saturn (perhaps excluding the special case of Titan, the others are airless) as worthy goals. The hardest part of doing that is the long travel time to destinations that far away, followed by the difficulty of surviving the radiation environments (applies to machines as well as men), followed by surviving the intense cold (more of a problem in the atmosphere on Titan).
I think there might be lots of water ice on Mars, if you land in the right places. Apparently there are a lot of iron nodules on the surface in many places, which could be easily scooped up, and constitute a fairly high-grade ore to refine. On Mars, it's harder to stay warm than it is in vacuum, but at least the atmosphere is low density (unlike Titan), so the convection coefficients are low.
The biggest problem with metal refining off Earth is coping with low or no gravity, and no atmosphere or atmospheres without oxygen to use. We will have to develop the right processes for this. And develop them to the point of readiness for industrial application. A lab demo ain't it.
GW
Itokawa as a Cycler?
I have not computed the orbital ellipses, and investigated the crossings with Earth’s orbit and Mars’s orbit. But multiple big questions come to mind. The first is: how could Itokawa (or any other object) function as a “cycler”, when the differing orbital periods of 3 (not 2) bodies are involved? (That is actually a fundamental question that I have about all cycler proposals.) Bear in mind that unless the cycler is very close to the departure planet at one end, and the arrival planet at the other, there is little point in trying to effect the transfer via a cycler. Failing that proximity at both ends, you are better off just flying direct to your destination, in terms of both velocity requirements and time spent in space.
With further regard to that first big question, while there will be a repeating point in time (two of them actually) where the asteroid is at minimum distance from Earth, when it crosses Mars’s orbit (and there would be two opportunities for that as well) it would seem unlikely in the extreme (!!!) that Mars would be located anywhere near the correct vicinity for an effective transfer of anything. However, at least the plane of Itokawa’s orbit is close to the ecliptic, so crude coplanar estimates would be reasonably close. The cycler would have to have exactly the right period in order to line up with Earth while Earth is there, and to line up with Mars while Mars is there. The periods pf Earth and Mars are what they are. The period of the cycler is your only variable available by which to address the double-line-up.
I know very little about Aldrin’s cycler concept. But whatever period it has is the period any other cycler absolutely must have. I do not know how to figure that, but maybe Aldrin did. Whatever perihelion and apohelion distances go with that period, that’s the orbit the cycler must be on!
Second big question: while there is measured “water” content, bear in mind that it is coming from a combination of hydrated minerals plus a little bit of surface-implanted solar wind molecules, and it is down around 1% by mass. That’s what the Hayabusa results indicate. That is a sparse resource that (1) requires processing a huge bulk to get a small return, and (2) requires a high energy in the form of concentrated heat for that processing, that is proportional to that large bulk and not so much to the small resource recovered. You must heat (all the bulk) the minerals to un-hydrate them, releasing a small amount of steam. The required temperature is usually close to the incandescence point (near 1200 F = 650 C). Given those facts, why would such a resource be in the least attractive for recovery?
Third big question: this body is rather certainly a loose rubble-pile of small particles (boulders, cobbles, gravel, etc.), with no binding but mutual gravity between them. Because it is so small, that binding gravity is vanishingly-weak! Indeed, the best interpretation of the Hayabusa findings is that Itokawa is a contact binary, accounting for its bent peanut shape. Under those circumstances, I have to wonder exactly how you would implant any sort of habitation upon or within it, and expect it to stay there? Our seemingly-unexpected experience at “Didymoon” (although I expected it) would seem to confirm my interpretation of the disruption risks at Itokawa.
Fourth big question: given its rubble-pile nature, how do you dock with any sort of habitation upon or within Itokawa, when the slightest applied force could well disrupt the asteroid into a free-flying cloud of particles? Or at least detach or excavate the habitat from the rubble pile? The typical language of “space rocks” used up to now about asteroids and comets is actually very self-deceiving: these “rubble-pile” things are completely outside any Earthly experiences we humans have ever had. They are not “rocks” in any prior sense of that word.
(And these same two big questions apply to asteroid mining proposals as well.)
