New Mars Forums

Hello.

I'm new here.  Although I'm not connected to the professional areas of science, space exploration, or politics, I do have a few comments along those lines with respect to SEI 2.0 and the Society's reaction to it.  I'll not attempt to articulate a complete stance, or even necessarily to articulate any position at all.  Primarily, I seek throw out a few things to consider.

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Text from Clipboard Row 0 in Step: 32 Hello.

I'm new here.  Although I'm not connected to the professional areas of science, space exploration, or politics, I do have a few comments along those lines with respect to SEI 2.0 and the Society's reaction to it.  I'll not attempt to articulate a complete stance, or even necessarily to articulate any position at all.  Primarily, I seek throw out a few things to consider.

    As space policy buffs and, in some cases, vigorous space activists, we find it all too easy to forget that space exploration takes part in the same world as do all the other things we read about in the newspaper and see on TV.  To be effective advocates, we need to understand the overriding politico-economic forces that the shape the priorities of the government and of the nation.  We need to understand that –pardon the expression- space policy does not exist in a vacuum.  Any new executive branch policy, space or not, does not become viable until it gains the support of the legislative branch, namely Congress.  Although there are politicians out there who operate from a foundation of strong morals and strive to be intelligent leaders, the reality is that one becomes a political force by playing the political games.  A politician who takes on the world usually finds his ass handed to him: the politician must pick his points, and is wise to pick points that matter to his constituency. 

    Because a politician is, in a very real way, beholden to his constituency, large changes in large government programs (in huge contrast to small government programs) are rarely sustainable without broad public support, because those lacking popular support make excellent targets for other politicians seeking to make their reputation as fiscally responsible, asking-the-hard-questions types of people.  A bad program, or a program the public believes is bad, is a perfect stage for political grandstanding and gamesmanship. 

    Today, it is very clear that the public believes the economy is, as one of my friends would say, “in the toilet.”  Although this betrays a profound (if unsurprising) ignorance of economic theory, it is incontestably the view of the general voting public.  So, from a purely political perspective, major new funding would never have passed through Congress- as evinced by the bad public reception to the initiative (~60% against, if I recall).  It is hard to overstate the damage this would have done.  Anyone questioning that should take a look at the incessant rambling about how much the original SEI was projected to cost—another setback like that one would allow a third attempt to be met by an extremely negative press reaction, along these lines: plans for Mars have rejected several times on the basis of astronomical (they’d be pleased with their pun) costs.  The general press will continue with its mantra: Don’t let the facts get in the way of the truth. 

    A rejected initiative can only produce negative results. 

We must also remember the public perception of NASA.  With the Columbia disaster and then the CAIB report, the public is becoming increasingly aware of the serious institutional problems they’ve developed.  They are quick to pick up on arguments that NASA is doing very little, that its programs are wasteful.  But the public will not be inclined to take a closer look.  In short the public typically does not distinguish between specific and general criticisms of NASA or its programs.  It does not recognize the difference between criticizing a particular program and criticizing the organization’s raison d’etre; in short, it conflates accusations of negligence and fiscal irresponsibility with condemnations of the very existence of NASA and the wisdom of a space program in general. 

    The recent loss of the Columbia presented the public and Congress with an extremely visible and extremely personal message: NASA is not well, and something must be done.  If we want to nurse it back to health –rather than put it to sleep-, it will (unfortunately) be necessary to illustrate, time and again, that NASA is “back on track” and performing in a fiscally responsible and, above all, safe manner.  Think of NASA like an aging track team runner- still fundamentally able to run the marathon, but needing to loose the beer gut and start running again- a little bit at a time. 

    Much though the Rovers have done to provide NASA with a desperately needed high-viz success story, they have not come close to making the public forget about the Columbia- nor could they have.  NASA needs a series of highly visible successes before it can even begin to rebuild the credibility to manage an expedition to Mars.  There is simply no way around it: NASA needs to complete rehab before it can become even remotely possible to consider the Mars.  The regrettable but inevitable reality is that no space program can proceed on engineering merit and cost effectiveness alone: it must be politically survivable. 

    Rehabilitating NASA’s image, which will be critical to funding new and ambitious missions in the future, requires the development of a long range plan, with several obvious milestones to achieve, just like those nicotine patches you see on TV.  First, everyone must be assured that there is a purposive rehab program that will not only restore NASA to its old effectiveness, innovation, and safety levels, but also prepare it for the future. 

    The steps outlined in the Bush speech provide these quite well.  Here’s an overview of how they do it:

    The Shuttle return to flight illustrates our continuing dedication to the space program in general and to the ISS in particular.