I posed these comments as questions to emphasize the fact that they demand answers before we can effectively plan missions that attempt utilization of these objects. Those are answers that no one anywhere yet has!
Given the unanswered nature of these big fundamental questions, I pose a 5th question: why is it prudent to explore the “cycler orbital” question (my first big question) by doing calculational work, when there would seem to be little advantage to be gained trying to use a rubble pile body as a site for a habitation of some kind (questions 3 and 4)?
Here’s a 6th question that I pose: given the unknown difficulties cited in “big questions” 3 and 4, why bother trying to put your cycler habitat upon or inside one of these celestial bodies (assuming one even exists with the right orbit)? Why not just build the habitat as a free-flying item? And give it course-correction capabilities, because close planetary fly-bys will disturb its orbit.
7th question: for radiation protection, how thick a layer of fiberglass batts and Kevlar cloth do you need, to get to 20 g/sq.cm of low molecular weight materials? A meter? So what?
Recommendation: forget trying to use asteroids as cyclers, just go with a free-flying habitat located in the right orbit for a cycler (whatever Aldrin came up with). Make it cylindrical 56 m diameter, spin it in rifle-bullet-mode at about 4 rpm for about 1 gee at the periphery, and make it long enough to be sure its baton-spin-mode moment of inertia is nowhere near the same as its rifle bullet-spin-mode moment of inertia. (Why? Having them the same invites spin instability.) Then wrap it with that meter-or-so of fiberglass batts and Kevlar cloth, because you need thermal insulation and meteor protection, as well as radiation shielding for solar flares and GCR. Then fit it with some high-Isp propulsion, with adequate propellant quantities to support course corrections.
We don’t need any asteroid properties or experience to do this! But high-Isp propulsion that is also high-thrust, would be a real boon.
GW
Interesting film and photos, including some detailed photos of how the nozzle assembly is made.
You can see the metal closure and contraction assembly to just past the throat, which pins into the aft end of the case. The inside of that has the ablative that actually forms the flow path surface, likely mostly silica phenolic. There would be a graphite throat insert piece, or insert pieces, likely backed to the outside and perhaps downstream with some sort of lower density graphite or maybe a carbon phenolic. All of this is bonded together and to the ablative substrate, in turn bonded to the metal shell. The metal shell is the pressure vessel, not the silica phenolic. You do not use ablative materials as pressure shells. Never!
The majority of the expansion bell shows an "ablative" construction, again likely silica phenolic, with evident glue joint seams. I would hazard the guess that there is a metal shell buried inside this piece into which there is a silica phenolic ablative liner bonded in place, that forms the flow path surface. In this particular big motor design, there are also silica phenolic pieces bonded to the outside, to protect the nozzle structure from the hot spreading liquid engine plumes at very high altitudes. (The edge streamlines bend around the nozzle lip to just a tad more than 90 degrees off-axis, as the air pressure drops to vacuum levels.)
This bell piece's metal core is what rivets into the metal-shelled aft closure-and-throat piece. You could see the rivets holding the two metal shell pieces together in one of the photos in Manley's video. I did not see anything that I recognized as pertaining to thrust-vectoring the nozzle; it appears to be a fixed geometry. That's good, because vectoring nozzles on solids have long been infamous as failure points.
If I had to guess a suspect to investigate, I'd guess the failure point is one of the adhesive bond lines between adjacent silica phenolic pieces, on the inside of the bell. In small motors, these ablative liners are monolithic pieces bonded to the metal shell. In really big motors. they cannot be monolithic, as no one make silica phenolic stock of that large a size. It is cured in a giant heated press. The adhesive bonds are less structurally strong than the silica phenolic material itself, inherently. All adhesives are stronger in shear than they are in tension. (Compression is strongest.)
That suspect fits the behaviors Manley described: a nozzle anomaly in a ground test, and now this same kind of nozzle anomaly in flight. But only a couple of failures out of many firings. If one of those longitudinal glue seams splits open, it lets the supersonic hot gas inside the split to contact the metal shell, burning a hole through it (and any ablative on the outside, which just takes a bit longer). Once the metal shell substructure has been weakened enough as the burn-through hole enlarges, the exit bell suddenly bursts due to the pressure inside of it, which while a small fraction of chamber pressure, is still much higher than the near vacuum outside.