    Having an established “expiration date” for the Shuttle (at least as we know it) suggests that while we remain strongly committed, we are going to be improving our activities.  The announcement illustrates that while we acknowledge and support the need to “keep on keepin’ on,” we are pursuing a more complete divorce from the checkered history of the Shuttle.  It also serves to more closely integrate the overall proposal with the idea that NASA has been a wayward for quite some time, which partially allows the proposal to draw on commentary and opinion that otherwise might have been oppositional. 

    The continuing commitment to the ISS justifies and requires the continuation of the Shuttle (~28 more flights required to complete the ISS).  This helps us politically, and builds confidence for potential international cooperation in the future.  Additionally, it allows us to conduct several years of intensive space medicine and biochemical investigations that will be required to get us to Mars (that the “insufficient medical knowledge” argument is largely fallacy is irrelevant; politicians won’t approve missions without a high probability of success and low potential for disaster…even if something is a 1:1000 chance and therefore a negligible portion of mission risk, no one is going to sign on until their ass is covered by excessive medical data, reports, and recommendations). 

    The CEV continues the theme of commitment to new and better ways to do things at NASA, and enables the next steps.  In great contrast to the Shuttle, the CEV is not being heralded as a technology development program: it is being built to achieve a real goal.  Even more important, it is (so far) being justified on realistic grounds.  The Shuttle was sold as a 100 launch/year vehicle, in part because it was (briefly) planned to handle the entire DOD launch manifest! 

    Returning to the Moon allows NASA to demonstrate to all that it is back where it was in 1973, that it has overcome the inertia and retuned to the heavens beyond.  It can easily be sold to the unknowing public as an intermediate step between the Earth and Mars, even though (for several reasons) this doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.  Furthermore, the Moon is extremely salable because China has been talking about send stuff there (first, it was to be manned, then unmanned, then just a satellite, now apparently even less certain), and several other countries are at work there.  Also, while there is far, far less payoff for a Moon mission, there is also a good deal less risk, which is something that will be necessary: another Columbia-type disaster within the next decade could be a serious threat to NASA’s manned space program for decades (depending upon what other countries are doing). 

    Finally, adding on that the Moon is a step towards Mars appeals to zealots like us.  It precludes any allegations that the whole program merely takes us back to where we were in 1973- when we quit exploring because of cost.  The announcement also leverages the high interest that the MERs have generated, and extends any comparisons with Kennedy’s Moon speech, forcing commentators to acknowledge that we are building towards a goal beyond the Moon.  By the time we’ve done the Moon missions, we’ll have been robotically exploring Mars on a sustained basis for at least 25 years (assuming we return in 2015 and complete large, government funded missions there by 2020), and quite likely 30 or 35 years.  Once the Moon has been completed, the only reasonable argument* against Mars missions will be cost, which is far fewer objections than are faced today. 
   
    The first milestones in the initiative will (hopefully) come this year, with the Shuttle RTF around September or so.  After that, it should operate on a fairly consistent basis for another five years, providing the image of a slow, deliberate, pragmatic and cautious approach to the program.  Contrary to intuition, a slower program will look better to the public –after all, we are selling this.   By the end of the next term (probably Bush’s second) the CEV is to have made its first flight, validating the technology and setting up the next administration.  Assuming the 2008 CEV demonstration is successful, the next administration won’t have too much of a choice: unless it’s willing to end manned space completely (politically infeasible, not in the least because of job loss), it will need to fund something to replace the Shuttle.  Even if the next five years of use don’t wear down the fleet enough to make SLEP programs impossible, the political fallout of canceling the CEV and just upgrading the Shuttle would be quite costly; politically more costly than simply supporting the CEV.  So, unless the 2009 administration is willing to see virtually all of it’s time in office without men in space, or at least none launched by US vehicles, it will have to support the CEV.  Even repairs of the shuttle started in 2009 (it would be a remarkable achievement for a new administration to cancel CEV, fight through the turf battles, decide to upgrade the Shuttle, fight through those battles, win, and get actual factory time in within a year of coming into office, even if space was a high administration priority), there would probably be a gap of two or so years with either nonexistent or hobbled manned launch capabilities.  There just isn’t a payoff there. 

    Furthermore, the satellite will also have been launched in 2008, and the lander is planned for 2009, so the Moon will remain in the public eye as a target for the space program well into the next administration, if even several 75, 80, or 90% complete missions were cancelled on the first day of the new administrations term.  And since we’ll be developing a vehicle capable of going to the Moon, there will remain a large group of people who want to do it.  In the meantime, groups like ourselves will be growing.  There will be no escape.  We will get to Mars.  To do it, we must think in terms beyond technical, financial, and even advocacy considerations.  We must think in terms of national policy, much though many of us would like to relegate political opportunism, party politics, and logrolling to the history books.  This speech represents a solid first step on the road to recovery, a road that leads eventually to Mars. 

*Assuming our robotic explorers don’t find signs of life before we arrive.

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