The silica phenolic is a stiff material, but not infinitely so, it has a Young's modulus less than steel or aluminum, and it has some elongation-to-failure capability. The typical epoxies used to bond the ablative to the metal (and to adjacent ablative pieces) have very little elongation capability, rendering them quite brittle! If the metal bell shell is not quite stiff enough, it will swell under pressure by some amount, and the silica bonded to it will follow it, but circumferentially there might be too-high a tensile stress across the longitudinal bond seams between adjacent ablative pieces. That fractures the bond and allows it to part open slightly, letting the hot gas in.
Small motors with monolithic ablative liner pieces simply do not see this failure mode. It is peculiar to large motor nozzles, too big for the ablative liners to be monolithic parts. It'll be statistical: some will fail and others won't, with some erratically occurring occasional (statistical) failure rate. The "fix" is a stiffer metal shell that swells less under pressure and thus avoids tensile stress across longitudinal bond seams. That is either a thicker part, or a material with higher Young's modulus. Both offer a stiffer assembly at the cost of a heavier assembly. But if the occasional failure is unacceptable, that's just the price you have to pay!
Having built those solids for 2 decades, I did end up knowing a lot of real-world stuff about their designs. The 3-D computer models sometimes lie to you (GIGO), usually because the model in the code doesn't truly match what you are doing in the real world. Seeing that design analysis error takes experience and judgement not yet possessed by newbies out of school, trained to run those codes. If there is corporate ageism (and there nearly always is), there are few-to-none old hands there to pass on the experience. This is part of the art that was never written down, because nobody wanted to pay for writing it down.
This problem can be fixed and prevented, plain and simple. But it cannot be done easily and quickly and cheaply! It is a redesigned nozzle assembly that must be validated in multiple tests. A small redesign, but it still has to be properly tested! And THAT is the expensive, but utterly essential, part! Plus, they already have built a lot of motors with the vulnerable nozzle assemblies. Those will need replacement nozzle assemblies. Recalls are expensive, in any industry.
GW
TH:
I honestly do not know. But I would assume that Blue Origin looked into that, while designing Vulcan.
Unlike some on these forums, I have no prejudice against solids. Those are just another tool to use, offering some very specific advantages, particularly during pre-launch checkout. But you do have to design them correctly, and you do have to verify your design is "right" with enough of the right kinds of testing to meet statistical standards.
Bear in mind that back in 1974 I worked on the Vought "Scout", which was a 4-stage solid satellite launcher. It flew 4 times experimentally, failing once, then operationally for over 30 years, without another single failure of the solids.
Just goes to show what can be done.
GW
Void:
The conventional wisdom is that most comets come from the Oort cloud and the Kuiper Belt, both well outside the orbit of Neptune. But, who really knows?
There are some asteroids in the Main Belt that occasionally show comet tails. However, these are invariably among the larger asteroids. None of the little ones do that.
GW
TH:
Think of it as a sine wave superposed on a DC level. The sine wave is the day/night cycle of thermal expansion and contraction, from the solar illumination or darkness every 90 minutes or thereabouts. The DC level is the pressure inside the shell, which is just pretty near 1 std atm. The DC level makes the basic stress level higher, while the sine wave is the cyclic part. It's too late to reduce stress below that for infinite fatigue life: the damage is done, the crack is there (and leaking).
These considerations do not depend on whether that is a weld or some shell panel. Only the specific numbers for cycles-to-failure. Most of what I read at least implies this is some cracked weld somewhere. Those fail quicker than the base aluminum, usually. But they haven't found it in 5 years of looking, so nobody really knows what is the true problem.
Metallurgically speaking, a sudden increase in crack growth rate occurs right before the fatigue sample actually fails, in the usual cyclic loading test scenarios. This is a piece of the module pressure shell, or there would not be a 5-year leak history. With the leak rate accelerating by over a factor of 10 very recently, we "know" that failure is "imminent". Failure means explosive decompression, likely fatal for the crew, unless that door into the leaking module is closed and sealed.
It really is that simple. And that dangerous in space. The biggest problem is that with no details, there is no definition of "imminent". Except my gut intuition says it ain't years anymore. Months? Weeks? Days? Who knows?
GW
From AIAA’s “Daily Launch” email newsletter for October 4, 2024
SPACE
Top 'safety risk' for the ISS is a leak that has been ongoing for 5 years, NASA audit finds
The ISS has been dealing with a leak in its Russian segment since 2019. As NASA and Roscosmos work to solve it, a new report says the leak is a primary...
My take on it:
If you follow the link to the Ars Technica article, you find out that the 5 year history is all low leakage rate until very recently. The leakage rate increased recently to something over 10 times higher. That smells (to high heaven!) of a crack either getting much longer or another crack forming in addition to the first. This is apparently some sort of fatigue crack failure, either in a component or in a weld somewhere. And they still do not know where it is, which means they cannot even in principle fix it.
I read a lot of discussions about the budgetary, international competitiveness, and reputational issues raised by this problem, but I read very little about crew safety, and that alarms me greatly! This is exactly the same kind of management thinking that preceded both of the fatal shuttle losses. It is happening again!
You are looking at a fatigue crack somewhere in a pressure shell that sees a pressure drop rather near 14-something psi inside-to-outside, under cyclic thermal expansion-induced loads every 90 minutes, with that crack ALREADY starting to grow more rapidly than before! Sudden increase in crack growth means failure is “imminent”, whatever time interval that might really be.
The consequences of the cracked part (whatever it is) actually failing are quite horrific: a sudden explosive decompression, likely of the whole ISS, unless the door to that module is closed and sealed. That whole-ISS decompression would inherently cause the loss of the entire ISS crew, if it were to occur.
Compare that to the fatigue failures that downed multiple Comet jet liners in the mid 1950’s, with loss of all aboard every time, in a complete midair breakup of the aircraft. That also turned out to be fatigue cracking, on a pressure shell seeing only about 7.3 psi pressure difference inside-to-outside. Fatigue was not well-understood then; but that “excuse” certainly does not obtain now!
My recommendation: close that damned door to the leaking module! Only open it when you must use that docking port, and when you do, close another door somewhere else, to limit how much of the station depressurizes, if the module does fail!
And when it does fail (and eventually it will!), that will be a very sudden event, and there will be no warning! Same as the Comet jetliners 7 decades ago.
GW
From AIAA’s “Daily Launch” email newsletter for October 4, 2024
Space
ULA’s new Vulcan Centaur rocket aces 2nd test launch
United Launch Alliance's (ULA) powerful new Vulcan Centaur rocket is two for two. Vulcan Centaur, the successor to ULA's workhorse Atlas V, launched today (Oct. 4) at 7:25 a.m. EDT (1125 GMT) after a series of holds, from Florida's Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, kicking off a key test flight called Cert-2. The rocket could soon be certified for U.S. national security missions.
My take on it:
If you follow the link to the article from Space, there is mention and a video showing a serious anomaly with one of the two solid boosters. The article says there was some sort of problem with the rocket nozzle, seen as an event creating a shower of glowing pieces. As near as I can tell, the exit expansion bell shattered (meaning it suddenly burst from its internal pressure and heating loads) downstream of the throat somewhere.
Because this failure took place downstream of the throat, it reduced the thrust from its nominal value to something nearer that of a sonic-only nozzle, without very much of a “P-A-kick load”. The sudden loss of thrust on that side was not enough to upset the vehicle’s attitude control, nor was it enough to prevent the vehicle from flying its intended trajectory anyway.
Had this bursting taken place ahead of the throat, the sudden change in thrust would have been much larger (loss of essentially all of the thrust), aggravated even further by a “P-A-kick” load of very significant size. That would likely have thrown the vehicle out of control. Even if it stayed in control, the vehicle would likely have been unable to fly its mission on thrust from only one of the boosters.
Somebody at Northrup-Grumman’s big solid motor operation (the monopoly that supplied these boosters) screwed up this nozzle design. That much is for sure! It is unclear whether that problem is a fundamental design error, or an undetected material quality defect. Neither is acceptable.
If I were making decisions for the Air Force, I would NOT certify this vehicle for launching spy satellites until I knew what actually caused the solid booster nozzle anomaly, and what must be done to see that it does not recur! Those payloads are expensive, and time-critical.
I would insist that the fix be demonstrated in flight, before even beginning to contemplate man-rating this vehicle! Why? Because I do not trust monopolies to behave ethically and responsibly. They never did before, in history. And big solid motors are now a monopoly in this country.
GW
The lesson here is stark: if you are going to use metal wheels, they need to be made of a steel with very high ductility while very cold. That's a 300-series stainless, likely 304 or 304L. Aluminum, which they used on Curiosity, simply does not qualify metallurgically.
GW
This is only my opinion, but I think the distinction between "asteroid" and "comet" in our language was likely a mistake. These bodies are all rather similar, with wildly varying amounts of volatile ices. Some formed with lots of volatiles, others did not (likely forming closer to the sun). Over 4.5 billion years, the ones closer-in have lost their volatiles from sublimation: a bit higher temperature due to sunlight illumination. Way further out, they stay cold enough to retain significant volatiles.
Recovering a resource is only worthwhile if you can afford the costs of extracting it, and then the costs of refining it into something you can really use. There are always refining costs, particularly to create actually-useful metal alloys. But don't forget the up-front extraction costs: this is exactly why fossil fuels were preferred for centuries over anything synthesized. It's just easier to dig something up than it is to heat something up to high temperatures, and try to handle that hot stuff, to obtain what you desire.
Just because you can do something is no reason to believe that you should do that something. The world around us is not simple.
GW
The "water" in a C-type asteroid that close to the sun will NOT be ice, but hydrated minerals. The thing will be a dry rubble pile which will not hold any stake you try to drive into it. You can recover water from the hydrated minerals ONLY if you apply a lot of heat energy to it. There is NO easily recoverable resource there!
The C-types that still have real water (and other volatile) ices in them, binding their particle together, are well beyond Jupiter. The sun drove the ices out by sublimation long ago in the smaller ones. Only the very large ones have any ices left. The further out you go, the more prevalent is remnant ice, even in the smaller ones.
Actual volatile ice is the easily-recovered resource, not hydrated minerals.
GW
I cannot answer most of your questions because those answers are not in any of the reports I have seen.
All of the ISS is pressurized to about 1 atm of synthetic air (21% O2, 79% N2). That would include the leaking tunnel module, except when that hatch is closed. Then only that module (and presumably the docking adapter it connects to) leaks down, without leaking down the pressure in the rest of the ISS. Nobody says, but I presume they have to equalize by bleeding air (somehow) into the leaky module before they can re-open the hatch and use the docking adapter.
I have seen absolutely nothing describing how they have been searching for the leak.
Any impactor to an asteroid is a "push", meaning compression in the material underneath the impact point. The gravity tractor is actually a "pull", because the force on the asteroid is directed toward the spacecraft, and the force on the spacecraft directed toward the asteroid. The spacecraft thrusts to keep from being pulled onto the asteroid. That thrust has to be canted at rather strong angles, so that the expelled mass streams DO NOT strike the asteroid, but instead just pass it by. Ion, other, makes NO difference.
Most people think you use a nuclear device as a direct surface impact, or even exploded within the asteroid, but that IS NOT correct! There is no blast wave in a vacuum. You explode the thing alongside very close by, and use the radiant energy to overheat and vaporize the adjacent asteroid surface materials. Those vaporized materials "explode" into space quite violently, causing a big "rocket reaction" force in the opposite direction. The spalled material from an impactor works exactly the same way. Neither approach can be used on a dry C-type (excepting the very smallest, rather inconsequential impactors), because the asteroid will disrupt into a cloud of debris instead of accelerating in the "push" direction.
And yes, the larger the mass of the gravity tractor craft, the more effective it will be. And the larger your thrust requirement, the more expensive your construction, and the more demanding your launch problem. It's a very complex trade-off. Nobody yet knows the right answers, because it has yet to be attempted in any form.
GW